

LESSONS IN THE  
STUDY OF HABITS,  
BY WALTER L. SHELDON



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# Ethics For the Young

SECOND SERIES

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## LESSONS IN THE STUDY OF HABITS

FOR USE IN SCHOOL AND HOME.



BY WALTER L. SHELDON

W. M. WELCH COMPANY

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## PREFACE.

There is a growing conviction among thoughtful people that ethics should constitute an integral part of the education of the young. A demand for text books on this subject is sure to arise, both for the use of the school and the home. With this thought in view, the author has been at work for several years on a graded scheme of ethical instruction for young people, covering the period from early childhood to adult life. Much of this material is now in manuscript form, and he is venturing in this volume to present one of the series of Lessons more especially adapted for the age from nine to twelve years. The thread of subject has to do with Habits of Life. The next series would deal with "Duties in the Home and the Family," to be followed by a treatise on "Citizenship and the Duties of a Citizen." Then would come a further text book on the most practical subject of "Justice." These would constitute a grammar school course. The later volumes to appear would take up in separate treatises the subjects of "Duties Pertaining to One's Self," and "Man in Society." The greater part of all this material has already been tried in a special school in charge of the author and proved to be successful. After testing the work in this way, he has been putting it through a thorough revision, incorporating by this means the experience which has been gained in the class work where the Lessons have been used. The most serious problem in connection with the whole subject has been to arrange the line of work so that it should in no way interfere with the special religious standpoint of the schools or families where the Lessons are introduced. The author has sought with painstaking care to be neutral in this direction, developing the points in

such a way that the teacher or parent might *add on* at any place the religious attitude desired, without making any confusion in the text. He believes, therefore, that such treatises could be employed in the home or the school room—in the grammar schools on the one hand, where any definite form of religious instruction would perhaps be excluded; and on the other hand, equally well in denominational Sunday-schools where doctrinal standpoints could be merged into the text at the judgment or discretion of the teacher. The main effort has been to sift out the great essentials of ethical conduct established by the long experience of ages of human history, and to impart them in conversational form to the young and growing mind before it has come into active contact with the world at large. It will be seen that each lesson as it is worked out usually contains a variety of material to be introduced by the teacher or parent according to circumstances. The body of each lesson will be found to consist of an imaginary Dialogue carried on between the child and the adult, and is intended either as a skeleton of method for the teacher, or as paragraphs to be read and studied by the pupil if preferred. At the outset there is a series of "Special Suggestions" to the parent or teacher which of course should be read with a great deal of care. In this special volume the material is of a miscellaneous character, with each Lesson standing by itself. But in the ensuing series, which may appear later on, the method becomes much more systematic, after the young people have become infused with the spirit which pervades this whole course of instruction. It is to be assumed that in such an important field where as yet so little has really been done, no two persons would quite agree on points of detail. Before many years have passed, a whole literature pertaining to this subject will have developed. The most that the author can hope, therefore, is to have helped in paving the way for better work to be done by others in coming years.

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## CONTENTS.

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	PAGE.
Special Suggestions to Parents or Teachers....	7
Meaning of Habit .....	18
A Further Consideration of Habit.....	26
Perseverance .....	34
Being Conceited .....	41
Order .....	47
Consideration for Others .....	54
Being Lazy .....	62
Deception .....	70
Being Saving .....	77
Being Soldierly .....	86
Citizen Soldiers; Chivalry.....	94
Ambition .....	101
Procrastination .....	109
Habits of Play.....	115
Self-Denial .....	125
Being Brave .....	131
Habit of Teasing.....	140
Humility .....	146
Pride .....	154
Frugality .....	162
Habits of Study.....	170
Exaggeration .....	178
Profanity .....	186
The Habit of Borrowing.....	194
Habits of Service .....	201
Generosity and Stinginess .....	214
Cheating .....	222
Prejudices .....	230
Respect for the Property of Others .....	239
Conscientiousness .....	251
The Habit of Speaking the Truth .....	260





## SPECIAL SUGGESTIONS TO PARENTS OR TEACHERS IN USING THESE LESSONS ON "THE HABITS."

*It is to be remembered that these lessons contain merely suggestive hints or outlines. Each chapter is a skeleton which is to be used or adapted according to circumstances. The teacher must put on the flesh and blood by his personality, by the way he puts the questions, the interest he personally shows, and the insight he displays into the minds of his pupils. If the method is a new one to the person using it, naturally it will work a little awkwardly at first. One cannot teach ethics as one would teach arithmetic.*

*The material introduced is of a varied character, with the expectation that the teacher will select from it at his judgment and discretion. The scheme is intended for use in the Grammar School, the Home or the Sunday-school, and hence must be modified accordingly. It would be a mistake to employ quite the same method under such diverse conditions. In this department of instruction, we must try many experiments and adjust our system to the grade or character of the pupils, the home or the school where we are teaching. The material can be the same, but not the form of its application. Lessons in ethics cannot be worked out along the same fixed lines that would be suitable in other departments of study.*

*These outlines could be used in one of two ways.*

*On the one hand, the teacher could read over the notice carefully and thoughtfully, choosing what points he thinks most appropriate under the circumstances; then laying the book aside and proceeding according to his own experience. In this form it would be a simple conversation carried on between teacher and pupil and not at all like a recitation.*

*Or, on the other hand, if the parent or teacher prefers, the "Dialogue" which makes up the body of each chapter could be placed in the hands of the pupil to be read or studied as a lesson. In this case the child would be expected to know in advance the points of discussion, and the class work would be more in the nature of a recitation, with additional features brought out by the adult. If this method is followed, the pupil might be encouraged to add further points of his own. It would depend a good deal upon the type of young people one is dealing with, as to which course should be pursued.*

*It will be noticed that these lessons on "The Habits" are without any special order or connection one with another. We are making the great introduction into the problems of ethics for the child-mind by these talks, and in this apparently haphazard way, we are undertaking to teach them just as life teaches them—by experience. It will not be necessary, therefore, to adhere to any special order in the arrangement of the chapters. The main point here must be to have variety.. If we have been talking for two or three sessions about bad habits, then we may change over to a study of one of the good habits.*

*There are several classes of material at command. The teacher will soon recognize the method and adapt himself to it by adapting it to himself. Most important of all, of course, will be the "Dialogue," which forms the central portion of each chapter. It will be seen that this is carried on in the form of an imaginary*

*conversation between the teacher and the pupil. We do not assume, for an instant, that the answers to the questions will come out quite as they are given here. It is rather a method, which is presented for the use of the teacher. It should be examined in each case, and then put aside. The author is simply endeavoring by such means to foster a system of instruction, by which the adult shall seem always to be drawing on the experience of the pupils themselves. This, of course, is possible only to a limited degree; but the method can be steadily pursued all the same.*

*The author, therefore, has deemed it advisable to preserve this form of an imaginary dialogue throughout the entire course of lessons. It may prove somewhat monotonous to the parent or teacher. Those who have had a thorough normal school training will, perhaps, feel that the chapters might often be condensed into a few lines in the form of suggestive hints. But in such a new department of instruction, it would seem better to err on the safe side. There are others who would prefer to have the lessons worked out in this form, at least until they have mastered the system. It is lesson-material we are here presenting, and not a scheme of ethics. We are not merely describing a method, but endeavoring to bring together such a variety of material, that parents or teachers, whether or not they have had special training, may be able to employ it in the home or the school.*

*The teacher is not, for an instant, to be tied down to the order in which the points are introduced. No two persons would carry on such a dialogue in the same form. He may begin with the final thought, if he chooses, and work backward. The one essential is, however, that he should have a thorough perspective of the whole lesson, and know just what chief thought he wishes to bring out, so that as far as possible, this shall form the core of his discussion for the*

day. It should always be in his mind, although the pupils may not be aware of it.

At the end of the "Dialogue" will usually be found a list of "The Points of the Lesson." These are intended rather as helps to the teacher, although they might at discretion be used at times for a summary to the pupils at the close of the discussion. They do not, by any means, cover all the thoughts worked out in "The Dialogue." They serve rather as a suggestion for persons of less experience in educational work, giving in this way some hints as to the thoughts which are to be emphasized. A good teacher will, naturally, work out his own scheme, and make such a list for himself, with the additional points which will surely occur to him after reading over the "Dialogue."

It will be seen at once that the discussions may cover only a very small portion of what might be brought out concerning each one of these habits. Each chapter could easily be elaborated into a volume. At times the "Dialogue" is only a feeble introduction to a field which could be extended indefinitely by the teacher. He may, therefore, prefer to continue for several sessions dealing with some one of these habits; or, on the other hand, the points of view which occur to him may seem of much more significance than those which are worked out here in the "Dialogue." If, however, the sessions of the class are held only once a week, it were better to have a new form of the subject for the pupils each time, even if the topic continues practically the same in the mind of the teacher. We must be on the lookout all the while not to tire the young people by holding on too long to one theme.

At the beginning of each chapter will be found a collection of "Proverbs or Verses." These are massed together at this point merely for the sake of convenience. They form one other class of material to be used in a great variety of ways, at the discretion of



*the teacher. In the "Dialogue" we have occasionally introduced one of these, merely as illustrating one method by which they can be made available. At one time the teacher might begin by reading aloud the whole collection at once to the pupils, then asking the young people to guess from this what is going to be the subject for discussion. Another method would be to have these selections written out on slips of paper and distributed in the class, letting each member read one of them aloud and asking him to explain it. Or, again, this special material could be reserved until the end of the discussion, and then read over aloud as a climax, without comment, to close the session with. More usually, however, they will serve the purpose of bringing out special points in the lesson, where the teacher can take one of them and apply it in the form of a discussion. It will be readily seen how the leader of the class can help himself out continually in this way, whenever he finds difficulty over the abstractions of the "Dialogue." A whole session could be given over, for instance, merely to talking about the Proverbs and what they mean. The list can easily be enlarged. Some of them might well be committed to memory.*

*There is usually attached to each chapter a short poem, which is intended to add a little sentiment to the lesson. This, too, could be introduced by the teacher in a variety of ways, as with the collection of "Proverbs." It might form the subject for discussion in the course of the "Dialogue," or be read aloud by one of the members of the class at the beginning or the end of the session. On the whole it would be better, however, if this poem were used mainly for recitation purposes, within the class or before the entire school; but it should be recited by individuals singly, and never in concert. Even if the literary merit of these selections is not always of the highest, it may be still worth while to fix certain points in the memory by means of such rhymes.*

*In connection with certain of the discussions will also be found a list of "Duties." Where these are introduced, they should be treated as of the greatest importance. It is intended that they should be written out or printed on slips of paper and committed to memory by each of the pupils. This should be treated as the most serious part of the lesson. A certain element of solemnity should be attached to the word "Duty." It should be used only on special occasions, and then with reverence.*

*It is vitally essential, especially in connection with the discussions on "The Habits," that the teacher should make an extensive collection of short stories or anecdotes. We have introduced material of this kind only to a limited extent, partly for the reason that it would require too much space, and also because of the fact that personal preferences may vary in this direction. But without this it would rarely be possible to carry on such a discussion with success. The mind of the young child is, of course, concrete. We must accept this fact, and deal accordingly. At times the lesson could be opened by means of a story or anecdote; or, on the other hand, a special point may be clinched by this means. Where these lessons are used, there should be a gradual accumulation of such material from which the teacher may select, so that he can have variety.*

*But from another side, the teacher is especially warned to exercise caution in the way this illustrative material is used. It may, on the one hand, help the discussion to success, or on the other hand, it may practically overthrow the entire effect desired. If one is not on the lookout, the whole session may be consumed in telling stories or anecdotes. The temptation in this direction will be great, because it will be found much easier by this means to hold the interest of the members of the class. It is the point of the story and not the story itself we are to consider, in a scheme of*

*ethical instruction. We are to remember that our readings, our facts, our anecdotes or stories are mainly brought in for the purpose of working a certain impression on the mind or heart. After this purpose has been accomplished, the illustrative material can be lost sight of.*

*At the close of each chapter will usually be found a paragraph with "Further Suggestions to the Teacher." These are simply additional hints showing at times how the discussion might be carried on further, or mentioning points that have not been already introduced. By this means also, the author has occasionally specified anecdotes or biographies which would be of service in connection with the subject of the chapter. Hence these closing suggestions may be of considerable importance, and should be read with some care. At the same time, it is to be assumed that every good teacher will be expanding these "further suggestions" and working out a whole new chapter for himself in addition to the one presented in these outlines.*

*It is to be understood that in using these lessons a great deal depends on the age of the pupils. They might be of service for young people all the way from nine to sixteen years. But in each case, it will be necessary to adapt them by expanding or omitting, rewording or illustrating, according to the experience or home surroundings of the pupils. So far as these notes are concerned, the author has had in view young people of about ten years of age. The same point also applies with regard to the personal characteristics, circumstances or temperament of the young people constituting the members of a class. We should pursue one method for pupils who are thoughtful and serious, and a radically contrary method according as they may have had little home training and are accustomed chiefly to the life of the streets.*

*If we are working with a class of young people who*

have had little home education, then we should adjust our discussions so as to make only a few points, and to bear down on these with heavy underscoring. Fine shadings or careful distinctions in ethics are only serviceable where we are dealing with thoughtful young people. If these are introduced to the other type, they may work the very opposite effect from what we intend or desire. It is useless and perhaps worse, to undertake to make points which the young people, owing to the circumstances of their life, will never apply and perhaps cannot even appreciate. For a certain class of pupils, therefore, we should aim to bring out the teachings in very bold outlines, and with very decisive applications. On the whole, the notes in the lessons here have been worked out more especially for a thoughtful, serious class of young people; but they can readily be varied and adapted to any conditions if the teacher will use proper discretion.

It is to be borne in mind that a great deal must depend at the start in having the class members interested in the discussions. For this reason, the success of the teacher will often be determined according to the way he opens the lesson, or to the points he undertakes to develop first. It is very much like playing at a game. Where one has the first move, the whole result may depend on the opening play. How to introduce the discussion, therefore, will be an important problem to any teacher who is dealing with the subject of ethics or religion. It will vary according to his knowledge of the members of the class, what they are thinking about, in what way their minds are called most quickly into activity, or what leads them soonest into conversation or discussion. The main point here is to study variety.

It is very important that in such a course of instruction the teacher should always have a small black-board at hand. Where there is a leading point which can be put down in a few words, these words should

*be written out to stand before the eyes of the pupils. It is a valuable method of emphasis. The class members themselves could do the writing. Furthermore, it is often of significance to give young people single catch-words or phrases, which should act like pegs on which the discussion may hang, and so help to fix the thought in their minds for the future.*

*The teacher is warned not to rely solely upon the text book. Let it be again repeated that the text book is but a suggestive outline which may be amplified and extended by the resourceful teacher. Lead children to think and discuss all phases of each subject. The class members should enter into the discussion as a conversation. The points should come up as of themselves, suggested by the talk going on. All the while the teacher should be aiming to draw what he has to impress upon the children, from their observations or experience. The most that he should have with him would be a few notes for his own guidance, on a single slip of paper, and it were better if even this were left behind.*

*It is to be kept carefully in mind by the parent or the teacher, that in ethical or religious instruction the method or purpose is different from what it would be in teaching reading, writing or arithmetic. Our aim is rather to influence the moods and temperament, the feelings or character of the young people, and not to give them instruction in facts. We have not failed in our purpose if they forget much of what has been told to them, provided we have left a certain impression on their minds. We desire to give a certain direction to their sentiments rather than to instil a series of abstract principles. In this line of work, memory is not nearly as important as it might be in other departments of instruction. The pupils may forget the points we have made, and yet retain a certain impression from it all as an influence lasting to the end of their lives. The ultimate effect, for the most part, can only show itself in future years; it may not be visible or obvious to the teacher at the time.*



*It will be apparent that in this whole scheme of instruction, we have sought to be strictly undenominational on the religious side. It has been the effort of the author to arrange the discussions so that they could be used in a Grammar School, where doctrinal teachings are excluded, or in the Sunday-school where these would be introduced as a matter of course. The plan has been to arrange the material so that the points of religious doctrine could simply be added on wherever desired, or omitted, according to the system or method of the school where this course of instruction might be employed.*

*The teacher who is giving lessons strictly in ethics, however, should be cautious about being too dogmatic. If we argue with the members of the class too far, where they disagree with us, we may only lead them to be all the more positive in their opinions. It would almost seem as if in ethics or religion, young people like to be contrary. We may often allow them to oppose us on minor points, with the hope of fixing rigidly on their minds the one or two leading principles, which strike us as of the most importance. Our method is not to be that of casuistry; we are not to let the young people feel that we are scheming to convince them in spite of themselves. We are simply trying, as far as possible, to have them see with their own eyes the truths of the lessons in ethics, which have been found out from thousands of years of experience on the part of the human race. At the same time there are occasions when the adult should be very positive with regard to his own convictions, even where the class members will not agree with him. This especially applies on points where the young people could not have had sufficient experience to form a judgment of their own. But even here the most that we may be able to do would be to say earnestly and solemnly, "I think in this way," and there let the matter rest.*

*There is a further danger to be considered in the fact that young people by this method of discussion*

may be encouraged to watch and judge other people rather than themselves. It is a point that certainly must always be kept in mind by the teacher. At the same time we may not overlook the fact that this is the usual method by which conscience develops. The first judgments are liable to be with regard to others. The art of the teacher must be to recognize this fact, and then after the young people pass judgment on others, to encourage them to turn their eyes inward and to measure themselves by the same ideal standards.

In a practical way, the teacher is advised to be cautious when using this method of ethical instruction, lest he employ certain words too much and make them tiresome to the young people. There are terms which should be introduced only seldom so that they may have an exceptional significance on the minds of the young. On the other hand the adult may simply irritate the mind of the pupil by a repeated use of the same term. This would especially apply in the series of lessons before us, to the word "Habit." The teacher will, therefore, be driven to find substitutes for it, although he must use it a great deal in all the discussions.

It may seem to many persons, in this special series of lessons, as if we had been somewhat limited in our choice of subjects. No two persons would probably choose the same list of habits for treatment. But it is to be remembered that these lessons form only an introduction. We assume that any teacher who has undertaken to follow out the method outlined in these chapters, and made a success of it, would easily be able to go on and work out future dialogues for himself.

## CHAPTER I.

### THE MEANING OF HABIT.

#### Proverbs or Verses.

"Habits if not resisted soon become necessities."—*St. Augustine.*

"Habit is second nature! Habit is ten times nature."—*Wellington.*

"Small habits well pursued betimes,  
May reach the dignity of crimes."—*Hannah Moore.*

"Ill habits gather by unseen degrees,  
As brooks make rivers, rivers run to seas."

"How use doth breed a habit in a man!"—*Shakespeare.*

"Unless above himself he can erect himself, how poor a thing is man."—*Daniel.*

"Habit in sinning takes away the sense of sin."

"It is a thousand times easier to contract a new habit than to get rid of an old one."

"Custom does often reason overrule,  
And only serves for reason to a fool."—*Rochester.*

"Custom makes all things easy."

"Tyrant Custom makes a slave of reason."

"Use can almost change the stamp of nature."—*Shakespeare.*

#### Dialogue.

What do we mean by habit? I suppose you know what habits are? Will you give me some idea of what the word suggests to you? "Why," you say, "it is doing something over and over again without thinking about it, just as if it were second nature."

Yes, that is all very true. But sometimes we do the same thing over and over again, and yet we may not call it a habit.

Did you ever watch a chicken just after it had come out of the shell? Did you notice that it pecks at something, as if it had done that a great many times? Yet, had the chicken ever done that before? "No," you

admit, "that would have been impossible, because it had just come out of the shell."

Then, was it a habit? If not, what is it that makes the chicken do that? "Oh," you assert, "the chicken acts in that way by instinct."

So then, it is instinct, you tell me. That is a new word. And what is the difference between instinct and habit? This is quite an important distinction. Be careful now in your answer. "Instinct," you explain, "is something that is born in a creature. It begins without the use of the mind." Yes, you are right. It is a sort of gift at the start.

Name over some of the instincts, for example. What about the birds? Do you fancy, for instance, that if a little bird had never seen a nest made, it would go ahead nevertheless, when it grew up, and make a nest all of its own?

What do you think? "Oh, yes," you answer, "we are sure the bird would go ahead and make a nest just the same." I presume you are right. "Nest-making," then, is one of the beautiful instincts.

What about human beings? Do they have instincts? Is there anything that we do as something which is born in us, just as the chick pecks, or the bird goes about nest-making? "You doubt it," do you? "We act by reason and not by instinct," you insist.

Do not be too positive about that. Do you suppose that if a human creature had never been taught to eat, he would not put food in his mouth? I am quite certain he would, even if it had never been taught to him at all.

If a grain of dust falls against the eye, would you not wink, even if you had never learned how to do it? I am sure that the eye-lid would close all the same. Yes, we have instincts, just as the animals do.

And now another question. Which really have the greater number of instincts—the animal world or human beings? "Oh," you reply, "human beings would have more instincts, if they have instincts at all."

And why? I ask. "Because," you assert, "we are

superior in every way, and so should have more of those gifts than the animals."

"Wait a moment now. How was it you said a creature acts, when guided by instinct? "Without reason?" Yes, without using his mind. Then are you sure that human beings, because they are superior, would have more instincts and act oftener without reason? No, it is really the other way. There are more instincts among the animals and fewer among human beings.

Can you see why? "It may be," you add, "because we exercise reason more than the animals do." Yes, that is it. Hence we have less need for instincts, inasmuch as we can make more use of our minds.

And now as to habits. If they are not born in us like instincts, where do they come from? Do they just happen? Do they come like second teeth? Do they drop down on us from the skies? "Oh no," you assure me, "because if they came that way, they would be a kind of instinct." Yes, you are right.

Where, then, do our habits come from? "Why," you point out, "we get them ourselves or we make them for ourselves." Do you really mean that? If you do, stop and reflect how important it is.

Appreciate what it signifies, *that we form our own habits*. Then what if we have bad habits; who is to blame for it? "We, ourselves," you confess. Yes, I suspect we are, if we form them ourselves.

Suppose we talk a little more now about the different kinds of habits. Then we shall be able to discuss this question in a more positive way. Mention some of the habits we may form.

Begin with the body. Did you ever see a girl throw a stone? Does she always throw it the same way that a boy does? You are smiling at that, I notice. Well now, why not? How does it happen that boys may throw stones in one way with their arms, and girls another? Although of course in this matter there is great difference in girls.

Or suppose that a boy and girl are throwing a ball.



Would they usually toss it in the same way? "No." And why not? Could not a girl learn how to throw a ball as well as a boy? I am strongly inclined to believe it. What is the difference?

"True," you continue, "but boys play ball a great deal and use their arms in throwing more, and so have a different habit of using the arm in throwing." Yes, and there comes in the word "habit." Did the boy definitely *think* just how to get his arm into a certain habit, so that it would throw the ball in a certain way? "No, it was not quite like that," you say. "He just kept on throwing the ball until the arm did it in a certain manner that came naturally."

Then what was it, that the boy really, consciously got, and what was it that came unconsciously? Would he ever have learned to throw a ball well, if he had not thought carefully how to do it? "No," you reply.

Do you assume, then, that he knew what he was doing in acquiring the habit of throwing the ball *well*, while the habit of *moving the arm in a certain manner*, came partly without his knowing it?

Please note that point very carefully, for it is very important. Some of our habits we form while we are thinking about it, or purposely trying to form those habits, and other habits are formed accidentally, as it were, while we are not conscious of it.

Can you name, for instance, some habits that are formed so early in life, that we know very little about how they started?

Suppose you saw two persons with almost the same figure, walking in front of you along the street; perhaps they may be dressed just alike and look almost exactly like each other from behind. Would you know them apart? "Yes, you think you would." But how? In what way? "Oh," you tell me, "by their walk."

Yes, and how did they ever get that walk? Did they learn it consciously? Why is it that each person walks in a peculiar way, so that you can recognize him by this means. "As to that," you answer, "it is a kind of habit which he acquired while he was very young."

Yes, I agree with you. And so you notice that there are some habits that we get very early in life. How we form them will depend a little on what others teach us.

Let me suggest to you another habit peculiar to each person. What if I had some money in a bank, and sent an order there for them to pay it to somebody else. Would the bank do it? "Yes," you reply, "if they were sure that they knew the other person, and if they were also sure the order came from you."

And how would they know the order came from me? Why could not somebody else write such an order in my place? "Yes," you exclaim, "but there would be the handwriting!"

Do you imply that each person has his own handwriting, a little unlike every other person's? "Yes," you insist, "each person has his own handwriting, and that is how the bank can know that the order came from the person who signed it."

Then what is that handwriting—a habit? True, it has been a habit we formed when quite young. Were we fully conscious when we were acquiring that habit? "No, not altogether," you say. Evidently it belongs to those habits which depend a little on how we were taught. Suppose we call these the *indirectly acquired habits*.

On the other hand, name over some of the habits of the body we acquire while we know that we are forming them. Did you ever watch two persons passing along, one of them holding his shoulders straight and his head erect, and the other slouching in an awkward sort of a way, his shoulders bent over and his head at a curious angle?

Did the habit of carrying himself with straight shoulders and head erect in a manly sort of way, come to one of those persons unconsciously, without his knowing it?

No, I can assure you that was a habit which the person had to *learn*; he had to be thinking about it a great deal and watching himself all the while.

But *now* when he carries himself in that way, do you suppose he thinks about it? "No," you admit. Well, why not? "Because," you answer, "it has now become a habit with him, and he does it without thinking."

How do such habits differ from those indirectly acquired? "We *know* we are getting them," you explain. Yes. We will call them *directly acquired habits*.

Note to the teacher: At this point, if desired, one could make a great deal of army discipline; telling how soldiers are trained; describing how many years men have to serve in the army over in Europe, in order to acquire the military habits, and why soldiers have to keep on doing the same thing over and over again in order to form those habits. The subject of military drill may splendidly illustrate the conscious acquisition of habits of the body, altho this will come in again in one of the later lessons.

Speaking about the indirectly acquired habits, you say that we know when we are forming the other kind, but are not usually conscious in the same way with these. Then do you assume that one may not be to blame for having any kind of indirectly acquired habits? "No," you insist, "one cannot be to blame in this case because one is not directly aware of what is going on."

Yes, it would seem as if you were right. But stop a moment. Perhaps what you say is true about those indirectly acquired habits we form when we are very young.

But there are others of this kind which we may be on the lookout for. Suppose a person falls into the habit of always hitting against things when he is moving about the house. Was he aware that he was forming this habit? "Not altogether," you answer.

But should he not have been on the lookout regarding it? Would you not blame him, after all, somewhat, for having that sort of a habit? "Yes, we think we should," you admit. Why? I ask. "Oh, because if he had been watchful, he might have seen that he was falling into that sort of a habit."

Then you would draw a line, would you not, between those indirectly acquired habits which we form

when we are too young to know anything about them, and those we form later on, which might also come of themselves, and yet which we might control if we were on the lookout.

I wish you would remember that point, for it is very valuable. We may not always shirk the blame for a bad habit because we were not conscious of it when it was being formed. One should *try* to be conscious of it.

### Points of the Lesson.

Count over now, the points we have learned about habits in this talk together.

In the first place, we described habit as "doing something we have done before, but doing it afterwards without thinking."

In the second place—about instincts, we have seen that instincts are inborn; but that habits are something we form or acquire for ourselves.

In the third place, we noted that we have fewer instincts and more habits, than animals; because we use reason more than they do.

In the fourth place, we have learned that some habits are for the most part acquired while we are not conscious of it at all. These we called "indirectly acquired habits," such as our walk or our handwriting.

In the fifth place, we discovered that we have other habits which we acquired only through close and watchful attention. These we called "directly acquired habits."

In the sixth place, we have seen that there are some of our indirectly acquired habits that we might control or avoid if we are on the lookout, although they seem to come partially of themselves.

### Poem.

He liveth long who liveth well,  
All else is life but flung away;  
He liveth longest who can tell  
Of true things truly done each day.

Be wise and use thy wisdom well,  
Who wisdom speaks, must live it too;  
He is the wisest who can tell  
How first he lived, then spake, the true.

—HORATIUS BONAR.

FURTHER SUGGESTIONS TO THE TEACHER—For illustration tell Huxley's story of the veteran who was walking with his plate of dinner when some-

body called out "Attention," and the man dropped his plate and dinner and mechanically threw his hands to his side. It will be recognized that this and the following lesson are merely introductory to the special discussions which are to come afterwards. The material can be amplified at discretion and the young people be encouraged to give anecdotes from their own experience. But there should be a pretty thorough understanding as to the meaning of habit and its distinguishing characteristics before the special habits are considered. It will be observed that the proverbs or verses at the beginning apply to each of the two lessons indiscriminately. There might also be some treatment of the word "custom," raising the question how it is related to "habit" and to what extent it has an independent meaning. So, too, with the words "use" and "usage." Additional points for consideration will be sure to occur to every teacher as he goes on with the discussions and the class members begin to raise issues for themselves.

## CHAPTER II.

### A FURTHER CONSIDERATION OF HABIT.

#### Proverbs or Verses.

"Whatever you would make habitual, practise it; and if you would not make a thing habitual, do not practise it, but habituate yourself to something else."—*Epictetus*.

"Powerful is the empire of habit."—*Publius Syrus*.

"Old inbred habits will make instances, but by better habits they shall be entirely overcome."—*Thomas à Kempis*.

"In the conduct of life habits count for more than maxims, because habit is a living maxim."—*Amiel's Journal*.

"Our deeds pursue us from afar,

And what we have been, makes us what we are."

—*John Fletcher*.

"He that sows thistles shall reap prickles."

"They have sown the wind, they shall reap the whirlwind."—*Bible*.

#### Dialogue.

In our last talk together we dwelt more especially upon habits of the body. What about the other part of ourselves, that we call the mind? Do we have habits there, too, just as in the body?

Could we fall into a way of thinking or feeling after a certain manner, or acting *in the mind* from certain motives, without being conscious that those motives are there? You do not quite understand what I mean. I can see that by your look. But suppose we illustrate.

Can you suggest any habits of the mind? Think for a moment about school life. I wonder if you have observed the difference between children at their books.

Observe a boy or girl about ten or twelve years old. Have you ever noticed how some pupils keep their eyes steadily on their books for a long while at a time,



working away without stopping for a moment? Then have you noticed how others may be looking up every minute or two, watching what is going on around them, glancing at their books and then glancing off again?

What is the difference between these two classes of girls or boys? The same contrast is apparent when the teacher is addressing them? Have you detected how some boys and girls listen all the time; while others are looking out of the window every other minute or noticing what the other pupils are doing? What is the difference between the two? What is it that the pupil is doing, who is listening to the teacher all the while?

"Why," you say, "he is paying attention." And what was he doing when keeping his eyes steadily on his book during the study time? Again you say, "paying attention to his work."

How does it happen that he does this; keeping his eye on his book, or listening attentively to the teacher who maybe is speaking to the class? Does he do it naturally? Is it perfectly easy for him to study hard for an hour without thinking of anything else? Can you listen without effort to a teacher when he is talking for a long while?

"No," you admit, "not at first." Why not? I ask. "Oh," you tell me, "it is hard work. It comes natural to look around and watch what is going on."

Then how is it that a certain pupil is able to pay attention for a long while in that way? "Why," you explain, "he got into the habit of it." But how did he get into the habit of it?

You say that he tried to pay attention, and not let his mind turn aside and think of something else, or watch what was going on; that after he had done this a long while, however, it came easier? But why? I insist. "Oh," you reply, "because it has become a habit."

And here we meet with a habit of the mind, do we? And what do you call it? "The habit of attention?" Yes, and it is a very valuable habit.

Have you ever thought about habits of the feelings? I wonder if you have ever seen persons who are disagreeable; boys or girls who may be "cross" or "snappish," as we say—I mean those who are that way very often?

One can tell by the look on your faces that you have known such people. What makes them act in such a way, do you suppose? When they suddenly "snap" or say anything mean or disagreeable, what starts it, what is going on inside of them? "Why," you assure me, "a mean or bad feeling has been aroused, and that leads them to say something mean or disagreeable."

And do they always know that there is such a mean feeling in their hearts, when they suddenly make such disagreeable remarks? "You believe they are aware of it?" I am not so sure about that.

However, it depends. What if a person had said mean things of that kind a great many times, and been disagreeable very often. And then fancy another individual who had not usually done anything of that kind, suddenly becoming guilty of it for the first time.

Which one would be more conscious of the bad feeling that started it? "Why," you assert, "the person who did it for the first time." Yes, you are right.

I assure you that we can have habits of the feelings, just as of the intellect. We may fall into the habit of having bad feelings start up on all sorts of occasions when we are hardly conscious of it, leading us to say mean or bad things that we ought to be ashamed of.

I wonder if you have ever heard of jealousy? We will not talk about that special subject now; but it, too, can be a habit of feeling. People may fall into the habit of jealousy who at first rarely ever showed any disposition of that kind.

But what about the control of habits? Have you considered that point? When is the easiest time to break off a habit—when it has become fully formed, for instance? "No," you assert, "that is just when it is hardest to break off."

Then you assure me that the longer we are under the influence of a habit, the more difficulty we shall find in changing it, if we desire to do so? "Surely," you answer.

I am afraid that is true. Habits of long standing are very much like tight gloves. Did you ever watch a person trying to take off a very tight glove? It comes hard, does it not? I wonder if you ever tried to take off a wet under garment, that fits close to you?

You may never have fallen into the water and had that experience. But I can assure you the garment comes off with the greatest kind of difficulty. A long-established habit is very much like a wet, close-fitting garment. It is no easy matter to get off.

On the other hand, suppose we want to acquire a good habit? What is the easiest time of life for acquiring it? Why is it, for example, that a grown person who has never learned to play a piano, finds it hard to play, and really never learns to do it well? "Oh," you answer, "his fingers are stiff." Yes, surely. And when are the fingers less stiff for such a purpose? "When we are quite young," you say.

Very few persons, I can tell you, ever acquire strong, fixed, valuable habits after they are grown up. The boy or girl who does not form a habit of attention when he is young, will probably never have it at all.

By the way, what are habits good for? Would it not be better for us if we did not have them at all, but always used our reason when going to act or to do something?

Is it not a little weak on our part to be subject to habits? Would you not say that there was something "slavish" about it? We are not free, are we, if we do something in that way without thinking about it or being conscious of it?

"True," you say, "one might prefer not to have habits, but to be free and always use one's reason." Then you are inclined to think that habits are really not good for anything?

If that is what you mean, suppose that every time

you throw a ball, you had to stop and think how to fix your arm, in order to throw it. Would you like that? "Oh, no," you admit.

But why not? Would you not be more free then? "Yes," you continue, "but if we had to stop and think about how to fix the arm every time, it would be pretty slow work."

You are not quite sure, then, about your desire to be free of all habits? It may, after all, be worth while to have some of them, at any rate. But what for? What service do they render? "Why," you explain, "they make the body do something of itself, so that one can attend to something else."

How about the mind and habits of the mind? When you are at work with your studies, would you feel more free and be more satisfied if you had to think all the time about being attentive, or would you prefer to be attentive without being obliged to think about it?

After all, we should be glad to have certain habits of the mind, and not always be obliged to stop and act by reason. What do these habits of the mind, if they are good habits, do for us, then?

"Why," you assure me, "they help the mind to act for itself in some matters, so that we can have more time to attend to other matters."

Do you see any resemblance, then, between habits and machinery? Can you observe how it is that they may do for us with our bodies and minds, what machinery does in the outside world? What is the real purpose of machinery? "To save labor?" Yes, and in what way? "Oh," you respond, "so that men may be free to do something else that cannot be done with machinery."

And do you recognize how it is that habits serve the same purpose for the body and mind? If we form habits, they make our bodies or minds do certain things for us, so that we may proceed to do other things that cannot be done by means of habits.

Speaking of habits of the mind, do you suppose this

has anything to do with the character of our thoughts? "We do not see how," you hesitate.

But why is it that some people think more correctly than others? How is it that we may have to argue longer with one person than another in order to convince them of what is known to be true. "Oh, because they are prejudiced," you suggest.

Yes, quite so. But if they let their prejudices influence their opinions, may it not be that they are under the influence of habits of thinking? Sometimes it would seem as if people actually had a habit of thinking crookedly, as we should say. They let themselves be controlled altogether by their feelings in the way they use their minds. This surely is a habit.

But if there are habits of the mind, as well as habits of the body, which do you think may be the more important? "Habits of the mind, probably," you reply. And why? I ask. "Because," you add, "the mind is more important than the body."

Yes, that is the reason. But perhaps there is another. Why is it easier for us to notice what is going on in the body, than what is going on in the mind?

"Oh, because," you explain, "one can see the body or feel what is going on there. But the mind somehow seems to be back out of sight." Yes, you are right, and this is most important. We are often liable to overlook habits of the mind, while we may have a great deal to say about habits of the body.

The mind has its way of working, just like the muscles or the fingers. If it is a good way, then it is very good; but if it is a bad way, then it is very bad indeed, because it is very hard for us to get at it, inasmuch as we cannot quite see it or feel it, the way we can see or feel how one's fingers move or one's hands work. If the mind is the highest part of ourselves, then it is exceedingly important that we should have the best Habits of Mind.

#### Points of the Lesson.

Name over, now, the further points we have discovered about habits.



In the first place, we have seen that there are habits of the body, and habits of the mind and heart.

In the second place, we have noticed that usually when a habit of the mind or heart is beginning, we are conscious of what is going on, but that after it has become fixed we are not conscious of it when we are influenced by it.

In the third place, we have learned that habits are hardest to control after they have been long fixed or established.

In the fourth place, we have found out that habits are more easily acquired when we are young.

In the fifth place, we have discovered that certain habits may be of great service to us, because they aid our bodies and minds, just as machinery aids us in the outside world.

**FURTHER SUGGESTIONS TO THE TEACHER**—A very good story to tell the children as again illustrating the power of habit, would be "The Soldier at the Gate of Pompeii." Give a little account of the destruction of Pompeii by the eruption of Vesuvius. Then tell how the people fled from the city, and how everything was buried many feet in the ashes. Describe how hundreds and hundreds of years later, when they came to dig the ashes away, they found the body of a Roman soldier lying at the gate of the city. Show how he had been placed there and stood there at his post because of the army discipline, which never allowed a man to leave the post assigned to him. Have a discussion as to whether any man who has never acquired very strong habits, or been under very severe discipline, could have done anything of this kind. Make it plain that it was the long years of military discipline that had developed the habit in the soldier of "staying at his post." Show how this was a habit pertaining both to the body and to the mind. See also Aesop's Fable about "The Camel." As regards the use of the terms "mind" and "body" it seems best to retain these distinctions which have become embedded in popular speech and which will always have their significance whatever may be the developments of the New Psychology. We must talk in the language to which children are accustomed and which the average person has adopted as expressive of his



innermost convictions. Such words as "thought," "feeling," "will," "mind," "heart," "soul," can never have the accuracy of scientific terms and yet they are most valuable for practical teachings in ethics or religion.

## CHAPTER III.

### PERSEVERANCE.

#### Proverbs or Verses.

“An oak is not felled with one blow.”—*Spanish.*

“In time a mouse will gnaw through a cable.”—*German.*

“Troy was not taken in a day.”

“Many things which cannot be overcome when they are together, yield themselves up when taken little by little.”—*Plutarch.*

“Many strokes, tho with a little axe,  
Hew down and fell the hardest-timbered oak.”  
—*Shakespeare.*

“Be the day weary, or be the day long,  
At length it ringeth to Even-song.”  
—*Ancient Couplet.*

“In every work he began, he did it with all his heart and prospered.”—II. Chron. xxxi. 21.

“Do not for one repulse, forego the purpose  
That you have resolved to effect.” —*Shakespeare.*

“I’ll fight it out on this line, if it takes all summer.”—*U. S. Grant.*

“Great works are performed not by strength but by perseverance.”—*Johnson.*

#### Dialogue.

Suppose today we dwell on the habit of Perseverance. We must think out what it implies, how one acquires such a habit and in what way it may be of service to us in our lives.

If you heard someone speak of a boy or girl, and say “such a boy or girl is very persevering,” what would that suggest to you? “Why,” you answer, “it means not giving up.” “Yes,” I continue, “but not giving up what?” “Oh,” you add, “not giving up if one does not succeed the first time.”

You say, then, that if a person did not succeed the

first time, and tried once more, you would describe him as a persevering individual?" "No, not exactly," you hesitate. "Why not?" I ask.

"Trying just twice would not be enough," you reply, "almost anybody might try twice." "Then how many times would a man have to try, in order to be persevering? Three or four times, do you think?" "More than that." "Well, how many, then?" "Oh, lots of times," you insist.

"What if a person, however, tried lots of times for one day, and did not succeed; and then when the next day came, he did not try any more? Would that be persevering?" "Certainly not," you assert. "But he had tried lots of times." "Yes," you admit, "but that was only for one day."

"You believe that being persevering implies trying lots of times for two days?" You smile at that. "Then how many days do you mean?" "Oh, a long while," you tell me.

"You assume, do you, that being persevering means trying a great many times and keeping it up a long while?"

What is the phrase we often use in urging one to perseverance? Can you recall the motto or maxim with the word 'try' in it? It contains just three words. "Try, try again?" Yes, those are the words. But you have said that the habit meant even more than that. It was "try, try again" *for a long while*.

"But does perseverance apply to any sort of conduct? What if a boy or girl who was trying to do something not so very difficult, and failed the first time, should try and then find it easy enough the second time. Would you say quite positively that such a boy or girl was persevering?" "You are not quite so sure about that?"

"Why not?" "Because," you tell me, "being persevering about easy things is one thing; being persevering about hard things is another." "Yes, I agree with you. Then you would imply, would you, that perse-

verance means try, try again, about those things which do not come easy for us?

Suppose a boy who was fond of play and wanted to learn how to play a game well, as for instance baseball, should try very hard over and over again. But what if that same boy, when it came to work he had to do, his studies or what his father wanted him to do for improving himself, would not try and keep on trying. Would you say that boy was persevering? "Not necessarily?"

But why not? Did he not apply our maxim in his play? Did he not keep on trying over and over again to learn the game? "Yes," you continue, "but that is not quite the same; that is play."

You believe, do you, that to be persevering is to keep on trying in something that is difficult, and where the something is *work* rather than play.

Do you think, by the way, that animals show perseverance? What about dogs? "Indeed they do," you exclaim. In what way? "Why," you point out, "a dog keeps on trying until he gets the thing, if he is a good dog."

Do you fancy, for instance, that with hunting dogs some will persist longer than others, before they give up trying to catch the game? "Yes, you are quite sure of that." Then you are convinced that some dogs are more persevering than others.

But how about dogs generally? Are they persevering? Did you ever use the word "dogged?" Have you ever met the words, "a dogged person;" or did you ever hear anyone speak of a "dogged" way of doing things?

What does it mean? What do you understand by a "dogged" kind of person? "Why," you tell me, "one who hangs on like a dog, and does not give up until he gets what he is after."

That is perseverance, is it? Does it mean work; hard work? "Oh yes," you assert, "there is a great deal of hard work in it."

Which class of persons are most likely to succeed in

the world, do you think; the "dogged" ones, those who hang on, and persevere; or those who take life easy? "There is no doubt about that," you respond; "success surely comes more often to the dogged people."

But is "being dogged" just the same as being industrious—working hard? If you knew a person who is always busy, constantly doing something, never idle for a moment, would you say that such a person was necessarily persevering?

"Yes," you answer, "it would seem so, at any rate." Why? I ask. "Because he would always be busy," you explain.

But what if he should be busy at a great many things; what if he is always at work, but trying this, that and another thing, and never keeping very long at one piece of work? Would you call that "being dogged?" Would that be perseverance? "No," you confess, "after all, being busy all the time does not always mean the same as perseverance."

What is the difference, then? "Why," you point out, "this habit implies trying persistently *at one thing*."

Do you fancy the time may ever come when we need not try and persevere any longer? Could it become such a fixed habit that we might show it in everything we do? "Yes," you say, "in time it might perhaps become a permanent habit, so that it would seem easy for us always to persevere."

I am not so sure that I agree with you, but we will speak about that later. Let me, however, ask you a further question.

When you know of a persevering person, one who goes on trying continually over and over again, and not giving up, always holding on; do you admire him? "Yes, indeed," you exclaim.

But what if a person would never give up in an argument, always insisting he was right, even when it had been proven beyond any doubt that he was wrong? That implies "not giving up," does it not? And is it a course you would admire? "Oh, no," you assert, "that is not perseverance."

Well, if not, I should like to know what it is. It certainly suggests hanging on, being determined, not being willing to give up.

"True," you tell me, "but that is stubbornness." And you think that stubbornness and perseverance are not the same characteristic. How is it that a person can be persevering and yet sometimes be willing to give up?

Is not a stubborn person very persistent? Does he not hang on? "Yes," you add, "but he hangs on when there is no use in doing so, when there is nothing to be accomplished by hanging on."

You imply, then, that hanging on when it is of no use, is not perseverance, but stubbornness? Perhaps you are right.

#### Points of the Lesson.

I. That perseverance means, not giving up, but keeping on trying many times or for a long while.

II. That perseverance means to keep on trying, especially in experiences which come very hard for us.

III. That animals may show perseverance, but not of our kind, because wanting in a conscious purpose.

IV. That perseverance does not mean simply being busy, but being busy at some one thing.

V. That perseverance is not the same thing as stubbornness or mulishness and should be kept distant from this latter characteristic.

#### Duties.

*I. We ought to keep on trying; we ought to persevere.*

*II. We ought to try all the harder when we are the most discouraged.*

*III. We ought to try the hardest and keep on trying the longest when the work is the hardest and the longest.*

*IV. We ought to keep on trying at one thing, instead of trying at too many things at the same time.*

*V. We ought to persevere, but not to be stubborn; to be firm, but not to be obstinate. We ought to try and acquire the persevering character.*



## Poem.

Over and over again,  
 No matter which way I turn,  
 I always find in the book of life  
 Some lesson I have to learn.  
 I must take my turn at the mill;  
 I must grind out the golden grain;  
 I must work at my task with a resolute will,  
 Over and over again.

We cannot measure the need  
 Of even the tiniest flower.  
 Nor check the flow of the golden sands  
 That run through a single hour.  
 But the morning dews must fall;  
 And the sun and the summer rain  
 Must do their part, and perform it all  
 Over and over again.

Over and over again  
 The brook through the meadow flows;  
 And over and over again  
 The ponderous mill-wheel goes;  
 Once doing will not suffice,  
 Though doing be not in vain;  
 And a blessing, failing us once or twice,  
 May come if we try again.

The path that has once been trod  
 Is never so rough to the feet;  
 And the lesson we once have learned  
 Is never so hard to repeat.

—ANONYMOUS.

FURTHER SUGGESTIONS TO TEACHER.—It might be well to make a good deal of the contrast between stubbornness and perseverance, because grown people as well as children often confuse them. The term "mulkishness" could be introduced, with some talk about the peculiarities of the mule, and a disposition to "back." The story could be told of the man who played a trick on a mule; turned him around with his head toward the wagon, and so by pulling at his head made him back several miles and draw the wagon without knowing it. Show the children how people, especially in judging themselves, will call their own standpoint "firmness," while in the case of other people they

would call it "obstinacy." For a story there is the familiar one about "Robert Bruce and the Spider," and also the well-known tale about the "Hare and the Tortoise" in Aesop's Fables.

## CHAPTER IV.

### BEING CONCEITED.

#### Proverbs or Verses.

"Conceit may puff a man up, but it never props him up."—*Ruskin.*

"There is more hope of a fool than of him who is wise in his own conceit."—*Bible.*

"The gosling would lead the geese to grass."—*French.*

"Self-exaltation is the fool's paradise."

"All is sugar to the vain, even the praise of fools."

"Every man has just so much vanity as he wants understanding."—*Pope.*

"Everyone thinks he has more than his share of brains."—*Italian.*

"No man sympathizes with the sorrows of vanity."—*Dr. Johnson.*

"She that looks too much at herself, looks too little to herself."

#### Dialogue.

You have heard about certain people "being conceited?" What would it indicate to you if it were said of anybody?

What is the chief characteristic of such persons? "They talk about themselves," you say. Yes, but how much? "Oh," you assert, "a good deal." Then you think that being conceited would mean talking about one's self a good deal?

But suppose a person should keep saying how much he wished he was able to do something, or kept lamenting because he was not strong enough to do it; what if he went on repeatedly saying how much better some one else could do a certain thing, than himself? That would be talking a great deal about one's self, would it not? Would it necessarily suggest self-conceit?

"No, not exactly," you answer; "self-conceit implies talking about one's self in a bragging sort of a way." But what do you mean by bragging?

"Telling how smart we are, or how much we can do," you reply. But is that all there is to such a habit? What if one were to assert how much one could do, but at the same time to admit that some one else could do it a great deal better, would that be bragging? "Not quite the same," you confess.

What would be the difference? "Why," you point out, "bragging would mean trying to show how much smarter we are than other people, boasting about ourselves as being superior to others."

And that is what you have in mind by being conceited, is it, always talking about one's self as being "smarter" than other people, or better than they are? And you call that "bragging?"

You assume, do you, that a person who never talked about himself could not be conceited. Is that it? "No," you add, "for a person could have that trait even if he did not talk about himself."

What would be going on in his mind if he were a conceited person and yet did not talk about himself? "Oh," you say, "he would all the while be thinking to himself how much smarter or better he was than other people."

It is your opinion, is it, that merely thinking to one's self about one's superiority, would imply "being conceited?" I am afraid you are right.

How do you fancy such a person would act, even if he did not talk to others about himself? Would there be any way by which people might know we were conceited, if we were conceited in that way? Could anybody find us out? "You doubt it?" But why? "Because," you insist, "we should keep our thoughts to ourselves; we should not tell of the feelings we have."

Now do you believe you really could do that? Would it be possible for you to feel in that way and not show it by your conduct, even if you said nothing about it?

Take, for instance, two boys or girls, one of them very conceited, and the other not so; how would they act when trying to improve themselves? Which one would be going to others in search for information, or trying to learn from other people? Would it be the conceited one?

"No," you admit, "quite the opposite." But why not? Would he not want to improve himself just the same? "On the contrary," you answer, "he would be thinking that he knew it already, fancying, perhaps, that he could not learn anything from anybody else." Have you ever met with boys or girls who act as if they knew more than their teachers? Are they conceited, do you think? "Yes, decidedly," you tell me.

Then which class of persons are most likely to go on improving themselves, those who are very conceited and think they "know it already," or those who are rather doubtful about how much they know and therefore try to learn from others? "You are convinced that the conceited boy or girl would not improve so much?" Yes, I agree with you.

How do you fancy a conceited boy or girl would act in the way of helping others? If he felt that he knew more and was smarter than they were, he would try to help others, would he not, and make them as intelligent as himself, or persuade them that they were his equals; would that not be his way? "By no manner of means!" you exclaim.

You smile at that, I see; but what makes you so positive? Suppose we show ourselves conceited to other people, would they admire us for it? "No, they would dislike us," you tell me.

But can you explain such a feeling? Why should others dislike us if we show self-conceit? "It would be," you point out, "because we should be showing that we had a feeling of contempt for them; we should not be trying to help them when they needed our help." "We should be 'showing off' to them," you add.

But why should people mind our trying to "show off," as you say? "Oh," you answer, "people who do

that are tiresome." You think, do you, that we grow tired of people who are all the time talking about themselves? I fear that is true.

And you believe, do you, that people may even show off without talking? That is what you implied when you asserted that a person might be conceited without constantly speaking of himself, was it?

Do you mean to say, for example, that a person who never talks of himself might constantly call attention to himself? "Yes," you insist. How? I ask. He does not cry out to everyone, "Look at me!" "Oh, yes," you answer, "but he acts in that way."

How could a man act that way, if he did not say anything? "Why," you tell me, "he might show it in the way he walks, how he holds his head, in the way he smiles."

By the way, do animals ever show self-conceit? "You are not quite sure?" But did you ever hear of crowing? What does it suggest? Do human beings crow? "In a sense," you admit.

Where do we get that word "crowing?" Why do we say that even people may crow? "Oh," you tell me, "it is because they call attention to themselves just in the way a rooster does when it crows." Then you think, do you, that a rooster may be conceited?

What other large bird do we often speak of as constantly calling attention to itself, or "strutting" around? "The peacock?"

And how does the peacock show itself conceited? "Why," you explain, "it spreads out its feathers, and makes a great show of itself, acting as if it were asking everybody to look at it." Do you fancy that we, as human beings, ever act like peacocks?

Now as to a *proverb* about self-conceit, one that is two or three thousand years old. Think what it means when I read it to you:

"Seest thou a man wise in his own conceit?  
There is more hope of a fool than of him."

What sense is there in that saying? What do you



mean when you assert that there is no hope for a man wise in his own conceit, or that you could do more with a fool than with such a man? Does it imply that the man has no hope for himself? "Oh no," you answer, "he has a great deal of hope for himself. He thinks he is going to do wonderful things." Yes, that may be true.

You assume, do you, that other people are hopeless about him? But why should we feel in that way? What did we say about the desire of the conceited man to improve himself? Did you tell me that he was more or *less* liable to improve, than the man who is without this trait of character? "Less so?" Then, you see, do you, why there is little hope for a self-conceited man? He thinks he knows it all, and so will not improve.

Already, therefore, two or three thousand years ago, people knew that even the most stupid person had more chance for improving than the conceited person. The trouble would be that such a person might also be stupid and not know it; or even if he were "smart" at the beginning, the stupid men might pass ahead of him by gradually improving. Hence there is a great deal of wisdom in this old proverb.

#### Points of the Lesson.

I. That conceited people may talk a great deal about themselves.

II. That they may *feel* or *be* very conceited and yet not say it in words.

III. That a conceited person can show it by the way he acts.

IV. That a conceited person is not so liable to improve, because he feels that he knows already and will not try to learn from others.

V. That a conceited person is not liable to be helpful to others, but rather contemptuous toward them.

VI. That the conceited person resembles the rooster crowing, or the strutting peacock.

#### Duties.

*I. We ought not to talk too much about ourselves.*

*II. We ought not to think too much about ourselves.*

III. *We ought not to be offensive to others by showing a sense of our importance.*

IV. *We ought not to be vain, lest we stop improving ourselves.*

V. *We ought not to be conceited, lest we make people laugh at us or despise us.*

VI. *We ought not to be vain, lest we deceive ourselves and lose our self-respect.*

FURTHER SUGGESTIONS TO THE TEACHER.—This lesson will naturally come with the ones on "Pride" and "Humility." Opinions may differ as to the shades of distinction to be drawn between these various virtues and vices. The teacher is certainly not confined to the constructions to be found in these special outlines. The chief consideration will be to impress the fundamental thoughts or sentiments on the young mind, while the *method* may be left to the discretion of the adult.

## CHAPTER V.

### ORDER.

#### Proverbs or Verses.

"Order is heaven's first law."—*Pope*.

"Set thine house in order."—*Bible*.

"A stitch in time saves nine."

"By entering all that is sold or bought,  
You'll escape much anxious afterthought."

"Let all things be done decently and in order."—*St. Paul*.

#### Dialogue.

We have a short word to discuss today. It is only of two syllables, and so you can easily take it down and remember it. I will leave it for you to decide whether it is a good or bad habit. But will you first write it out? "Order."

That is the word. And does it suggest a good or a bad habit? "Oh, a good one," you exclaim; "that much we know."

But I am curious to find out whether you really understand what it means. Have you ever seen the letter-carrier, when he comes to your door in the morning? What does he have in his hands? "Why," you answer, "a pile of letters and papers."

And when he calls, does he stop and look all through the pile in order to find out what belongs to your home? "Not by any means," you continue; "he takes certain ones from the top and hands them to us."

But how do those letters happen to be on top whenever he arrives? Is it magic or chance? "No," you tell me, "there is no magic about it. He has fixed them in that way before he started out."

But what do you mean by fixing them in that way? "Oh," you explain, "he has taken them and sorted them

according to the house numbers, arranging them in order."

There is the word, now, "order." And so we have come upon this habit in the letter-carrier. But what good is there in such a method for his purposes? Does it not take more, much more, time to sit down at the office and arrange all his letters according to a system before he starts out? Don't you think it is a waste of time? "No," you insist, "it is the other way. If he had to go through his package of letters at every door, it would take three times as long, and so it would require much more work on his part, and also many more letter-carriers."

Then what is the first thing which a habit of order does for us? What does it save? Money? Is that what I am thinking of?

"No," you point out, "it saves one's time." Yes, that is it exactly. Then put that point down. It is very important. "The habit of order saves time."

Would you be able now to tell me what you mean by order? Can you describe it? Oh," you answer, "it implies fixing things so that it is easy to find them when one wants them." How is it, for instance, in school life? Did you ever observe a boy or girl who was obliged constantly to fumble in his desk and be all the time looking and looking, in order to find anything he needed? And what is the trouble with them? "They do not keep their things in order."

But now, one other point. Suppose you had all your things fixed on your desk or in your room so that you could easily find them, that would be order, would it not? "Yes," you assert, "surely."

I assume, then, that if you always threw your collars or other clothing on the floor in the corner of your bedroom, and could always find them there, you would call that order? You would certainly have no difficulty in laying your hands upon them when you needed them.

What if you had a way of tossing your soiled clothes into a pile beside your table in your bedroom

during the week, there would be no difficulty of knowing where they were at any time. Would that be order?

"No," you hesitate, "we are not quite so sure about that." But why not? You would have no embarrassment in being able to find your things, and that is what you said the habit of order implied.

I wonder if you ever went into a person's room, or came in upon him suddenly there, and noticed how he began to hide things out of the way, pushing a pair of shoes under the sofa, picking up a soiled handkerchief and putting it in his pocket, or suddenly brushing off some dirt from his clothes, or trying to straighten out his table a little.

Does that ever happen? "Yes," you admit, "everybody does that now and then."

But was that not what we should describe as order? What if his slippers were out in the middle of the room, or three or four shoes were lying around on the floor, or some clothes were hanging over a chair instead of being put away in the closet? He can always find these objects; he knows just where they are. Why is that not an indication of order?

"Oh," you tell me, "it doesn't look right." Why so, I ask? "As to that," you continue, "the way he tries to hide things when we come into the room shows that he is ashamed. He feels that he is guilty, and that it is not the same thing as order."

It strikes me, then, that we have learned something further about order. Apparently it does not always mean just having a thing where one is able to find it, but also having a proper place for a thing. Will you put it down: "Having a proper place for a thing."

Now what does that really imply? Suppose that there are two or three of your collars lying on the floor and your shoes scattered around. Where do they actually belong? "Why," you assure me, "in the closet or in the drawers." Exactly. Then there is a proper place for these clothes, and order means having them in their proper place.

Do you believe there are people, for example, who always *look* very neat in their dress, and very proper, with their hair always brushed, their hands clean, and their clothing just right, and yet who have private rooms where their things are scattered over the floor, with everything untidy, so that they would feel awfully ashamed if anybody suddenly came in and saw them there? I am afraid that a good many persons live in just that way.

But I wonder if you can see how it affects one's moods having the habit of order. Do you think the person who has the habit will be more or *less* cheerful than the person who does not have it? "In that respect," you ask me, "why should it make any difference?"

Have you ever observed a person searching around everywhere for something he could not find, looking in his closet, in the drawers, on the table, everywhere? Is he cheerful and very happy just at that moment? Would you enjoy being with him just then?

"No," you smile, "he would not be exactly in an agreeable mood." Well, what sort of a temper would he display, do you fancy? "Why," you confess, "he may be inclined to be cross, out of sorts, just then." Then how may the habit of having things out of order affect us, would you say? "Make us cross and out of sorts?" Yes, surely.

I think you will find it true that people who have no habit of system or order are liable to be *constantly* disagreeable and out of sorts. You would not like to live in the same room with them or in the same house all the time. They would always be looking around for their things and be in a "snappish" mood, I fear.

But is there also such a thing as having order in the way we do our work, just as in the way we keep things in our room? Suppose I give you an illustration. Take two boys at school. What would be the method of the boy who was disorderly in his ways of working?

"Why," you explain, "he would jump around from this book to that book, or from this study to that study.



He would never have the same time each day for the same work he was going to do."

And what would be the method of the boy who had order in his school work? "As to that," you answer, "he would have a regular time for each study or each book, and keep steadily at that study until he had finished it. He would not be skipping around in all sorts of ways."

And which boy or girl, do you suppose, could recite his lessons better, the boy who had the habit of order, or the boy who had the habit of disorder? "Oh," you exclaim, "of course the boy who had the habit of order."

But why? How will the boy who does not have any such habit recite his lessons? Will he begin at the right point and go along connectedly? "No," you admit, "the chances are he will skip around in his recitation, just as he skips around in his way of doing his work." I am afraid you are right.

What if a boy, when dressing himself in the morning, had no regular way of putting on his clothes, some mornings putting them on one way, or in one order, and another time another way, and in another order? Would it make any difference in the long run? Do you think he would get his clothes on just the same? Why should it matter?

"Oh," you tell me, "it would encourage a habit of disorder. Then, too, sometimes he might forget certain garments." You mean, do you, that such a boy might come down to the breakfast table without his tie or collar?

Is it possible that you have ever heard of a boy who forgot to brush his hair before he came down to breakfast? How could he overcome such mistakes? "Why, you assert, "that is plain enough. If he had a regular method of dressing himself, he would not forget." Yes, that is certainly true.

I wonder if you know of a word or phrase that we sometimes use about people who do not have habits of order. It is not a very nice term. But it describes

those persons who come down to the breakfast table without their cravats on, and who forget their collars, or overlook brushing their hair, or leave their bedrooms in an untidy condition, with clothes lying around on chairs or on the floor, or have spots on their clothes, or soiled shoes. Suppose you write it down. There it is—"Being slovenly." It is anything but nice to be slovenly.

Did you ever hear of a girl who always has hairpins lying around on the table, or shoes with buttons off or only half buttoned? What would you call a habit of that kind? "Slovenliness?" Yes, that is just what it would be, slovenliness.

### Points of the Lesson.

I. That order implies arranging things so that one can find them easily.

II. That it means having a proper place for things and having them in that place.

III. That it helps us to save time.

IV. That it helps to keep us from being cross, or out of sorts, or disagreeable.

V. That it means also having system in the way we work, so that in this way we can accomplish a great deal more.

VI. That it keeps us from losing our self-respect. If we have the habit of order, we are not ashamed when persons come upon us suddenly.

### Poem.

Work while you work,  
Play while you play;  
That is the way  
To be cheerful and gay.

All that you do,  
Do with your might;  
Things done by halves  
Are never done right.

One thing each time,  
And that done well,  
Is a very good rule,  
As many can tell.

Moments are useless  
Trifled away;  
So work while you work,  
And play while you play.

—M. A. STODART.

### Duties.

*I. We ought to do our work in such a way as not to waste time.*

*II. We ought to have a suitable place for a thing and keep it there.*

*III. We ought to have a method in the way we work and keep to that method.*

*IV. We ought to follow those methods by which we can accomplish the most work.*

*V. Whatever we do we ought to do it with system and order.*

FURTHER SUGGESTIONS TO THE TEACHER.—The question may come up whether a person could not be too orderly, although this is not a usual danger among children. Yet there may be some value in dwelling upon it. People as they grow older and pass into middle life sometimes become positively “cranky” about having things exactly in the same place, so that it makes them unhappy if the place for the thing is changed, even where the change is really needed. The question could be raised whether an exaggerated habit of that kind is real order, or whether it is not becoming a slave to routine. Naturally this part of the subject requires a great deal more caution in the way it is dealt with. It may rest with the option of the teacher whether to take it up or pass it over. Sometimes the children will raise the point themselves. There is the term “fussiness” or “being fussy” as applying to this phase of the subject.

## CHAPTER VI.

### CONSIDERATION FOR OTHERS.

#### Proverbs or Verses.

"It is a secret sympathy,  
The silver link, the solemn tie,  
Which heart to heart and mind to mind  
In body and in soul can bind."

—*Sir Walter Scott.*

"Give unto me made lowly wise,  
The spirit of self-sacrifice."

—*Wordsworth.*

"A forced kindness deserves no thanks."

"A word of kindness is better than a fat pie."—*Russian.*

"He merits no thanks that does a kindness for his own ends."

"Kindness breaks no bones."—*German.*

"Write injuries in dust, but kindnesses in marble."

"Politeness is to do and say

The kindest things in the kindest way."

"One ought to remember kindnesses received, but forget those one has done."

#### Dialogue.

Have you ever been in a street car and seen an elderly lady enter when the car was full, and some one, perhaps a young lady or a young man, rise at once and give the older person a seat? "Yes, it does happen sometimes," you say.

And what do you call an act of that kind? "Why," you answer, "it is a form of generosity." True, but I think it is a great deal more. Can you suggest another name for it? The person in that case does not really divide what he has. He gives it up altogether in surrendering his seat. What is his motive?

"Oh," you explain, "the person who has entered the

car is old, and finds it difficult to stand, and we owe consideration to old people."

There is the term I have in mind—*consideration for others*. Yes, that is a beautiful habit, which I should like to talk about today.

When you start to say something unpleasant to one who is listening to you, and stop, why do you hold back? "It may be," you explain, "because we do not like to seem disagreeable to others."

But is that always the reason? Can it come from any other motive? "Yes," you add, "we may not wish to hurt their feelings." You think, then, do you, that we ought to stop and consider the feelings of others when we are speaking?

And do you imply that when a person is away and not hearing you, it may be all right for you to say all the disagreeable things about him you please, because he cannot hear you? "No," you admit, "that, too, may not be right."

But why not? They do not hear what you say. They may never know about it. You do not hurt their feelings. Why should you care?

"True," you continue, "but we may do them an injury just the same." How, in what way? I ask. "Why," you answer, "it may cause other people to dislike them."

What is this habit called, talking about others or saying mean things about them when they are not present? "Talking behind their backs," you suggest. Yes, but what one word is used to describe it? You have already mentioned half of it—something about "backs."

"Backbiting?" Yes, that is the term. And why is backbiting wrong? "Because it is an injury to another." But what should be the motive or habit on our part leading us to be cautious in that regard? We have named it already. "Consideration for others?" Yes, that is it, surely.

Can you tell me further how we may show consid-

eration for others? For example, what can we do for a person who comes into the house extremely tired?

"Oh, there are all sorts of things," you say. "We can try and relieve him for a while from anything else he may have to do in the house, make everything as comfortable for him as possible, give him all the chance to rest he needs."

Again, suppose a number of persons are in conversation together and there is a subject mentioned which is very painful to one of those present. What might you do in order to show consideration for him? "Try and turn the subject, leading off the conversation as quietly as possible in another direction?"

But, best of all, what can you do when there is danger of such a subject occurring? "Why," you point out, "we can be on the lookout not to mention it at all, so as not to give him pain." Yes, that is a very nice point, although people very often forget about it.

But there is another way by which we can show such consideration for others. You know sometimes people have instincts which they cannot control. There are some things they are peculiarly afraid of, and the fear is of a kind they can never conquer. Certain persons, for example, have such an instinctive fear of some insects or of certain animals.

Do you think we ought to regard such feelings? "It depends," you say. "Why should they not try to overcome such fears?"

Yes, I answer, but I am talking of those fears which are instinctive, and which *cannot* be conquered. "Well," you admit, "if there are such fears, it may be right for us to take them into consideration."

There are persons who have an intense shrinking from dogs. They almost tremble or are made sick at seeing them. Now, do you think it would be right for a member of the home where that person lived, to have a dog in the house just for his own pleasure?

"No," you confess, "out of consideration for the feelings or temperament of the other, we ought to make a sacrifice of our own pleasure."



I wonder if you can think of the name we naturally give to the persons who are most considerate of others? What should you say was the chief difference between the common man and the gentleman?

Is it a matter of family? "Yes and no," you hesitate. You mean, do you, that even a person without any family connections could be instinctively a gentleman? "We certainly think that is possible," you reply.

But what if he had no special education, no training in manners. Is such a person ever called a gentleman?

"Sometimes," you insist. And what leads people to apply that term especially to him? "Oh," you explain, "it is because he is so gentle or delicate in his conduct with others."

Then you really believe, do you, that this habit we are describing, consideration for others, is the first mark of a true gentleman? It means, does it, trying not to hurt other people's feelings, being considerate in what we say about them, or what we say to them, being of service to them in little ways?

But suppose such a person is gentle in this way to people he is fond of, or to members in his own home, showing true consideration for their feelings, but is regardless about people with whom he is only slightly acquainted. Is he a true gentleman?

"No," you assert. Well, why not? He shows consideration for the feelings of others. "Yes," you add, "but he does not do it always—he makes distinctions." Then you really feel, do you, that one ought to show such conduct for others everywhere?

By the way, when is it hardest to show consideration for others? Have you ever thought of that? "It may be," you tell me, "when we dislike the person we are showing a consideration for." Yes, it does come hard under such circumstances. You are right. It is much easier to do this for the people we like.

But how is it, whether it be in the case of people we like or in the case of strangers? When may it still be very difficult to be on the lookout to show such gentle

consideration? "Well," you say, "it comes that way sometimes when we are very tired."

At any other times that you think of? How about those occasions when you are "cross" or "out of sorts?" Does it come easy then? "No," you admit, "it may be hardest of all then."

Have you ever been on a street car, or traveling, for instance, where the car is pretty full, and seen one person occupy space enough for two persons? Was it right to do that?

"Yes," you insist, "if nobody needed the seat." But what if some one enters, and there are a number of persons doing the same thing, which sort of a person usually moves up and relinquishes half the seat? "Why," you suggest, "it would be the person who shows consideration for others."

But when are we the least inclined to do this, or when is it hardest for us to do? "Oh," you explain, "it is when we are tired."

Yes, that is true, and we have to be on the lookout then. Sometimes just from being tired we can be very selfish and inconsiderate. Watch a street car and observe the kind of persons who never move or offer to divide their seat. See how easy it may be on such occasions to read people's characters.

Again, suppose a car is full and two persons enter, one a very old lady, rather plainly dressed, and another a pretty young lady handsomely attired. Which one will probably be given a seat first? "Oh," you exclaim, "the pretty young lady."

But now think of it. What would be the true way for a gentleman—to give his seat to the old lady or to the young woman? Which course would show the real consideration for others? "As to that," you acknowledge, "probably it would be to give the seat to the old lady."

Then why do not people think more about such things? "Perhaps," you suggest, "it is because they have not cultivated this habit of consideration for others."

But does this habit always make people popular? Do you fancy, in that instance, if a man gave his seat to the old lady, the young woman would like him and admire him for it? "It would depend on the young lady," you answer.

For what persons, then, are we to show the most consideration, for those who are strong like ourselves, or for those who are weaker than we are?

"Why," you say, "probably it should be for those who are weaker than ourselves." What class of persons do you mean by that? "It may be old people," you suggest. "It may be very young people. It may be persons who are lame or blind. It may be persons who have no way of defending themselves."

But what of those who may ordinarily be just as young and strong as you are, but who may be ill, who may be suffering from pain? If there is any time in the wide world when we can show consideration for others it is when they are sick. But it is often then that it comes hardest, because we have to suppress ourselves in all sorts of ways. The true gentleman is able to do it, nevertheless.

#### Points of the Lesson.

I. That consideration for others has to do with small things as well as great, and may come even harder in the small things.

II. That consideration for others may require severe effort on our part, in order to overcome selfish inclinations.

III. That in consideration for others, the effort may have to be greater when it is for those we care for the least or for strangers or foreigners.

IV. That consideration for others comes the hardest when we are tired or out of sorts, when we are nervous or in a state of discomfort.

V. That consideration for others implies not simply a form of gratitude or politeness, but a feeling of human kindness and a desire not to hurt the feelings of others, with efforts, where possible, to add to their happiness.

#### Duties.

*I. We ought to be considerate of the feelings of others and not give them pain by what we say to them if we can avoid it.*

*II. We ought to be considerate of others and not say evil things about them if we can avoid it.*

*III. We ought to be considerate of the feelings of others when they are sick or in trouble.*

*IV. We ought to be considerate of the feelings of others who are not as strong as we are.*

*V. We ought to be considerate of the feelings of others, because it is the act of a true lady or a true gentleman.*

*VI. We ought to be considerate of the feelings of others by trying to cause as little pain or trouble to others as possible.*

### Poem.

Do you wish the world were better? Let we tell you what to do:

Set a watch upon your actions, keep them always straight and true,

Rid your mind of selfish motives, let your thoughts be clean and high;

You can make a little Eden of the sphere you occupy.

Do you wish the world were wiser: Well, suppose you make a start

By accumulating wisdom in the scrapbook of your heart.

Do not waste one page on folly; live to learn and learn to live,

If you want to give men knowledge, you must get it ere you give.

Do you wish the world were happy? Then remember day by day

Just to scatter seeds of kindness as you pass along the way;

For the pleasure of the many may be oft-times traced to one,

As the hand that plants the acorn shelters armies from the sun.

—FROM "UNITY."

FURTHER SUGGESTIONS TO THE TEACHER.—Naturally this is but a feeble introduction to one of the most important subjects in the whole domain of applied ethics. Yet it would be a mistake to carry the discussion too far, lest the young people tire of it. At least one further lesson might, however, be devoted to it, taking up such additional points as may occur

to the teacher or be adapted to the experience of the class members. In one way or another the same subject must come up again and again in other forms in any scheme of ethical instruction. One's whole life is but a single prolonged lesson on this special topic, as it is borne in upon us in a thousand ways how much joy or pain we may give by the gentleness or callous roughness we display in dealing with the feelings of others. A teacher can surely illustrate this in a great variety of forms, although it should be done without too much preaching or moralizing. Something, at any rate, will be accomplished if the attention of the young mind is called to these points and one's thoughts are started in that direction, even if the suggestions are not put into practice until years afterwards. Observations of the violation of this habit are brought home to us every day of our lives. The adult can teach here from what he himself sees in the world around him. All that we have ventured to give in this outline is a few scattered hints capable of indefinite expansion.

## CHAPTER VII.

### BEING LAZY.

#### Proverbs or Verses.

“Laziness has no advocate, but many friends.”—*German.*

“Who is lazy in his youth must work in old age.”—*German.*

“Laziness travels so slowly that poverty soon overtakes him.”—*Franklin.*

“A lazy boy and a warm bed are difficult to part.”—*Danish.*

“As lazy as Ludlum’s dog, that leaned his head against the wall to bark.”

“A lazy man eats his own brains.”

“An indolent man draws his breath but does not live.”—*Cicero.*

“Enjoyment stops where indolence begins.”—*Pollock.*

“A young idler, an old beggar.”—*German.*

“An idler is a watch that wants both hands  
As useless when it goes as when it stands.”

“He that is busy is tempted but by one devil; he that is idle by a legion.”

“Idle folks have the least leisure. Idle people take the most pains.”

#### Dialogue.

Now for a good, plain, practical subject! We shall speak today about a habit to which we may be all tempted at times.

You may write it on the blackboard. Put down the words. First, “being.” You see that means the “habit of,” doesn’t it? Now add the word “lazy.” There it is: “Being lazy.”

Did you ever hear that word before? “Surely.” Anybody ever call you lazy? What do you say? Can you remember? “Yes,” some of you admit, “we have had that term applied to us.”

And did you ever call anybody else lazy? Did you



ever say, "Oh, you lazy fellow, you lazy girl?" I suspect you have. People are more liable to talk about other people in this way than about themselves.

But I must know what you had in mind when you called somebody by such language. What was the trouble with the boy or girl, for instance? "Oh," you suggest, "they would not do anything. They just sat still when we wanted them to help us about something."

You would say, would you, that anybody who was sitting still for a good while was lazy? What if, however, he had a book in his hand and were reading?

"It would depend," you explain, "on what he was reading." And what do you mean by that? What sort of a book would he be reading if you felt he were lazy and would not come away from it? "As to that," you tell me, "it would probably be a mere story or some pictures with nothing else there of consequence. He would be simply amusing himself."

You mean to assert that anybody who sits still reading a light book and will not get up to work or to render you a service when you ask him, is necessarily lazy? What if he is very tired? What if he has been working very hard? "No," you admit, "if he is very tired and has been working very hard, we should not call him lazy."

Yet you say you are convinced that if he is not tired and might just as well get up and help us, but will not do it on account of his story, he is lazy, is he? Now are you sure of that?

What if that boy or girl who was reading a story had some work on hand of importance to himself, then if it suddenly occurred to him and he jumped up and went about it and toiled at it with all his might, although he would not rise to please you or help you, could you say that he was lazy? "No, not exactly." What would he be, then—selfish? "Yes, certainly."

You see, after all, a person might be very selfish and not be lazy. You must tell me what this habit really

implies. Try it again. Practice now the habit of perseverance.

"Why," you suggest, "perhaps it applies to some one who sits around doing nothing a great deal of the time; some one who seems not to use his body or his mind very much."

How would you describe a lazy boy at school, for example. In comparison with the other kind, how would he conduct himself? "Oh," you add, "he would be looking around a good deal of the time, watching the other boys and girls, or looking out of the window, seemingly waiting until school should close.

And how would you describe a lazy boy or girl at play, when there was no school work, and you were out at games? What would be the difference between such a boy and the other kind? "Why," you point out, "the lazy boy would sit around and not care for the games which required hard work. Or if he went into them he would play for a little while and then stop and say, 'It is too much work.'"

You really believe, then, that a boy or girl could actually be lazy in their play? Did you ever hear any one in speaking of play, exclaim, "It is too much like work?" What is it, do you suppose, that a lazy person likes most of all? What would give him the greatest pleasure, such as it is? "Doing nothing?" you answer. Yes, I suspect that is it.

Did you ever hear of a person who said he would like to do nothing for ever and ever and ever? When a person makes such a speech, would it necessarily indicate that he was lazy? "Oh yes," you assert. Wait now. Do not be too sure. What if a person has had to work very hard for a long while. Might he not, when he was very tired, make that remark just because he was tired?

Think again. Some time after you have grown up and have to work to earn your living, what if you receive some sort of a position, two of you, and do your work through the day, both of you, perhaps, just alike, if it is not very hard. Now, at the end of the

day, what would the lazy one do? "Go home and eat his supper?" Yes, and after that what would he do? "Not much of anything," you answer.

And how would you describe those persons who in their evenings wander around and do not do much of anything? "Loafers?" Yes, that is the term. Put that down. We have come upon another word for laziness.

And what would the other type of man do, if he was not too tired, at the end of the day, assuming he had his evenings free? "Why," you respond, "he would go to work at something." But he has done his day's labor, all he is paid to do. What more is left for him in the way of work?

You add, "He can go on improving himself, studying." But his school life is over, is it not? You mean that to improve himself a man must go on educating himself after school is over, when he is grown up?

You may seem a little puzzled over that. But I can promise you that when you are grown up you will realize that there is more need for study even than when you are boys and girls. The lazy person never studies. When his work is over his mind goes to sleep, while the other type of man keeps on trying in some way to improve himself.

It may be said of a person, "He always seems busy at something. Just as soon as one kind of work stops he goes and finds another." And then of still other persons it is remarked, "They never seem to be busy at anything." We call *them* the loafers.

Suppose two men are employed at the same kind of work during the day, of a comparatively easy kind, so that at times there is an opportunity for doing a little more than what they are paid for. Will the lazy man ever do it? "No," you exclaim, "never!"

Do you think it is worth while ever to do any more than what you are paid for? What do you say as to that?

Note to the Teacher: Here is a good opportunity to talk for a while with the boys and girls about work; in order somehow to make them feel the value of doing even more

than they are paid for. Start in their minds a sense of shame at the idea of working for mere pay and nothing more. Point out to them that they degrade and hurt themselves much more than they hurt their employer when they take that standpoint. The disadvantageous side from a business standpoint could be put to them; since they are far more liable to get on in the world and be advanced to better positions by winning the respect of those who employ them. It is very important to arouse in the children's minds a sense of disgust for laziness, at the same time making them see that a man can be lazy, even when he works steadily, if he does all his work in a routine way. Read over the further lesson on "Habits of Service," however, so as not to anticipate that subject too much.

But you have not told me yet where laziness really starts from;—in the body or in the mind, would you say?

"Why," you answer, "probably in the body. Such people will not work. They like to sit around and do nothing." But, now, are you sure of that? Is it their bodies which are lazy?

Do you suppose, for instance, that if a boy or girl had a lazy body which moved slowly, sleepily, he or she could help it, or could do anything about it to overcome it? "Yes," you insist, "there would be a way. They could determine to change. They could *will* to act differently."

You are right. Laziness starts inside of ourselves, in the soul, and not in the body. It is a matter of will. When we speak of a lazy person, we mean a lazy *soul*, and not a lazy body.

But do you think it comes natural for some persons to be rather lazy, and for other persons to be rather energetic? "Yes," you admit, "there is a great difference in persons from the time they are born."

I suspect that is true. It is a fact that it is easier for some persons to be energetic than for others. Some people are born with *lazy minds*.

Does it ever happen that a boy or girl finds it very hard to get up in the mornings? And it is just as difficult for one person as another, is it not? "No," you

assert, "some persons seem to find it easier than others."

But what if it proved very hard? If it came natural to you to be a little lazy about getting up in the morning, or about going ahead to do anything, what would be the best way to conquer the habit, and overcome it?

If, for instance, you hear the bell ring or the clock strike when you are to get up, is it a good plan to lie for a little while, trying to arouse yourself? Do you fancy you can work yourself up to a pitch of effort in that way?

"You doubt that?" Why? What would happen? "Oh," you add, "one would go to sleep again." Then what is to be done? "Jump quick," you exclaim. Yes, that is the way. There are persons, for instance, who find it very hard to get up in the mornings, and so have an alarm clock right close to them, and they make a point of being out of bed before the alarm has stopped sounding. On the other hand if they wait two or three seconds too long, until the alarm has ended, they may turn over again and go to sleep for another hour.

What, then, is the best way to conquer laziness? Suppose you write the words down: "Jump quick." The lazy man who stops to think is lost.

I wonder if you have ever heard a short proverb about laziness, just six words; something about taking the most pains? Can you recall it?

"Lazy people take the most pains?" Yes. And do you see any sense in that sort of a proverb? Did you not say that a lazy man likes, more than anything else, just doing nothing?

Apply it to the person who wants to get up in the morning at a certain time. Which is easier, after all—to jump quickly or to lie thinking about it for half an hour trying to coax one's self to the point of getting up? Is it not true that in this latter way a person takes the most pains? Will you suggest other examples?

## Points of the Lesson.

I. That the lazy person never does any more work than he has to do.

II. That the lazy person is a loafer and does not try to improve himself.

III. That the lazy person is lazy in his mind. He is a lazy soul.

IV. That the lazy person never acts promptly. He is a shirker.

V. That the lazy person is a selfish person and is of no service to the world.

VI. That the lazy person never conquers his lazy habits; he never conquers anything.

## Poem.

Sweet is the pleasure  
Itself cannot spoil!  
Is not true leisure  
One with true toil?

Thou that wouldst taste it,  
Still do thy best;  
Use it, not waste it,—  
Else 'tis no rest.

Wouldst behold beauty  
Near thee? all round?  
Only hath duty  
Such a sight found.

Rest is not quitting  
The busy career;  
Rest is the fitting  
Of self to its sphere.

'Tis the brook's motion,  
Clear without strife,  
Fleeing to ocean  
After its life.

Deeper devotion  
Nowhere hath knelt;  
Fuller emotion  
Heart never felt.

'Tis loving and serving  
The highest and best;  
'Tis onwards! unswerving,—  
And that is true rest.

—JOHN SULLIVAN DWIGHT.



FURTHER SUGGESTIONS TO THE TEACHER.—All sorts of examples could be introduced in this lesson by way of illustration. It would be well, perhaps, to devote ten minutes to instances showing how a person by getting behind, really has to do more work than if he did it on the instant. Application can be made to school and home life. But it is very important also to point the subject with regard to those who are adults. It will be noticed in this lesson that the main points have been drawn more with regard to the life of boys and men. But the subject should be carried into the life of girls and women, and applied to all the work of the home. Dwell on the lazy way of doing work in the house, of setting a table, of dressing one's self. Point out what a lazy housewife would mean. Show how certain women who have a large household accomplish a great deal more and seem to have more time and leisure for other things than those who may have a small household and more assistance from others. Ask them to explain how it is that such persons have more time for self-improvement, or for doing work for others. A subject like this can be carried on indefinitely, and the children should be encouraged to give any number of illustrations or examples.

## CHAPTER VIII.

### DECEPTION.

#### Proverbs or Verses.

"Deception and treachery make no man rich."

"It is an ill thing to be deceived, but worse to deceive."

"O what a tangled web we weave,  
When first we practice to deceive."

"Who has deceived thee as often as thyself?"—*Franklin*.

"He who whispers, lies."

"The truth will out."

"We live by reposing trust in each other."—*Pliny*.

"Men are never so easily deceived as when they are endeavoring to deceive others."—*Rochevoucauld*.

#### Dialogue.

Did you ever in your whole life by any chance know of a person who tried to deceive? You smile at my question, do you? But why? "Oh," you answer, "because there are many persons who are guilty in this way." Do you mean that an immense number of people are always deceiving somebody? "No," you add, "not always, of course; but they do it sometimes."

Are they usually glad to have other people know of it and observe that they are doing this? Do they take pride in being able to deceive? "Usually not," you tell me. How, then, do they act? "Probably they try to hide it or not to have it discovered," you confess.

You think it is a little as if they were ashamed of it? But is it always so with such people, would you assume? "Oh, they may not care, or sometimes they even boast of it," you reply.

But what sort of persons would *they* be, who boasted of being clever at deceiving? "Why," you explain, "they would be individuals who were decidedly bad, or else persons who had fallen into the habit of it so

completely that they did not think anything about it."

Is that the only reason? Do you think that a person could ever be trying to deceive, and yet not quite know that he was doing it? "Yes," you admit, "that might sometimes take place."

Do you believe that this could occur the first time the person tried it? "No," you add, "probably the first time one tried it one would be sure to be aware of it." It is possible, then, to fall into the habit of deceiving, so that one may do it without really being conscious of it?

But what does a person do when he tries to deceive? Is it always an outright lie? "No," you say, "people may not want to go as far as that." What is it they do, then? "Well, for instance," you point out, "they avoid giving a straight answer. They may say something which has two meanings to it."

How can that be? I ask. "Oh," you assure me, "we might use words which meant one thing to us, and yet we could know that the person we are speaking to did not understand the words quite in the same way. That is one way of getting around the truth and avoiding a straight answer."

But if any one has ever done this to you and you have found it out, how do you feel about it? Do you then appreciate all the distinction he has made and rest satisfied that he has told you the truth?

"No," you continue, "when that is done to *us* we are liable to call it a lie outright." I suspect this is almost everybody's experience. They do not think of it in that way when they do it to others. But when it is done to *them*, there is no distinction in their minds between the black and the white lie.

After certain persons have deceived you in that way, when they tell you something the next time, how do you feel towards them? "Oh," you exclaim, "we do not take what they say for certain. We have our doubts. We think perhaps they are trying to mislead us."

Who, then, suffers the most, do you suppose, in the

long run in that way, the one who is deceived or the one who deceives? For my part, I am strongly inclined to think that the deceiving person in the end gets the worst of it. People do not trust him.

But have you any idea that a person could really deceive himself as well as other people? "Yes," you insist, "that might happen." How is that possible? It seems almost absurd. Can I not know what I am doing, or what I am thinking, or what I feel?

"Yes," you continue, "but one can cheat one's self about one's motive." You mean that if I asked you why you did a thing, you really may have one reason for it and tell me another? And by and by a person can deceive himself in that way by inventing reasons for conduct which at former times he would have been ashamed of?

You see, then, that one may not only deceive other people by one's words, but also mislead one's self in regard to one's reasons or the motives for one's conduct. And so it is possible, perhaps, for a man to tell a straight lie to himself.

What do people deceive for? Why do they do it? Why should they not always come out at once and tell exactly what is on their minds?

"Well, for one reason," you point out, "they may take such a course in order to escape punishment. Perhaps they know they have done something which they have been forbidden to do." But do they really get punished in any other way, do you suppose? "Sometimes," you admit.

In what way, for example? "They may be found out," you say, "and then people lose confidence in them." Besides that, they feel mean in themselves, don't you think, at least at first, when they have been deceiving?

What other motive can you suggest for such conduct? "Well," you continue, "they may do it in order to have persons think well of them."

You mean that they will run the risk of losing an-

other person's respect simply in order to be respected more? I fear you are right.

You have heard the phrase about people who put the best foot forward, or make the best outside possible? And are such persons found out? "Probably?" Why? I ask. "Because," you add, "they fall into the habit of it, and then people begin to notice it and laugh at them for it."

But can there be even worse motives for such conduct? "Yes," you answer, "they may do it in order to gain something from somebody else." But does that not strike you as positively vile, for a person to deceive not merely to avoid punishment, or to look better in the eyes of others, but actually in order to get something from other people?

When we discover that persons have treated us in that way, we just despise them, do we not?

Speaking of this habit of deceiving, how does it usually show itself? "Why," you explain, "it is by the way people talk, what they say to others. One deceives usually by means of words."

But is that the only way? Do you think it might happen that a person's words could be absolutely true, no deception in them at all, and yet that he might be deceiving right along? "Perhaps," you admit; 'he may say one thing in words, and change the impression by the look on his face.'

Is he really guilty, then? He has spoken the exact truth. "Yes," you insist, "but it is deception, nevertheless. He assumed that look on purpose."

Is it only with the face or in what one says, that one can mislead? Might not the face look all truth, and the words be true, and yet a person be able to deceive? "You hardly see how that would be possible?" But what about the tones of one's voice? Is it possible, for example, to say something true, and yet to change the effect of it by the way the words are spoken, or the way you pronounce them?

Suppose I say of a certain individual: "He is a nice man." Can those words have more than one

meaning? Would they always imply that I thought the man I was speaking of, was really a fine person whom I truly admired? "Not necessarily," you confess.

What makes the difference? "One might throw a tone of contempt into the language," you add. "One could emphasize the word 'nice' and really speak as if one were despising the person."

By the way, is it an easy thing, do you suppose, always to avoid deceiving? "No," you reply, "sometimes it comes very hard, indeed." Then you believe that occasionally it may seem more natural or easy to be deceitful than to speak the exact truth?

Do you mean, then, that we could fall into this habit as a matter of course, so that we need to be on the lookout in order to escape it? "Yes, it looks that way," you confess. I must agree with you. It comes very hard sometimes to tell the straight truth. One of the easiest habits to fall into, is this habit of deception.

But why is it so easy? Why should we fall into it so readily? "Well," you answer, "sometimes it may be the quickest way of getting out of a difficulty." You are right. It may not help one out of a difficulty in the long run, but it does so for the moment.

Do boys and girls ever purposely mislead each other? Or do they only deceive grown people? "Perhaps," you say, "they more often try to deceive grown people." And why? "As to that," you continue, "for one reason it may be easier to do so. Boys and girls know each other and are on the lookout for each other."

I wonder what you will think about one other point I wish to put to you? It is bad or mean to deceive anyway; but which is worse—to mislead a person who thoroughly trusts you, or a person who may not like you, perhaps despises you, or has no care for you at all? "In that case," you say, "it would seem even worse to deceive the person who trusts us."

What sort of feeling may come over us sometimes if we have deceived and got ourselves out of a difficulty and afterwards begin to think about it? "Why,"



you add, "perhaps we feel ashamed." Anything more than that? "Yes. We wish that we had not done it."

And why? "Well, for instance," you continue, "it makes one feel mean, or as if one had done something mean. It makes one despise one's self."

Do you fancy that one could go on in this way, being deceitful for a long while, and never come to the point of telling an outright lie? "Probably the lie would come, too," you confess. I am afraid you are right. One begins by deceiving or trying to avoid the straight truth, and by and by one comes to telling outright lies.

At any rate, when any one has deceived you, you usually feel, do you not, that the same person might lie to you the next time?

#### Points of the Lesson.

I. That we can deceive by the way we speak, the way we look, the way we act.

II. That we can deceive by using words in one sense when we know they are understood in another sense by those who hear them.

III. That people who begin by deceiving others, come by and by to deceive themselves.

IV. That if we begin by being deceitful we shall end by telling lies.

V. That deceitful people are always found out after a time and then they are always distrusted by other people.

VI. That deceitful people may not be believed by others, even when they tell the truth.

VII. That deceit usually injures the deceiver more than the person deceived.

#### Duties.

*I. We ought to be straightforward in our language and dealings with others.*

*II. We ought to be straightforward and true in our dealings with ourselves.*

#### Poem.

"Boy, at all times speak the truth"—

FURTHER SUGGESTIONS TO THE TEACHER.—This lesson should be developed with any number of anecdotes. Some of them probably will be suggested by the children themselves. On the other hand, as far as pos-

sible, keep mainly to the general subject with regard to deception through words or looks. Avoid overlapping and entering upon the lesson dealing with "Cheating" or the one concerned with "Exaggeration." At the same time, after having taken up one of these topics, the teacher may naturally refer again to it. But avoid anticipating. The general subject of "Cheating," "Deception," "Exaggeration" or "Untruth" covers such a wide field that it is well to come back to it a number of times. Yet the children will tire of it if the series is made continuous. It is well, therefore, to take up a theme in this way under different topics. One should be especially cautious when bringing out comparisons as to what forms of bad conduct are worse than others, lest for an instant we allow the children to feel as if the lesser evil were of small consequence.

## CHAPTER IX.

### BEING SAVING.

#### Proverbs or Verses.

"He who saves in little things can be liberal in great ones."  
*German.*

"For age and want save while you may,  
No morning sun lasts the whole day."

"Saving comes too late when you get to the bottom."—  
*Seneca.*

"Saving is a greater art than gaining."—*German.*

"Know when to spend and when to spare,  
And when to buy, and thou shalt ne'er be bare."

"Thrift is the philosopher's stone."

"A farthing saved is twice earned."

"He that eats and saves, sets the table twice."

"Cut your coat according to your cloth."

"Waste not, want not—waste makes want."

"Wasting is a bad habit; sparing, a sure income."

"To burn out a candle in search of a pin."

"In the happy family, as in the state, the best source of  
wealth is economy."—*Cicero.*

#### Dialogue.

We seem to come on many habits, good and bad, and you may think there are more bad ones than good ones. But that will depend.

Suppose we talk today about a good habit. We mean by this, do we not, that a habit which is good is always a good habit? "Yes," you say, "of course." For instance, if acting under the influence of generosity you were to give something away to a person who asked for it, when it was really needed for a sick brother or sister at home, was it a good habit, nevertheless? "No," you hesitate.

But if so, it strikes me that you are taking back what you said at first. "Well," you add, "perhaps one good

habit needs to be kept in check by the influence of another good habit." Yes, that is the point exactly.

Have you ever noticed the contrast between two boys or two girls, how, if they have any money given them, one goes at once and spends it, all of it, right away, and how the other may spend only a part at once, or perhaps not spend any of it right away at all, because he has thought the matter over and wishes to keep a part of it to put away somewhere?

How would you describe the conduct of this second boy or second girl? "Why," you explain, "it is being saving." Yes, that is one way of expressing it. But can you think of any special characteristic it suggests—in a short word of one syllable, beginning with T? "Thrift?" Yes; and what does it mean? "Oh, saving one's money," you explain.

But is that it exactly? Suppose a person went on saving his money, not really allowing himself enough to eat or enough clothes to wear, just for the sake of the money, in order to hold it and keep it. Would you call that being thrifty? "No," you tell me, "just the other way. It implies saving one's money *for a purpose*, so as to be able to use it by and by."

How do you speak of the man who saves the money just for itself, denying himself or his family even the necessities of life? "He is a miser," you say. But he is saving, is he not? "Yes," you admit, "in a certain way." But is he thrifty? "Oh, no; on the contrary, he gets no good out of the money. It is of little more value to him when he has a great deal of it than when he had none at all."

Do you recall a phrase we often use in regard to the saving habit, and what it is for? Something to do with the weather? "Yes," you answer, "being ready for a rainy day."

What sense is there in a saying like that? How does the saving habit make us ready for a rainy day? "Why," you point out, "it means that if a man has to work out doors he may not be able to continue at his labor when it is raining, and so he cannot be earn-

ing anything. At such a time, if he has not saved up, he will not be able to buy anything to eat or drink or any clothes to wear."

It strikes you, does it, that being thrifty, in order to be ready for a rainy day, may be a good habit? But is it an easy one to acquire? Why is it, do you fancy, that some people are thrifty and some are unthrifty? "Well," you answer, "some people may not try hard enough." Try what? "Oh, try to be saving."

You feel, do you, that it requires an effort to be saving? But why should that be so? One could be thinking of the pleasure one might get from spending the money by and by.

"Yes," you add, "but that may not be as nice as having the pleasure just now." You assume, do you, that refusing pleasure just now for a greater pleasure by and by does not come easy as a habit?

How would you describe the real purpose that we should have in wanting to have the habit of saving? If I can buy five cents' worth of pleasure today and five cents' worth tomorrow and five cents' worth the day after tomorrow, why is it not as good as fifteen cents' worth all at once?

"As to that," you explain, "perhaps with three times as much money we can get more than three times the worth of satisfaction or pleasure." Yes, that is true. There are certain things we can have only by saving up for them, and it comes pretty hard to do it.

Suppose, for instance, you wanted to make your father or mother a Christmas present, how could you possibly do it without asking them for the money? "Why," you say, "one might save one's pennies for a long while and then have enough to buy something for them."

But could you spend the pennies, all of them, as they come, and be able to do this also? "No," you smile, "that could not be done." I wonder if you have ever heard of a rather slang saying in this connection, and whether you can see any meaning in it? It runs this

way: "You cannot have your cake and eat it, too." That is nonsense, of course.

But do you see any point to it? "Yes," you answer, "it implies that if one spends one's money, then it is gone and one cannot get any good from it by and by. One has to make one's choice."

But do you think that we ought to save all that we get? Should every single penny or piece of money that is given to us be put away in a bank?

"No," you insist, "we need to get some good out of it as we go along." Yes, you are right. One should be allowed to spend a little money or a little something of what one receives.

Then what course might we pursue in order to be saving? What sort of a method could one try? "Why," you suggest, "one might perhaps save half the money that one gets, and put it in a bank, and spend the other half, or save three-quarters, or something of that kind."

But suppose a boy should spend a quarter of what he receives one day, and a half another day, and three-quarters the third day, do you think that boy would ever be able to save very much? "No," you assert, "on the contrary, he would probably end by giving up trying to save altogether."

Why so? He began by saving a good deal. "True," you continue, "but one must have a regular way of doing it, putting aside just so much all the while, or else one will not save at all."

Do you know how grown people sometimes proceed in order to be obliged to have a regular method of saving? What kind of an insurance do they often have, for instance? "Life insurance?"

Yes, you see, people may compel themselves to adopt the habit of saving so much regularly, by taking out what they call "life insurance." Then they must keep up their payments, or else they would lose a great deal by stopping.

But what if a person were trying to be saving, and every time he got so much saved, perhaps twenty-five



cents or fifty cents, or one dollar, he went at once and spent it, and never managed to save more than just that fixed amount, what would be the trouble with that sort of a person?

"Why," you assure me, "his habit was not fixed enough." But can you suggest any method by which he might be able to establish himself more firmly in the habit, and so prevent himself from using that money every time it reached a certain sum?

"Oh," you say, "he might make a resolution." But do you think he would keep it? "You doubt it?" What else could he do? "Well," you answer, "he might put the money where he could not easily get it."

You mean, do you, that he might place it in his father's or his mother's hands, and tell them not to give it back to him at all, until he had saved up two dollars or five dollars, or some other definite amount? In that way he would *compel* himself to improve in the habit of saving.

What is it, in the long run, that keeps people from poverty? "Why," you assert, "it is work, earning one's living." But there are persons willing enough to work, who yet are very poor? "Yes, sometimes," you admit.

Then what is it that makes them poor? "Oh," you tell me, "they may have had bad luck. Maybe they could not get work. Perhaps they are sick or unfortunate."

You think that misfortune or sickness or accident may keep a man poor. But is there any other possible cause? Could people who are unfortunate or even sickly, ever escape from poverty? "It might happen," you add; "they may receive gifts, or be able to earn more money when they do work, even if they cannot work as much as others." Yes, but what if they spend everything as they go along? "In that case," you tell me, "they would be poor under any circumstances."

What else, then, may keep people poor? "Oh," you answer, "being unthrifty, and not having the habit of saving." Yes, that is emphatically true. Poverty

very often comes, as well as great hardship, from carelessly spending as one goes.

But how would it be if one waited until one grew up before cultivating the habit? Why should we begin to save a little even when we are children? "Well," you explain, "perhaps in that case it will come easier to us to save when we are grown men and women." Yes, you are right.

Are there any young men, for instance, just beginning life, who spend every cent they earn every week? Why is it they do this? "Perhaps," you suggest, "they never had the habit of doing otherwise. When money was given them they just spent it and never began the habit of saving anything."

Yes, you are right. One may have to begin by saving what one receives as a gift, in order to form the habit of saving a part of what one earns. If we do not begin it as children we may never begin it at all.

But there is another phase of this habit that is rather strange. Did you ever hear the proverb, "Penny wise, pound foolish?" Suppose I tell you what the words imply.

The word "pound" means a sum of money, about \$5.00, over in England, where the proverb arose. Now suppose a person should be very careful in saving his pennies, never wasting them, but when he had a larger amount, say five dollars, then should go and spend that whole amount on the first thing that came into his mind, how would that strike you?

"Well," you answer, "he might almost as well have spent the pennies all along as fast as he received them." But would it be thrift? "Of a poor kind," you assert.

You mean that being thrifty applies not only to what we do with the small sums we save, but the large sums as well; it depends on the importance of the purpose we spend our money for?

What if a person has saved quite a large sum, several dollars, or even several hundred dollars, and then thinks of some really important thing he wants, and

goes and spends the whole sum because he really required it, would that be unthrifty? "No," you reply, "not if he needed that thing very much." But do you think it was wise of him to spend every cent of all he had saved?

"Perhaps not quite all of it," you confess. Yes, I agree with you. It is a bad kind of thrift to spend every cent of one's savings, even for something very important. Better keep a little in reserve and not let the last cent go.

After all, what is the best purpose of all, would you say, in being saving or thrifty? "Being ready for a rainy day," you answer? Yes, but when the rainy days come, you may be able to borrow something from your friends.

"That is true," you assure me, "but it is not so nice to borrow of one's friends." Why? I ask. "Oh, it makes one dependent on them." You assume then, that one of the highest purposes of thrift is that we may be independent.

Yes, it is a most painful experience if there is nothing left for you but to borrow from somebody. One somehow feels ashamed. It is no longer as if you just depended on yourself. It makes one feel "small."

By the way, let me give you four pretty lines of verse describing the purpose of thrift:

"Not for to hide it in a hedge,  
Nor for a train attendant;  
But for the glorious privilege  
Of being independent."

You see the significance of the verse, do you not? The first man that the poet mentions, is the miser, who wants to save just in order to hide the money away. The second man is the one who wants to make a show, and have a lot of servants attending him.

The third man who wishes to acquire the habit of saving, does it in order that he may not be a burden to others, but can be self-dependent and therefore independent.

## Points of the Lesson.

I. That saving should not be for the money's sake but as a means of self-preservation.

II. That by saving, one can do more with larger resources when these can all be used at once or together.

III. That saving has to be done regularly according to a system, if it is to be acquired as a habit.

IV. That saving is one of the greatest means of avoiding the evils of poverty.

V. That saving is also a great means toward preserving one's self-respect.

VI. That the habit of saving should be formed when people are quite young, if it is to be acquired as a habit.

VII. That people need to be saving about items great as well as small.

VIII. That the habit of saving may preserve us from taxing our friends and being a burden to others.

IX. That the habit of saving is supremely of value, by helping us to be self-dependent, rather than dependent on others.

## Duties.

*I. We ought to save so as to be ready for the "rainy day."*

*II. We ought to save, not for the money's sake only, but in order to be able to put our money to better or larger uses.*

*III. We ought to begin saving when we are young, so as to acquire the habit of saving.*

*IV. We ought not to spend our savings all at once.*

*V. We ought to save so as to become self-dependent and to have our resources in ourselves.*

FURTHER SUGGESTIONS TO THE TEACHER.—In a lesson like this, a biography might be introduced for the purpose of illustration. The teacher should use his own judgment here in the matter of a choice. But he might for instance take up the story of the life of Peter Cooper. It is connected with experiences of struggle and hardship. And the point should be brought out that being saving as a habit can only be cultivated at a sacrifice involving hardship and oftentimes a great deal of struggle. A sketch could be given of the difficulties through which Peter Cooper passed and how finally he amassed his wealth. The

advantage of this biography is that it also points the additional lesson in showing what opportunities one may have later in life to put one's savings to a good use, if one forms the habit in early days. The story should not be completed, therefore, without describing the philanthropy of Peter Cooper; how much good he accomplished with his money; and what a service he was able to render to the world by having had his experiences of struggle and hardship when young and by having acquired the habit of saving in his early days. Naturally the teacher must be on the lookout not to foster the expectation that the habit of saving will necessarily bring wealth. It can be stated that the wealth of Peter Cooper may have come in part by accident of special opportunities. Under any circumstances, however, the young people can see that the habit of saving would be sure to put them in a better position for being of service to the world, whether or not they have a chance to accumulate wealth. There is also the subject of "Poor Richard" and the story of the life of Benjamin Franklin.

## CHAPTER X.

### BEING SOLDIERLY.

#### Proverbs or Verses.

"All are not soldiers who go to the wars."

"He is not a good soldier who fights with his tongue."

"The best soldiers are from the plow."

"The stern joy that warriors feel

In foemen worthy of their steel."—*Sir Walter Scott.*

"A good cause makes a stout heart and a strong arm."

#### Dialogue.

Note to the Teacher.—As boys and girls are always interested in soldiers, it might be well to give two or three lessons to this subject, drawing out the children's views and discovering how much they know about it, at the same time, in a quiet way, introducing the ethical points every now and then, and without making this feature too conspicuous, gradually working up to the point that being soldierly *is a habit*, and that men only become good soldiers by *long drill*.

Did you ever see a soldier in the streets? How does he look? In what way does he seem unlike the ordinary person? "Why," you tell me, "he dresses differently. He wears a uniform."

What do you mean by a uniform? "Oh," you reply, "it is a dress of certain color or certain shape." Quite true. But is that all? "No," you continue, "sometimes he carries a gun or wears a sword."

But if he did not wear any special uniform or carry any weapon, do you think you could ever recognize that a man was a soldier? "Yes, perhaps," you suggest.

How would you know? "By the way he walks, for instance," you say; "the way he holds himself, or the way he stands." But what is the difference between his walk, or the way he holds himself, and the walk of other people?



"In that regard," you add, "it is more *soldier-like*. He stands straighter, holds his shoulders more erect, perhaps."

How many kinds of soldiers do we have? What is the most usual type? "Why," you answer, "the foot soldier, the 'private,' as he is called; the one who marches on foot."

And what other kind of soldiers may there be, who do not march on foot? "Well," you continue, "there are the horsemen, who fight on horseback, the cavalry."

If a country had only cavalry and foot soldiers, would it always be safe? What if ships came sailing over the seas to make an attack? "Oh," you add, "there is also the navy." Yes. Then you would have a third kind of soldier, those who fight on warships.

But do you suppose that all soldiers fight with guns or revolvers or swords? What other class would they have need of in an army? "As to that," you say, "there are the men who look after the cannon or big guns." Yes, that is true. We may call them the artillerymen. But are you going to stop there? Who make the music?

"Oh, yes," you assure me, "there is the band." But are they not soldiers? "True," you answer, "they wear the uniform. They are soldiers. They too must be in the battle, if the fighting is going on."

And how are the men in an army graded? Who ranks above the private soldier? "Oh," you exclaim, "the officers." And what are the titles of some of the officers? "Captain, lieutenant, colonel, general?" Yes. How about the titles of officers on the sea, in the navy? What terms do they have? "Commander?" "Admiral?" Yes.

Now come to the main point. What are soldiers for? "Why, to fight," you assert. Do you mean that all the soldiers in the army at the present time have been in war, and have had to fight? "No, not yet," you admit, "but they may have to do this sometime." But if there should be no more war in this country for

the next fifty years, as long as these men live, would they not have been real soldiers?

"Yes," you insist. And would it not be important to have soldiers in the country just the same? "Perhaps," you answer. Why so? I ask.

"Oh," you add, "we may need to have them so as to avoid the necessity of war." What do you mean by that?

"Why," you explain, "if other nations know that we have soldiers and a good many of them and so can defend ourselves, they are less liable to attack us."

Then you imply that soldiers are here not only for the sake of fighting, but also for the sake of making fighting unnecessary. That is quite an interesting point.

Are all soldiers just alike, do you suppose? "Not by any means," you assert. Why not? A soldier is a soldier. He wears a uniform, is ready to go into battle.

"True," you add, "but some may march better than others, fight better, show more courage. Some will run away more quickly than others."

If so, then which class of soldiers do you think would fight or march or do their work better; those who had been in the army quite a long time, or those who had been there only for a short while?

"Surely," you say, "those who have been in the army quite a long time." But how do you explain that?" I ask. Can not a man study, read books and find out how to be a soldier, and then become a good soldier at once by that means?

You smile at that, I see. But why? "Because," you insist, "a soldier must have drill." What do you mean by that? I ask.

"Why," you point out, "he must march with other men and go through the movements, do what the others do. He must practise." Well, how much? For a week or ten days, do you think?

"No," you add, "for a long time. He must practice a great deal." Why is it that a man cannot walk in

a soldierly way or make the movements at once when they are described to him?

"As to that," you answer, "a man might do it correctly the first time. But it is another thing to do it in that way right along." But what if he keeps thinking about it all the time? "If he must keep thinking about it all the while," you reply, "he would not be able to think about anything else."

What is it, after all, more than anything else, that makes a soldier? What sort of discipline? "Oh," you say, "drill and a good deal of it." You assert, then, do you, that a man must be made to do the same thing over and over again, hundreds of times, until he does it without thinking anything about it. Is that it?

And so being a soldier is something that comes only as a habit, is it; and the true soldier will only be this in so far as he has the habit of a soldier?

And yet, these men will do very little fighting. I suppose if a war were to last several years, very few soldiers would actually be in a battle more than a few times, and that only for a day or two at a time. What is all this drill for? Is it just in order to fit a man for a battle?

"Yes," you insist, "that is what it must be for; just so that a man will be ready to fight when the time comes."

When there is a battle, for instance, what is the feeling in the mind of the soldier, do you suppose? Would he be perfectly quiet, unexcited, just as if it were a time of peace and there were no war at all?

"Oh no," you smile at that; "of course he would be tremendously excited." Why? "Because," you answer, "there would be the danger. He might get killed. Perhaps other people are being killed all around him."

What would happen, if he got too excited? "Oh," you exclaim, "he would be frightened and would want to run away!" Indeed! And what is it that would keep him from being frightened or wishing to escape? "His courage," you reply.

And where does he get that courage? "As to that,"

you explain, "it may come naturally to him." But is that all? Do you think that a man who had never had any experience as a soldier and never was on a field of battle, would be as cool and steady as another who had had long drill? "No," you admit, "it is the drill that does it more than anything else." Yes, I believe you are right.

But what if it were a sudden danger; almost all persons, if they are courageous, can face a sudden danger, can they not? "True," you say, "but if the danger lasts for a long while, a whole day or several days, then it is another matter."

Have you any idea how long men usually have to serve as soldiers in order to receive the proper drill, in those countries where every man has to be a soldier? "Oh, a long while," you say.

Yes. Over in Germany, for instance, most of them are obliged to be soldiers for at least two years. This seems a long time, does it not? Yet there is a difference. Some of the citizens of that country only serve one year. And those are the educated men who graduate from a college. They have to go through the drill for one year, while the uneducated have to undergo it for two or three.

Can you see the reason for this? "Yes," you say, "the educated man can learn more quickly, adapt himself better."

Do you mean that education itself is a kind of drill, a drill for the mind, if it is thorough, somewhat similar to the drill in the legs and arms which a man gets when he becomes a soldier? If so, the educated man has in a way been put through part of a soldier's training, in the hard discipline of study and mental work.

Suppose, however, a man had all the courage that was necessary so that he would never be afraid, and were strong and vigorous so that he could go on marching and never get tired; suppose he knew how to carry a musket or to use a sword as well as any other man. Then do you see why he should need any drill?

"Yes," you assert, "he must be able to learn how to

move with the other soldiers." True. One fighter all by himself would not be good for much. In order to be a real soldier one has to be drilled for days and weeks and months along with others, so that the men can all work together, or move together, or act together.

You see, if in moments of excitement men lose their heads and forget, they may not act together at all, and get all mixed up and confused. Unless they have had the drill, making them all move together in one way without thinking anything about it, they would make poor soldiers when the battle came on.

Suppose now we write down some of the qualities of a good soldier, noting them one by one. What is the first one you would think of? "Courage," you say? Yes. But go on. That is not enough. Must he be strong or be able to endure? "Of course," you assure me. Put that down also: "Endurance."

But what if a man, for instance, was not afraid at all; was brave and bold and able to endure a great deal; yet took his own way and acted as he pleased on the battlefield. Would he be a good soldier? "Not by any means," you exclaim.

Then what would be wanting? What also would he have to do? "Why," you tell me, "he would have to obey orders, do exactly what he is told to do."

You mean to say, then, that a soldier has to obey, just like a child? Very well. Put that down: "Obedience to orders."

Do officers have to obey orders, like the private soldiers? "Yes," you explain, "they must obey the orders of their superior officers." And these superior officers? "Yes, they must obey the orders of the President."

Have we come to the end of the list, do you think? What if a man were to shoot his gun the wrong way, or not know how to load it; would he be a good soldier?

"No," you smile, "of course not." What else shall we put down besides? What other quality? "Knowl-



edge," you add? Yes. He must *know how* to obey orders, and not merely be willing to obey. He must know how to do what he is told to do.

Have we come to the end of this list? Knowledge, the Spirit of Obedience, Endurance, Courage. That is a great deal. But what if he were slow or awkward; would he still be a good soldier? "No, indeed." What else, then, shall we add? "Why," you say, "quickness or promptness." Yes. He must not only know how to do his work, but be able to do it with great quickness or speed.

By the way, do you recall the expression we ordinarily use in speaking of the chief duty of the good soldier, apart from fighting? What is it that he must do? Suppose a man were stationed at a certain spot, and told to stay there, what would it imply? "Why," you answer, "keeping to his post." Yes, that is the word. A good soldier is the man who can keep to his post.

What if he is a picket on guard, and it is dark and he is alone? It is cold, cheerless. There is danger of being shot. There he stands with the one duty before him. You will see that it requires a great many qualities in order to be able to do just that one thing.

And what is it we have said that more than anything else develops these qualities in a man? "Drill," you answer? Yes, it is drill that makes the soldier.

#### Points of the Lesson.

I. That a man becomes a good soldier only by drill, and a great deal of it.

II. That the good soldier must be able to obey orders without asking questions.

III. That being soldierly means having courage and endurance.

IV. That the duty of a soldier is to stand to his post and to obey orders.

V. That being soldierly means being willing to submit to drill and discipline.

FURTHER SUGGESTIONS TO THE TEACHER.—As the subject of soldiers and armies is always of interest to children, additional features could be introduced, if



thought best, through pictures of various kinds. The teacher might get an illustration of a soldier standing at his post, or on the other hand, of some monument of a soldierly figure. In showing this, point out the erect carriage, the way the soldier stands and holds his head, the strength and force latent there. Dwell on all those elements which have come into that figure or person through drill and discipline, and let the young people note these features themselves, if they can do so. Then, too, a picture might be secured of a regiment in the act of marching. This is of value in showing how they are moving together, almost as one man. Here, too, draw out the fact that this has come through the drill and discipline. Let the young people see that acting together in this way can only come by habits of submission to orders, from being accustomed to obey rules. Instead of encouraging the interest of the young people in soldiers on the fighting side, try and attract their attention to those *habits* which make the good soldier. For this reason do not bring in pictures of wars or battles. Let the members of the class feel that all this drill and discipline in making the good soldier, serve rather the purpose of avoiding war, by having an army ready to fight, if necessary, through the drill and discipline which the men have received. Emphasize again and again, as far as it can be done, without making it monotonous, that obedience to orders, with submission to rules, is what makes the soldierly character, developing those characteristics which people especially admire.

## CHAPTER XI.

### CITIZEN SOLDIERS: CHIVALRY.

#### Proverbs or Verses.

"There are soldiers of the plow as well as soldiers of the sword."

"Do you ask me in general, what will be the end of the conflict? I answer, 'Victory.' But if you ask me in particular, I answer, 'Death.'"—*Savonarola*.

"Fear to do base, unworthy things, is valor;  
If they are done to us, to suffer them is valor, too."

"When Duty whispers low: 'Thou must,'  
The youth replies, 'I can.'"—*Emerson*.

"Perfect valor consists in doing without witnesses  
All we should be capable of doing before the world."

—*Roche foucauld*.

"True valor knows as well how to suffer as to act."

"When valor preys on reason it eats the sword it fights with."

#### Dialogue.

If you heard it said of a person: "He is a soldierly man," what would you understand by it?

"Oh," you say, "perhaps it implied that the man at one time had been a soldier. Or possibly it meant that he is a soldier now." But would that be the only suggestion? Could there be any sense in the words if the man never had been in the army?

"Yes," you admit, "it might indicate that the man had soldierly qualities." Fighting, do you think? Would you assume that he was a person fond of quarreling? "No, not quite that," you reply, "it asserts rather that he would make a good soldier if he *had* to be one, or if ever he were to join the army."

That he could make a good, ready-made soldier without drill, do you say? "Oh, no, not that," you reply. "it means that he has certain characteristics which in a real soldier would make a very good one."

Can you explain to me further what it all implies, this idea of being a soldier in time of peace and without uniform? You insist that it does not necessarily make one think of a fighting person. Could a man be soldierly if he had no fight in him at all, if he could not "push" or be vigorous at certain times?

"Oh, no," you assure me. "But there are other forms of fighting besides that in war," you suggest.

In what way, then, could a man show a soldierly, fighting spirit, without wearing a uniform or carrying a musket? "In politics, for example," you say. And would that mean striking men or beating them in any way? "No," you add, "only trying to make his side win."

Then you believe, do you, that it is the part of a true soldier in peace to fight for his side in politics? "Yes," you assert, "if he is on the right side."

You think that a man could not be a true soldier in peace and be on the wrong side? "No," you insist, "although he might be a good fighter." But what would be the trouble in such a man. He might have courage, endurance, promptness, knowledge—just those qualities that we described as being characteristic of a good soldier. Then why would he not be a true one, as well?

"Because," you point out, "the motives also count, and he must have good motives." You are convinced that if he knows he is in the wrong he cannot have true motives as a fighter? Yes, I agree with you.

But how else, for instance, could a man show a soldierly spirit even if he carried no musket or had no uniform? In what way besides in politics? "Oh," you exclaim, "he might stand up for a person who had been wronged." By what means? Should he strike the man who is doing the wrong?

"No, not that," you reply. "He could help the man defend himself by the law in the courts, perhaps; or try to protect him."

But suppose that nothing could be done through the courts. What if a man is being wronged in such a

way that the law cannot help him. Suppose he is being attacked by false statements which are being made about him, and his reputation being injured in that way. How could the true soldier show the right spirit as a fighter?

"Why," you continue, "he could stand up for the man, take his side, deny the charges, show a friendly spirit toward him, let other people see that he was on that man's side."

Does this take courage, do you say? "Yes, indeed, any amount of it." Why? I ask. What courage should it require just to stand up for another man? It does not injure one's life or property.

"True," you answer, "but to uphold an unpopular man may make a person also unpopular, and so one may have to bear some of the charges the other man has to bear."

Does it ever happen, for instance, that a boy or girl in school may become unpopular among the others, and yet be a really good, fine boy or girl, so that the unpopularity is not fair or right? "Yes," you continue, "that might occur."

But if so, would it be perfectly easy to take his side? "Not exactly," you admit. Why not? "Oh, because it would make other boys or girls laugh at us. It would make us unpopular, too."

Then it may call for a man with truly soldierly qualities to stand up for an unpopular person and defend him? I certainly believe you are right. Oftentimes it requires the greatest amount of courage to be just and true toward people who are unpopular.

But what about people who are in distress? Do you see any way by which a man could show himself soldierly on such occasions? "Why, yes," you add, "he might help or protect the person in distress." You think that if a man had lost all his money, and his family were in need, that it would be showing a soldierly characteristic to go and assist the family or to manifest a spirit of sympathy?

By the way, did you ever hear the word "chivalry?"

What does it mean? "Yes," you answer, "it applies to soldiers who used to wear armor and rode on horseback and fought one another with swords and lances."

And what did they call such soldiers in the days of chivalry, who used to fight in that fashion. "Knights?" Did they fight with guns, do you suppose, with revolvers, with rifles? "No," you say, "more often with swords." Then do you imply that any soldier who wore armor and fought on horseback with such weapons, would be truly chivalrous or represent chivalry?

What if he were a splendid fighter and displayed any amount of courage, but were discourteous to women. Would that be chivalry? "Oh, no," you assert, "he would not have been a true knight if he had been discourteous to women."

Then being chivalrous meant sometimes more than fighting on horseback and wearing armor; it implied being courteous, respectful or reverent toward women? But what else? Suppose a soldier were a splendid fighter, very brave and strong. But what if he should happen to see a lame man and shoved him aside out of the way? Would that be chivalry?

"Not by any means," you answer. But why? again I ask.

"Oh, well," you add, "it would be mean, unworthy of the true soldier to treat a man in that way, who had an infirmity." Then being chivalrous meant also showing respect for the weak or unfortunate, did it?

Does not this imply that there could be chivalry now-a-days just as much as hundreds of years ago; that a man might show the spirit of chivalry if there were no more war, or if he did not wear armor or uniform?

As a soldier he could protect the unfortunate, show respect for the weak or infirm, have regard and reverence for women. He could fight for those who were in trouble and stand up for the unpopular man. He could do all this, could he, in time of peace?

If that is true, perhaps we might be glad to have peace soldiers as well as war soldiers.

## Points of the Lesson.

I. That a man can have a true soldierly spirit without being in the army or fighting in war.

II. That the true soldier is the man who fights for the right, even when there is no glory in it—putting the same energy in such effort that other men may put into real bloodshed or war.

III. That a soldier must have right motives, else he is not a true soldier—and so also of the man with the soldierly spirit.

IV. That being soldierly may mean standing up for the man who has been wronged—taking the side of persons who have made themselves unpopular by doing what is right.

V. That to be soldierly in spirit means displaying chivalry and obeying the principles of chivalry.

VI. That chivalry implies taking the side of the weak or infirm, showing peculiar respect to those less strong than one's self, and in the third place paying a high regard to woman.

## Poem.

Once, as many German princes  
Feasting sat at knightly board,  
Each began to boast the treasures  
He within his lands had stored.

Cried the Saxon: "Great and mighty  
Is the wealth, the power I wield,  
For within my Saxon mountains  
Sparkling silver lies concealed."

"Mine's the land that glows with beauty!"  
Cried the ruler of the Rhine;  
"In the valleys yellow cornfields,  
On the mountains noble wine!"

"Wealthy cities, spacious castles,"  
Lewis said, Bavaria's lord,  
"Make my land to yield me treasures  
Great as those your fields afford."

Wurtemberg's beloved ruler,  
Everhard, called "the Bearded," cries,  
"I can boast no splendid cities,  
In my hills no silver lies;

"But I still can boast one jewel:  
Through my forests, wandering on,  
All my subjects know me—love me—  
I am safe with every one."



Then the princes, all together,  
Rose within that lofty hall:  
"Bearded count, thou'rt rich," they shouted,  
"Thou art wealthiest of us all!"

—*Anonymous.*

FURTHER SUGGESTIONS TO THE TEACHER.—An unlimited opportunity is offered in this chapter for discussion and illustration. The lesson could be lengthened out by talking about "Knights" in the days of chivalry; what kind of men they were, the armor they wore, how they used to fight—also showing pictures of the subject. The children could be asked whether they knew anything about King Arthur and the Knights of the Round Table. Some incidents connected with that story could be introduced. But the main point of it all should be to make the children feel that chivalry not only pertained to those days, but that the spirit of it ought to be preserved and maintained at the present time. It is a beautiful word, chivalry, and one that boys and girls should appreciate. Perhaps the tables could be turned and the girls asked in what way they could be chivalrous, or in what way they might show themselves *unworthy* of being treated in a chivalrous spirit. Make it plain that girls have their work to do as well as boys, in chivalry. The point with regard to standing up for the unpopular person can be brought home to the girls by suggesting how they can show courage in being helpful under such circumstances. If the teacher wishes to use a biography, he might introduce something concerning the life of Prince Albert, the husband of the late Queen Victoria of England. One could dwell on the fine qualities of chivalry this man exhibited, the peculiar delicacy and difficulty of his position, the soldierly qualities he displayed in the arts of peace, and what he did in arranging for the first great World's Fair ever held, in the Crystal Palace at London. If the photograph is also available, the teacher could introduce a picture of the Albert Memorial Monument in London, describing how this monument was erected in honor of that Prince, who had shown such fine soldierly qualities in civil life and

lived up to the principles of chivalry in the arts of peace. It is significant that this should have been done in honor of his memory, this great monument erected, as if he had been one of the great soldiers or warriors of England. The older pupils would be interested perhaps, in having their attention called to the fact that Tennyson should have dedicated his "Idyls of the King" to Prince Albert.

## CHAPTER XII.

### AMBITION.

#### Proverbs or Verses.

"Ambition is as hollow as the soul of an echo."

"Ambition is the last infirmity of noble minds."

"Ambition is the way in which a vulgar man aspires."—*Beecher.*

"Ambition, thou powerful source of good or ill."—*Young.*

"Black ambition stains a public cause."—*Pope.*

"By jumping at the stars you may fall in the mud."

"He that cuts above himself will get splinters in his eyes."

"He would fain fly, but wants feathers."

"There is no eel so small but it hopes to become a whale."  
—*German.*

"Vaulting ambition o'erleaps itself."—*Shakespeare.*

"He that will not strive in this world should not have come into it."—*Italian.*

"He who strives to do, does more than he who has the power."

"If I were a cobbler, I'd make it my pride,  
The best of all cobblers to be;  
If I were a tinker, no tinker beside  
Could mend an old kettle like me."

"If what shone far so grand,  
Turns to nothing in thy hand;  
On again! the virtue lies  
In the struggle, not the prize."

"He who does not improve today will grow worse tomorrow."—*German.*

#### Dialogue.

Suppose a boy or girl in school is working very hard indeed, trying to do better than any of the other boys and girls, so as to get ahead of all of them, if possible. What would you call that?

"Showing off," you say; "trying to be smart; want-

ing to get favor with the teachers." True, those might all be motives for such conduct. But that is not what I mean. What is the one habit that would explain it; a big word of three syllables? "Ambition?" Yes, that is the word I am thinking of.

And now that you have spoken of it as showing off, evidently you do not think much of such a habit. "Well," you add, "it depends a good deal as to what one is ambitious about, or what the real purpose of the ambition may be."

You assume, then, do you, that there may be more than one kind of ambition, so that sometimes it may be a good habit, and then again it may be a bad habit? In this special case that I mention, what was it that made you speak rather slightly of the *motive*. The language you used was most contemptuous.

"Why," you explain, "all that boy or girl was trying to do was just merely to get ahead of the others. And this would not be the very best sort of a purpose to have."

Yes, but stop a moment and reflect. Is that not just what you do when you play? When you are at a game, do you not try to get ahead of others? Is not that a form of showing off? "True," you admit, "but then, that is play."

You mean that the motives should be different according as the effort applies to play or to work? I certainly agree with you. You believe, then, that merely trying to "show off" in one's work is not a very fine sort of a motive or a high sort of ambition?

But would not that be a spur, for example, to urge the boy or girl on to very hard work, and so make them very studious and help to develop habits of study?

"It depends," you answer, "on what kind of persons the other boys and girls are; if they do not amount to much, are not very studious, or have not much mind, then it may be very easy to pass ahead of them and to shine, even without the habit of study."

You evidently do not approve of the motive of ambition as a habit of showing off. But tell me, in what

case would it really imply a good habit? "Why," you point out, "if we try very hard to please our teacher or our father or mother, because we are fond of them and want to have them think well of us."

It is certainly a nice and beautiful distinction you make between the motive to get ahead of others, and the desire to win other people's approval. But can you suggest another form of ambition? What do we have in mind sometimes when we say that a man is trying to rise in the world?

"Oh," you answer, "it may mean trying to make money." Yes, but make money for what purpose? I ask. "Why," you continue, "it is when the money is desired so that one can have more position or be more of a person, have more influence."

How would you describe, for instance, the boy or girl who is supposed to have a good deal of influence? "It would be the one who is a kind of leader," you add, "one who is ready with suggestions as to what to do; the one who can take the lead in play, propose games; or the one who has ideas or opinions, and can make those opinions accepted by others."

And do you think it would be quite right for a person to be ambitious to have influence in that way? Would it be the same as trying to show off or to get ahead of others?

"No, not exactly the same thing," you tell me; "in having influence one may be doing a service, helping others. If one knows more than they do, one can be a guide to them."

Then you think that ambition as a desire to be of influence, may after all be a good and true motive, while the mere effort to show off is otherwise.

But when you hear a person spoken of contemptuously or with indignation, as being very ambitious, what usually comes to your mind? What sort of persons in history are usually considered to have been the ambitious ones? "The conquerors," you suggest, "the soldiers, the men who have been tyrants or ruled over others."

Yes, that is the phrase I am thinking of: "Ruling over others." Bad ambition may imply just the sheer habit of trying to rule. But what is the difference between this and having influence over others?

When you seek to influence a person, what do you appeal to, usually? You would not strike him, would you? "No," you assert. Would you laugh at him? "No?" Why not? "Oh, laughing would prejudice him against us," you say, "instead of influencing him."

But what would you do? "Why, we should speak to him, talk to him, argue with him." Then what is it in the person that you appeal to? "His mind," you answer. Yes, in trying to have influence over a person, we aim to reach his mind, and so to make him think and feel as we do.

But do you fancy you would try to do it in this way if you felt sure you were in the wrong; if you knew you were mistaken? "No," you admit, "we do this because we are convinced that we are right."

Then the form of ambition which seeks to have influence over others, really means, does it, trying to have the right or the truth influence *them* just as you think it influences *you*.

When, however, a person is ambitious to rule over others, does he appeal to their minds? "No," you say, "he wants that others should obey whether they agree or not. He desires to control others."

What is it that the tyrant, then, most enjoys? "He likes to command people; to make them obey." And how does he accomplish it?—by helping the person, by influencing his mind?

"No," you assert, "more often he does it by conquering him, injuring him." Then bad ambition, you imply, is of a kind that tends to injure people. It is the desire just to rule over them whether right or wrong.

What, then, is the thing we say the ambitious man, in so far as his motive is bad, most cares for? Can you suggest the word? It has only five letters in it and begins with a "p." "Power?" Yes. Bad ambition cares mainly or only for power.



Now to come back to the other kind, the good ambition. Take the example we spoke of at the outset, the boy or girl who is studying hard. "Why," you say, "if the desire is to win the approval of older persons or one's teachers, then it is worthy." But can you suggest any other still higher kind of motive, than just seeking for the approval of others?

What if, for instance, a boy or girl did not study hard, but only tried to look as if he were doing so, and in that way won the approval of the teachers or his elders? "Oh," you continue, "that would be sham or make-believe. It would be a kind of lie."

What, then, would be the true sort of ambition at the bottom of all, in the desire to please your teachers or your elders? "Why," you explain, "It would be the effort to improve ourselves."

But do you see any resemblance at all between this and the desire of trying to get power, the bad kind of ambition you spoke of? "Oh, no," you assure me, "of course they are quite different."

I am not quite sure about that. Is the boy who is trying to improve himself not trying to get power? "Yes," you admit, "he may be trying to get power over himself, or the kind which comes with knowledge." Then you see, after all, good ambition is also a desire for power, only of another kind.

I remember having seen a line from an English poet that ran as follows:

"Ambition, thou powerful source of good or ill!"

What sense do you make out of that, or does it mean anything at all?

"Why," you tell me, "it implies just what we have been saying, that sometimes ambition may be good and then again it may be bad."

What was the bad kind? "The desire just merely to rule over others or to shine more than others?" Yes, and what was the good ambition? "Oh, the wish to improve one's self."

But do you think that one can have too much of the

good kind, too much desire to improve one's self? "We don't see how that is possible," you continue.

Then let me quote another proverb and will you tell me whether you notice any reference in it to the point we are discussing? It reads this way:

"By jumping at the stars you may fall in the mud."

Do you see how anyone could do a silly thing like that? What allusion do you recognize there to the subject of ambition? "As to that," you say, "it means aiming too high, trying to reach a point beyond one's capacities."

Did you ever hear of people who fancy they have certain gifts when they do not have them? Could you imagine a person trying to become a great artist, to do wonderful things in painting, for example, when not really having any capacity in that direction?

Would such ambition be wrong? He would be trying to improve himself, to make himself a great painter. "Oh, yes," you exclaim, "but, then, he could not succeed because he has no gifts in that line."

And what usually becomes of such persons, who try to do things quite beyond them? "Why," you explain, "they usually fail to do anything at all, or make themselves laughed at."

And now do you see any sense in that proverb? How would you describe the person who jumped at the stars? "Why," you point out, "it would be the one who tried to achieve something he was utterly incapable of, or not at all fitted for."

#### Points of the Lesson.

I. That ambition may be good or bad according to the motive behind it.

II. That bad ambition means the desire to get power over others whether it is good for the others or not.

III. That bad ambition means striving after glory, whether one deserves it or not.

IV. That bad ambition means trying to be as important as others or to rise above others by trying to do what one is unfit for or quite incapable of.

V. That good ambition implies the effort to improve one's self, so as to achieve all that one is capable of.

VI. That good ambition means the effort to get influence, so as to be of service to others.

VII. That good ambition tries to win influence over the minds of people rather than to have power over people themselves.

#### Duties.

*I. We ought to try and improve ourselves, so as to make the best use of the gifts with which we are endowed.*

*II. We ought to try to be of influence in the world, so as to be of service to others.*

*III. We ought to care for power only in so far as we can do the most good with it.*

*IV. We ought to strive for the esteem of others, if it is an esteem we deserve.*

#### Poem.

“Try, Try, again”—

FURTHER SUGGESTIONS TO THE TEACHER.—If thought best, this lesson could be divided into two parts, one session being devoted to “bad” ambition and the other to “good” ambition. It must all depend on the interest in the subject displayed by the members of the class. Opportunities for illustration through biography are manifold. A story of some life could be given, where complete failure had occurred through overreaching one’s self in “vaulting” ambition. And then on the other hand, by contrast another life could be brought forward, where the ambition was of a good kind, in the effort to be of real service to the world. Care must be taken not to throw contempt on the desire for the esteem of others. This would be pushing the spirit of resignation too far. More is accomplished if we emphasize the importance of putting one’s power or influence to the service of others, and not seeking it just for its own sake. Love of power as power is what we most wish to condemn in dealing with the phases of good and bad ambition. Inasmuch as the desire for achievement is supposed more often only to apply to men, it might be

well, on the other hand, to bring out the good side of this ambition as it has shown itself in woman. In order to do this, there is an excellent example in the life of the artist or great animal painter, Rosa Bonheur. The teacher might sketch the career of this woman in some detail, telling of her methods of work, the course she pursued in order to perfect herself in her art, the patience and persistence of it all, the love she had for art itself and its ideals, the simplicity of her life, and her devotion to the one purpose before her. It all makes a beautiful and most effective narrative. A few pictures could be introduced in connection with the story, especially the beautiful one where she stands with her arm resting on the head of a calf. It would be well also for the boys to learn of this biography, in order that they may appreciate better how woman may likewise be capable of great achievements and win renown and glory, if she has the right kind of ambition.

## CHAPTER XIII.

### PROCRASTINATION.

#### Proverbs or Verses.

"Procrastination is the thief of time;  
Year after year it steals till all are fled."—*Young*.

"A sluggard takes a hundred steps because he would not take one in due time."

"At evening the sluggard is busy."—*German*.

"Go to the ant, thou sluggard; consider her ways and be wise."—*Bible*.

"The sluggard makes his night until noon."

"The sluggard's guise; loathe to go to bed and loathe to rise."

"'Tis the voice of the sluggard; I hear him complain,  
'You have waked me too soon, I must slumber again.'"  
—*Watts*.

"What better is a house for a sluggard rising early."

"'A slothful man never has time.'—*Italian*.

"Time and tide wait for no man."

"The good time comes but once."

"What greater crime than loss of time?"

"Who has no time, yet waits for time, comes to a time of repentance."

#### Dialogue.

We shall talk today about a very big word. It is long and has four syllables. Yet I presume you have heard it a great many times. It is one of those large words that we become acquainted with when we are quite young. Our mothers use it, and our teachers.

It describes a habit we are liable to fall into, and one which exasperates our elders very much. Can you guess what it is—a long word of four syllables, beginning with P, and suggesting a bad habit that boys and girls very often display. "Procrastination?"

Yes, and what sort of a way of doing things does it indicate? Would it imply going ahead promptly about

everything? "Oh, no," you answer, "it means rather putting off what one has to do."

Would you say that any person who ever puts off doing any piece of work is guilty of procrastination? What if there is something which I should like very much to do today, but which I cannot possibly attend to, and so I defer it until later?

"No," you answer, "that would not be what we have in mind." Then what kind of putting off would imply such a bad habit? "Why," you explain, "putting off until later something which one might really do now."

Suppose, however, I have two pieces of work which I want very much to do today, but cannot do both of them. What if I defer the one which is very easy and do the difficult one today? Would that be procrastination? "No," you admit.

What, then, is the difference? "Why," you continue, "procrastination would rather mean putting off something which is hard, and that one would rather not do, and doing the easier thing first." I suspect you are coming nearer to the true explanation now.

What kind of persons would you say are given to this habit? Lazy people, or busy people? "Oh," you answer, "the lazy ones, of course."

And so you think, do you, that busy persons never procrastinate? What if you had a lot of things to do and kept yourself occupied all day doing the easy things, and putting off the hard work until some other time, you would be a busy person, would you not? "Yes," you hesitate.

Then you would not be procrastinating, I suppose? "Oh yes," you admit. After all, you agree, do you, that even a busy person could have this bad habit?

But do you mean that all lazy people procrastinate? "Yes, indeed," you assert. Then we note, do we, that all lazy people and a good many busy people are guilty of this habit?

How do you suppose it is that people fall into the habit of procrastinating, or putting off? Should we not assume that one would like to have all the hard



work out of the way? "Yes," you answer, "but perhaps one fancies that when tomorrow comes it will be easier to do the hard work than it would be to do it today."

It may be you are right. What, however, is the actual experience? What if you do put off the hard thing until tomorrow? Would you really find it any easier to do, than doing it right off at first? "Yes," you insist, "sometimes. Perhaps something may occur which will make it easier."

But how will it be, usually? "Why," you confess, "probably it will be just as hard as ever."

But is that all? Will it not be even harder the second day than the first? How do you explain the fact that when tomorrow comes we may feel even more disinclined to go ahead and do what we have put off?

What is it in ourselves under such circumstances, that seems weaker than yesterday? "The will?" Yes. Somehow the will inside of us seems weaker the second day than the first, and that is what makes the work even harder to do.

But when people really do put off until tomorrow what they were going to do today, do they usually attend to it when tomorrow comes? "Oh, no," you smile at that. You mean, do you, that what is put off may never be done at all? I am afraid you are right.

If, for example, you put off until tomorrow something which is rather hard to do today, and which you are not inclined to do, suppose the day after tomorrow again you have something hard to do, are you more or are you less disposed to put that off also? "There is no question about that," you confess.

But why? "Oh," you say, "putting off becomes a habit." Yes, that is true, and it is a habit that follows some people to the very end of their lives.

Does it make any difference to other people, however, whether we ourselves have this habit? Will other people care, do you think?

If you have the habit of procrastinating, can people then rely on your conduct? Can they know what

you will do and what you will not do? "We fear not," you say. Then could you be trusted in the same way that others could be trusted who do what they have to do at once?

You see, it does make a great deal of difference to other people. We may easily lose the confidence of others by falling into the habit of putting off.

I wonder if you have ever heard a line of poetry about procrastination, something to do with "time" and a "thief." It comes from an old volume entitled Young's "Night Thoughts," and runs like this:

"Procrastination is the thief of time."

Do you detect the point of that quotation? Could anybody steal from time? "Yes," you say, "by taking up our time in talking to us or interrupting us when we are busy, and so preventing us from doing something."

Suppose I have a habit of putting off, do I accomplish more, or in the end, less? Do I waste anything? "Why," you explain, "One wastes time, of course." And is that the way the habit of procrastination affects us? It makes one waste one's time. Hence one does very much less, and somehow has a shorter life, because there is so much less accomplished.

#### Points of the Lesson.

- I. That procrastination implies the habit of putting off.
- II. That it means doing the easy things first, and putting off the more difficult ones.
- III. That even a busy person may procrastinate.
- IV. That it is really harder to do the next day what we put off until tomorrow, than it would have been to do it at once.
- V. That putting off one thing until tomorrow gets us into the habit of putting off everything.
- VI. That this habit makes us less trusted by others.
- VII. That this habit steals our time and makes our life seem shorter, because we accomplish so much less than we should otherwise.

#### Poem.

We are but minutes—little things,  
Each one furnished with sixty wings  
With which we fly on our unseen track,  
And not a minute ever comes back.

We are but minutes—yet each one bears  
A little burden of joys and cares.  
Patiently take the minutes of pain—  
The worst of minutes cannot remain.

We are but minutes—when we bring  
A few of the drops from pleasure's spring,  
Taste their sweetness while we stay—  
It takes but a minute to fly away.

We are but minutes—use us well,  
For how we are used we must one day tell;  
Who uses minutes has hours to use—  
Who loses minutes whole years must lose.

FURTHER SUGGESTIONS TO THE TEACHER.—It might be well in this lesson to introduce anecdotes from biographies or any history concerning misfortunes which have occurred through the neglect to act promptly, or through the "habit" of putting off. For this purpose even stories where the evil outcome has been very great would be effective. It may be worth while to give a *shock* to the minds of the young, by this means. They hear much about procrastination and may think of the evils coming from it as being of minor importance. It is one of those habits the hardest to deal with and the most difficult to overcome. In actual life sometimes it is conquered only through a sharp and most painful experience. Facts of history or biography would be better than mere stories. If desired, an account might be given, quite thrilling in its character, of the first ascent of the lofty peak, the Matterhorn, in the Alps. One can describe how the party started out with their guides, and with great difficulty at last reached the summit in triumph, after all the failures of former parties to win the glory of this achievement. Then it could be narrated how they started down the mountain, fastened together by a rope, still proud of their work, and thinking what glory they should win and how all the world would soon hear of it; and how within a few steps of the summit the foot of one of the number slipped, causing him to fall; how the rope broke with a snap, and how this man, with three

others, fell several thousand feet down the precipice and lay dead on the ice and snow at the foot of the mountain. Then point out how one of those who had been in the rear and had been saved, afterwards examined the shoes of the man who had slipped, and discovered that the rough nails the mountain climbers always used over there, had been worn nearly smooth on one foot. Hence this young fellow, a nobleman of England, brave and strong as he was, by procrastinating about having the nails fixed to his shoes, had lost his own life and caused the death of several others. The story has been told most graphically by the leader of the party, and it could be made quite effective as bringing home a lesson on the evils of procrastination.

## CHAPTER XIV.

### HABITS OF PLAY.

#### Proverbs or Verses.

"Play not with a man until you hurt him nor jest until you shame him."

"An hour of play discovers more than a year of conversation."

"What is sport to the cat is death to the mouse."—*German and Danish.*

"What is play to you is death to us."—*Fable of Boy Stoning the Frogs.*

"Play is not for gain, but sport."—*Geo. Herbert.*

"Play—that is, activity, not pleasures—will keep children cheerful."—*Jean Paul Richter.*

"A jest driven too far brings home hate."

Work while you work,  
Play while you play,  
That is the way  
To be happy and gay."

"Better lose a jest than a friend."

"He that would jest must take a jest,  
Else to let it alone is best."

"A day's pleasures and a year's grief."

"A man of pleasure is a man of pains."—*Young.*

"Fly the pleasure that will bite tomorrow."

"We should play to live, not live to play."

"What is play to the strong is death to the weak."

"There are games which it were better to lose than to win."  
—*Latin.*

"The more skillful the gambler, the worse the man."—*Syrus.*

"He who hopes to win what belongs to another deserves to lose his own."

"Many players lose in an hour what they cannot gain back in a lifetime."

#### Dialogue.

When you see boys and girls running up and down the street, chasing each other, moving around in all

sorts of ways, leaping, jumping, talking, laughing—what do you say they are doing?

“Why,” you exclaim, “they are at play; they are amusing themselves.” But is there any sense in that, any purpose or good in it?

“No,” you tell me, “it has no special purpose; nothing to do with ‘good.’ It is just play.” Yes, I know. But what is it done for? Why do you run and jump and laugh and talk, and like to go out together and amuse yourselves?

“Oh,” you answer, “there is no reason. We just like it. It is pleasure and nothing else.” But don’t you think it is rather foolish, then, to be doing something that has no purpose in it, no special good in it one way or the other? Don’t you think one ought to be a little ashamed of wasting one’s time in that way?

“Well,” you assert, “if we ought to be ashamed, at any rate we all do it.” Yes, but if somebody told you that you ought not to play and advised you not to play any more, do you think you would follow his advice? “No,” you answer, “we should go on playing just the same.”

After all, then, you assume, do you, that it is perfectly right and just to play, to have a good time, even if there is no reason in it?

But suppose boys and girls never did anything but play from morning till night all the year round. Would it be all right? “No,” you confess, “we suppose not.”

Yes, but you said it was right to play, to amuse one’s self, even if there was no purpose in it. Then why not play all the time, never do anything else? “Oh, well,” you add, “that would be another thing; it would injure us, do us harm.”

Why should it do you any harm if play is natural and right? “As to that,” you answer, “if we played all the time we should not improve ourselves. We should never become educated.”

But you would grow up just the same; you would become men and women, even if you never did anything else but just play? “Yes and no,” you answer.



"A person might be grown up and yet not exactly be a man or a woman."

Well, then, what would he be? "Oh," you explain, "a sort of a child." You mean that a grown man or woman could be a child? What sense is there in that? "Why," you point out, "they would act just like children, and not work or be serious like grown men and women." Are you not serious when you play? "No, not exactly," you answer. Well, what are you doing? "We are just amusing ourselves," you say.

Then what do you think "being serious" implies, unlike just amusing one's self? You add: "It means thinking about tomorrow, working with some purpose in view, doing what we are doing now so that it shall have some kind of a result at some future time."

In play, then, you think only just of the moment when you are playing, only of being amused, while "being serious" means thinking about the future, having some reason for what you are doing?

Which persons are given more to play, grown people or children? "As to that," you say, "of course children play much more than grown people." And why? "It comes natural," you answer. "Children care more about play." Then how would you feel if a grown man or woman were given to play just as much as children are? Would you think as highly of them?

"Not by any manner of means," you tell me. But why not, if play is natural? "Oh," you insist, "they are not children." Why is it that you would rather despise grown persons if they did nothing else but play, or if they were given to play as much as children?

"Well, for one thing," you continue, "if they were to live in that way there would be nobody to care for us or provide for us as children. Somebody must be serious in order that we can live."

But it strikes me it is rather selfish that you should want grown people to be serious just so that you can amuse yourselves and have a good time.

"Yes," you add, "but there is more besides; a grown

person has all his education, all his experience. He has powers of strength which we do not have. He would be wasting it all, if he did nothing else but play."

Then you mean, do you, that if we *waste* our capacities or our strength and do not use them to a purpose we do wrong? You feel somehow that merely thinking all the time about amusing himself and nothing else, for a grown man would not be right, or that it would not be right if he did it as much as children do? You assume that grown people somehow ought to be more serious.

What do you think play really does for a grown person? What is the use of it all? Let me ask you, for instance. Suppose you are extremely tired, after playing or working very hard indeed, tired in mind and body. What do you like to do? "Rest, and do nothing more," you say?

Now when a grown man is tired—suppose he has worked very hard all day—what does he like to do in the evening? Does he care always to just rest and do nothing more? "No," you tell me, "he may like to amuse himself."

Do you see, then, any purpose that play may serve for a grown person? If that is what he likes to do when he is tired, then what good may it do for him if he goes and amuses himself with play of some kind?

"Oh," you assert, "it rests him." Yes, that is the whole point. When people are grown up, they want to play oftentimes just in order to get rested, so that they can work better. It is, therefore, a good thing to try and encourage our fathers and mothers to amuse themselves, have a game, or to go out in the evening just for the sake of getting rested.

But does it strike you that when you play with all your might and main, it rests you? "No," you assert, "afterwards we feel tired."

Then play evidently tires children and rests grown people. Now that you have found that play does some-

thing for grown people, can you think of any purpose it serves for children?

For instance, when children are romping, running, playing together, what effect may it have on the body? What is the way, for instance, to make the body grow; to make the muscles strong? "Exercise," you answer. Then it may help to develop the body or strengthen the muscles when you are not thinking about it.

What is the difference usually between the plays or games of grown people and the plays or games of children? Can you name one of the amusements of grown people? "Chess?" you say. "True." Now what part of themselves are they exercising when they are playing at chess; their muscles? "Not much," you answer; "rather their minds."

But how is it when you are out playing in the street, having running games; what part of yourself is very active; your minds? "Yes, to some extent," you assure me. But your minds more than anything else? "No," you admit, "our muscles or body."

Then with children play means rather an exercise of the muscles of the body, whereas with grown people it often implies using a certain part of their minds. When, however, you are at a game of any kind, what are you trying to do? Suppose it is baseball or something of that kind? "Oh," you say, "we are trying to win the game." Trying to beat some other boy or some other girl? Is it that? "Yes, surely."

But does it not strike you that doing anything of that kind is selfish? Are you not trying to get ahead of some other boy or girl; to surpass them if you can; or to keep them back if possible? Now, would this not be the same thing as if among grown people one were trying all the time to get ahead of somebody else, to keep him back and not let him succeed?

"No," you insist, "in the one instance it is only play. And play is not serious; it only pertains to the immediate moment."

You mean, do you, that in play you are not trying

to get ahead of the other for your whole life? Well, if so, that is a very interesting point.

Suppose in the struggle of earning your living you kept another person back by forcing yourself ahead of him. What do you do to him? "Oh," you confess, "we injure him. Besides helping ourselves forward we prevent him from succeeding."

But how is it in a game? "Why, in that case," you tell me, "it is the other way. There is no injury done if one wins and the other loses, because it is a mere game."

If play in the effort to win is not selfish, did you ever see a boy or girl who was selfish in play? "Yes, indeed," you exclaim.

But how is that possible when you say there is nothing selfish in trying to beat others in games?

"Why," you answer, "one could try to keep all the pleasure for one's self and not let others share in the game."

Do you think, for instance, that if there was a game at which only four could play and five were present, it would be selfish for four of them to go on playing all the while and leave the other one out? "Yes, surely," you confess.

But why? It is only play. What could you do and yet have your game? "Oh," you reply, "we could take turns, letting the fifth person now and then join in and one of us step out for a while."

But is there any other way by which people could be selfish in play? selfish in the game? "Yes," you answer, "they can be disagreeable."

What do you mean by that? "Oh, they can be cross or out of sorts when they do not win or are not coming out ahead." But why is that selfish?

"Because," you explain, "it makes the others feel uncomfortable; it spoils the pleasure of the game." You think, do you, that those who play in the right spirit ought to be cheerful and pleasant, even if they are beaten? But is that an easy thing? "Not very," you admit.

I wonder, too, whether you have ever seen boys or girls who, right in the middle of the game would stop, break it up and say, "I won't play." What did they do it for? "Oh," you answer, "just in order to be disagreeable, because they could not have their own way. They wanted the game run just in the manner they liked, whether the others wanted it that way or not."

Where there are eight or ten boys and girls playing together, and one or two of them want it one way, and the others want it another way, is it right for the one or two to decide? "No," you insist, "that would be selfish, because they would be only one or two, and there would be so many more who preferred to have it the other way." Yes, there is nothing much more selfish than the habit of saying, "I won't play," just because one cannot have things exactly the way one wants them.

What if there are several persons, either grown people or children, who talk of starting a game, and one of them happens to be very skillful at it and another very weak. How would it strike you if the first individual started that game merely in order to show off or to make the unskillful person appear contemptible?

"You think that would be rather selfish?" Yes, but why? It is only play, and in play you say it is all right to try and beat the other. "True," you add, "but they ought to be more evenly matched; otherwise there is no real victory. It would be nothing more than showing off."

Have you ever noticed how persons who are really fond of nice games much prefer to play with those with whom they are quite evenly matched? "Yes," you say, "that is often true."

What do you suppose is the reason for this? "Oh," you answer, "they do not feel that there is any real victory where they do not have to use their best skill."

I wonder, by the way, if in a game you have ever seen how occasionally some person does not try to play well or as well as he knows how. When you are



playing with such a person does it make any difference to you? "Oh, decidedly," you reply. "That would be selfishness on his part. If the person does not try his best there is no actual victory in defeating him."

You think even in play one ought to do one's best or work with all one's might? You feel that one should not even play at play, do you; otherwise it would strike you as selfish?

But suppose, on the other hand, one did the other thing and played at his work, how would that seem? What if three or four persons were all working together to accomplish something and one of them worked carelessly, just as if it did not matter much, dealing with it as if it were a kind of play. Would that seem all right?

"No," you insist, "that is just about as bad as being careless in real play; it would be selfish. It would be making the others do more than their share."

But how would it be if one were just doing one's own work and played at it? What would you understand if it were said to you that a certain person always played at his work? Does not one work hard at play?

"Oh," you insist, "there is a difference. "At real work a person must keep steadily at it, whether he likes it or not, whereas in play he may stop when he is tired or does not want to play any more."

It strikes me that we have learned a great deal about play and found out that it has many sides both for grown people as well as for children.

#### Points of the Lesson.

- I. That it is right to play just for the sake of play.
- II. That children are entitled to play more than grown people.
- III. That in play we think only of the moment. In work we think about the future.
- IV. That play to children is not only amusement, but exercise, as a training for the body.
- V. That play to a grown person is rest, mainly because it is *diversion*.
- VI. That children play more as exercise for the muscles, grown people as exercise for their minds.



VII. That getting ahead of another person in play may not be selfish, because it is only play.

VIII. That selfishness in play may consist in not sharing the game with others, being disagreeable or cross when one is beaten, insisting on one kind of a game when most of the others wish another kind, trying always to have one's own way in the game, and in many other ways.

IX. That when we play we ought to do our best, else we are not fair to the others in giving them a chance to win a real victory.

X. That we ought to play at play, but never to play at work.

XI. That play for adult people should not be carried so far as to weaken their energies for the work they have to do. The best kind of games are those which are a rest and a diversion, and yet which may, without our thinking about it, improve us in one way or another all the while, by developing the body or the mind.

FURTHER SUGGESTIONS TO THE TEACHER: There is enough in this lesson for two or three sessions with the class. If a few points could be lodged in the mind with regard to play among adults as well as children it may be of service. We do not wish to throw a contempt upon amusements or diversions. On the other hand, we should like to make young people think concerning them, in considering the value of different kinds of play or amusement. There might be some talk concerning the Code of Honor in play. The point could be raised as to when it becomes mean to try and win a victory over an opponent. There could also be some discussion concerning what we understand by "fair play." The teacher should dwell on the phrase used by adult people, "foul play," as applying to very serious matters, where real play is not involved at all. Show how this term arose through a defiance of the Code of Honor among young people in their games. Foul play in amusements may lead to foul play in real life. The subject of the "Ethics of Games" is one which could be discussed by young people of any age, or even by a class of adults. The particular topic of "cheating in play" we shall however reserve more especially for a future lesson on the subject of "Cheating." Opportunity may be offered to bring in a great

deal of ethical instruction in the discussion, which is sure to arise on each of the points introduced, because of the natural interest in the subject on the part of the children. The teacher may be somewhat dubious as to the "intellectual" features of amusements among adults. The children may also be disposed to dispute this point and to cite the athletic sports of grown people as an example to the contrary. The distinction can only be drawn in a general way and could be passed over if desired.

## CHAPTER XV.

### SELF-DENIAL.

#### Proverbs or Verses.

"Self-denial is painful for the moment, but very agreeable in the end."—*Jane Taylor*.

"Self-denial is the best riches."—*Seneca*.

"Better give than have to give."

"He gives double who gives unasked."

"He that gives his heart will not deny his money."

"He that gives to be seen will relieve none in the dark."

"Self denial is often the sacrifice of one self-love for another."

"Alas! this time is never the time for self-denial; it is always next time."

"The worst education which teaches you self-denial is better than the best which teaches you everything else but that."

#### Dialogue.

You know of self-denying people. Perhaps you have met with self-denying boys and girls. How do you feel about them? Do you admire them? "Yes, surely," you say.

And should you care to be like them? "Why," you answer, "it may depend on what one means by self-denial."

Suppose you tell me what you understand by the word. What comes first to your mind when it is mentioned? "Giving up," you suggest.

You assume, do you, that if a person wanted to buy something which he needed very much for himself, and he had the money with which to purchase it; and

then if he decided not to do it, and said he would deny himself, you would call that self-denial? "Not necessarily," you reply.

But why not? Did he not deny himself? He wished to buy that thing, and yet refused to gratify himself. "Oh, yes," you continue, "but he needed it, and perhaps there was no good reason why he should deny himself."

You think that if a person denies himself when there is no reason for it, then it would not be true self-denial. Is that what you imply?

But what if a boy or girl went out to buy something good to eat—candy it might be—and then discovered that by waiting until tomorrow it would be possible to get three times as much for the same money, would it be self-denying to wait? "No," you insist.

But why not? again I ask. That would be refusing to gratify one's self, and there would be a reason for it. Would you not especially admire the boy or girl who waited until tomorrow, in order to get three times as much candy? "No," you add, "not especially; that only means giving up some pleasure today, in order to have more pleasure tomorrow. It would not be doing good to anybody. It would all be just for one's own pleasure."

If that is what you assert, we shall have to modify our language again. That boy or girl had a reason for denying himself. Yet you do not especially admire his conduct. You think, do you, that self-denial means giving up in order to do something for somebody else.

Can you give me any example of this kind of self-denial. Suppose you are at play, and a number of you wanted to have the first turn in the game, what would the boy or girl who practices self-denial do? "Why," you say, "let one of the others have the first turn, and not try to take it for one's self."

What if you wanted to eat something very much, but knew if you did so, it would give displeasure to your father or mother. How might you practise self-denial there. "Oh," you tell me, "one could refrain and

not eat what one desired, in order to avoid giving pain to one's father or mother."

In the one instance, then, it would be in order to give pleasure to another, but in the second it would be in order to avoid giving pain.

What if you were enjoying yourself making a noise at home, and were told that your mother had a very severe headache, and that the noise made it worse. What would self-denial bid you do? "Why," you answer, "stop making a noise."

Suppose one were going to do something for one's self, but did not care very much about it, and then refrained from doing it at the request of another, would you call that self-denial? "Not exactly," you confess. Well, why not? "Oh," you reply, "self-denial usually implies giving up something that we care for a good deal." You feel, do you, that such conduct usually comes pretty hard?

But do you suppose that there is ever any pleasure in self-denial? Could one find any pleasure in giving up pleasure? You fancy, do you, that it would always be a painful experience? "Not altogether," you say. "Because," you add, "there is some pleasure in giving pleasure to others." Yes, that is true; more perhaps than one realizes at first.

But do you insist that self-denial always means giving up something for the sake of somebody else? What if a boy had some money and wanted to buy something nice to eat with it, and then changed his mind and concluded that he would purchase a book with which to improve himself. Would that be self-denial? "We are inclined to think it would," you say.

But that would be done mainly for himself. "Oh yes," you answer, "but it implies giving up pleasure. And it is not done exactly for the sake of some other pleasure."

What is it done for, then? "Why," you point out, "it is for the sake of his own improvement or in order to educate himself."

Do you think, then, that one can deny one's self for

the sake of one's self, and yet practice self-denial? Yes, I believe that when we give up pleasures in order to improve ourselves, it is a form of self-denial.

What two forms of this habit have you now described; the one where one gives up some thing in order to be of service or give pleasure to another; and the other is what? "Oh," you tell me, "where one gives up a certain pleasure for the sake of improving one's self."

Did you ever hear of Daniel Webster? Do you know what he did just after he got his education? He wished to go out into the world, and begin at once the practice of his profession. But instead of that, he went and taught school, in order to earn money so that his brother might also get an education.

What sort of conduct was that, do you think? "Self-denial?" Yes. But which form of it, should you say? Was it for the sake of his own improvement? "No," you assure me, "it was the other kind, in order to render a service for another."

Did you ever know of a boy who was anxious to finish his studies in order to go out and play, but who stopped to help another before he started? Do you think that is ever done? "Perhaps, sometimes," you answer. Is it easy, do you suppose? "No, not very," you confess. Would any boy or girl do it? "No, indeed," you exclaim.

But why not? All one has to do is just to wait a little and help the other before going out to amuse one's self. Why is it not easy enough to wait? "Oh, but it isn't," you insist. Then why would some boys do this thing, and others not?

Does habit have anything to do with it? Would the boy who had not been accustomed to giving up be liable to display such a spirit? "We think not," you say. If that is true, self-denial must be a habit. One cannot do that sort of a thing readily, unless one *gets into the habit of it.*



**Points of the Lesson.**

- I. That self-denial means giving up.
- II. That it means giving up only when there is some good reason for doing so.
- III. That the reason must not be merely giving up one pleasure in order to get another, but rather in order to render a service to somebody else.
- IV. That there is also another form of self-denial, where one gives up pleasure for the sake of one's self-improvement.
- V. That one is not liable to show self-denial unless one has formed the habit of it.

**Duties.**

*I. We ought to practice self-denial in order to be able to surrender a small pleasure for the sake of a Higher Good.*

*II. We ought to practice self-denial in order to win control over ourselves.*

*III. We ought to practice self-denial in order that we may be able to do more work in the world.*

*IV. We ought to practice self-denial so that we may be able to be of greater service to all mankind.*

*V. We ought to practice self-denial because it puts the mind or soul in control over the body and makes the Highest Self the True Sovereign.*

**Poem.**

"A little kingdom I possess  
Where thoughts and feeling dwell,  
And very hard the task I find  
Of governing it well;

"For passion tempts and troubles me,  
A wayward will misleads,  
And selfishness its shadow casts  
On all my words and deeds.

"How can I learn to rule myself,  
To be the child I should,  
Honest and brave, and never tire  
Of trying to be good?

"How can I keep a sunny soul  
To shine along life's way?  
How can I tune my little heart  
To sweetly sing all day?

"I do not ask for any crown,  
But that which all may win;  
Nor try to conquer any world  
Except the one within."

—LOUISA ALCOTT.

FURTHER SUGGESTIONS TO THE TEACHER: The above poem is a rare little gem and should be treated with the highest respect. It is said to have been written by Miss Alcott when she was only thirteen years of age. Biography could be introduced here also. The story could be told of some life where a person had made great sacrifices in order that others might be helped on to success. It would perhaps be better to introduce the narrative of the life of some brave, self-denying woman, as this is a virtue which has been conspicuous in woman's life. But we should take care not to make it a "far-off" virtue, as something which we may admire but do not expect to practice ourselves. Pictures of exceptional persons showing these virtues often have this unfortunate effect. Yet on the other hand there is a certain value in presenting rare ideals, which may call forth the spirit of devotion on the part of the young and be kept there as a distant standard for their awe and reverence. If the teacher is not too strictly limited in the attitude of neutrality on religious subjects, an excellent life for him to introduce in connection with self-denial on a large scale would be that of Father Damien and the way he gave himself up to go and live with the lepers in the Sandwich Islands. It could be told with or without the religious motives, as the teacher may deem best, according to the system adopted in the whole scheme of lessons in schools or classes where they are used. But it is a magnificent picture to put forward as a sublime example of complete self-sacrifice—all the more powerful as coming within recent times.

## CHAPTER XVI.

### BEING BRAVE.

#### Proverbs or Verses.

"Many are brave when the enemy flies."—*Italian*.

"Some have been thought brave because they were afraid to run away."

"Courage in danger is half the battle."—*Plautus*.

"Courage ought to have eyes as well as arms."

"Put off your armor and then show your courage."

"Who hath not courage must have legs."—*Italian*.

"Be sure you are right, then go ahead."—*Davy Crockett*.

"A gallant man needs no drums to arouse him."

"A man of courage never wants weapons."

"Courage, conduct and perseverance conquer all before them."

"I dare do all that may become a man;

Who dares do more is none."—*Shakespeare*.

"The more wit, the less courage."

"A coward calls himself cautious, and a miser, thrifty."

"A coward's fear may make a coward valiant."

"Cowards die many times before their death;

The valiant never taste death but once."—*Shakespeare*.

"Many would be cowards if they had courage enough."

"No man can answer for his courage who has never been in danger."—*Roche foucauld*.

#### Dialogue.

If a person has to go through some trying experience, perhaps having a tooth pulled or having his arm set if it is broken, or if he should risk hurting himself in doing something for another, and if it is all done without any outcry or display of alarm on his part, how would such conduct be described?

"As being strong," you answer. Yes. But what else would you call it? "Why," you say, "it would imply pluck or power of will." Any other way of speaking of it that you can suggest?

"Oh," you tell me, "it means being brave." True. And what is the one word we use for that sort of characteristic? "Courage?" Yes, surely.

Is it an easy thing to be brave? "No," you assert, "if it were an easy thing, then it would not be bravery." I suspect you are right. Being brave does not come very easy to most people.

But does it come easier to some people than to others? Or is it equally hard for everybody? "No," you answer, "it depends a good deal on the person. Some people," you add, "can endure more than others; they can suffer pain to a greater extent without flinching." Why is that, do you suppose?

"Perhaps," you explain, "because they are born that way. Some have more natural courage than others." Yes, but is that all? "No," you continue, "it also depends on how one has acted before." That is quite true. You have made a very important distinction there.

Which person shows the more courage when going through something painful, the one to whom it comes easier, or the one to whom it naturally comes harder? It is the same act of bravery, isn't it? "Yes," you admit, "but there is a difference after all," you insist; "the one to whom it comes harder shows the more bravery."

But why? I ask. "Oh," you tell me, "he must exert himself more." Yes, but exert himself in what way? "Why, it must be an exertion of the will," you say.

Do you think it would be possible, for instance, in the case of two boys or two girls, one of whom was naturally more courageous than the other, that it might happen, by and by, that the one who was less courageous at first should, when they grow up, have more real courage than the other? "Yes," you think, "that would be possible."

But why so? "Oh, it would depend on how often the two persons had been called upon to show bravery, and on how much effort they had put forth each time."

Yes, it is quite true that the one naturally less brave might later on have more real courage than the one who at the outset was naturally more courageous. You see, it depends a good deal on one's self.

What do we mean by physical bravery? Have you any idea? What does the word "physical" apply to; the mind, the heart, the soul? "No," you answer, "it applies to the body."

Then how might we show physical courage? "Why," you tell me, "by being brave when enduring pain, when something hurts us."

In what way could you show bravery if you were undergoing pain? What does the person without courage do on such occasions? "Oh," you exclaim, "he cries, sheds tears, makes a great deal of noise, uses bad language, makes everybody uncomfortable." Yes, that is all very true.

And how would the brave boy or brave man act? "Why," you say, "he would keep back the tears, not shout or groan or cry out and disturb everybody."

In the first place, then, by physical bravery, you mean, do you, enduring pain without creating lots of disturbance. But do you think that under the most terrific pain one should never cry out? If a man, for example, were having his hand cut off, would you regard it as weak or cowardly if he groaned? "No," you answer, "not under those circumstances."

But why? "Oh," you tell me, "sometimes the pain is so severe that one has to cry out." Yes, you are right.

Then, under what circumstances would you say that one should control one's self, and when, on the other hand, would it be all right to cry out under severe pain? "Why," you point out, "it would depend on the degree of suffering. If it were something terrific, like having one's leg cut off, that is another matter."

But how about the ordinary pains, headache or a sore finger, or those hurts everyone experiences more or less throughout life? What would be the real bravery under such trials?

"Why," you explain, "being brave would mean trying very hard to ignore it, and not making a noise about it." Yes, that is a good point. But is there any other form of pain excepting that of the body?

"Oh, yes," you say, "where a person has had a very disagreeable experience, or something unpleasant has occurred to him. Perhaps his feelings have been hurt, or he cannot do something he would like to do."

Then how do many people act under those conditions? Do they smile and act as if they were indifferent in regard to it? "No," you assure me, "they scowl or use unpleasant language, or mope, or make themselves disagreeable to others." Yes, that is sadly true.

On the other hand, what would be the real bravery when such things happen to us? How might a man or woman show courage at such times? "Why," you say, "one could try to act as if after all it did not matter very much." Yes, but suppose it did matter a great deal, and you could not make yourself feel that it was of no consequence, what then can you do in order to show bravery? "As to that," you continue, "a man could at least try to keep it to himself."

I wonder whether you have ever heard the word "whine." Have we ever talked about that word before? What does it mean? What sort of animals whine? "Dogs," you answer? And do you think human beings ever whine? "Perhaps they do." Well, in what way?

"Why," you point out, "they may keep talking about how unhappy they are and how disagreeable others have been to them, or about all the unpleasant experiences they have had." Yes, that is true. Some people have a way of groaning out loud and making other people very unhappy, just because they may not have their own way, or there are unpleasant experiences which they must undergo.

Suppose that you have something disagreeable to do, perhaps it may be an unpleasant piece of work in



school, or some trying service to render for another boy or girl.

Now did you ever notice when one has to do anything of this kind, that certain persons will go through with it, only it will take them a long while to come to the point. They will hold off and wait, stay back, but finally do it. Then there are others, who, when it must be done, go right ahead and have it over with. They are quick about it. Just as soon as they know it must be done, they act at once.

Which ones show the bravery? "As to that," you say, "usually of course it would be those who act at once." Yes, you are right. Being brave means acting promptly and without hesitation, when we have something painful to go through or a disagreeable task to perform.

You have talked about showing physical bravery, and also about being brave when undergoing some painful personal experience. Now, let me ask you: Is there any other form you can think of? These two forms pertain to one's self, would they not? "Yes," you reply, "surely!"

Then what other kind can you suggest? "Why," you say, "it might be where one has to do something brave for the sake of another." True, that is another form of courage. Which comes easier, do you suppose; being brave for yourself or being brave for somebody else? "Oh, it would depend," you exclaim, "on our feelings for the person, or on what kind of a reward one is going to receive." Indeed!

Do you assume that when a man has done something courageous for the sake of another, he likes to have people know of it? "Yes, decidedly," you say; "that comes natural."

Suppose there are two acts of bravery to be performed; one where other people will know of it and praise you, and another where people will not know of it, and you will get no praise at all.

In these cases which act would require the most courage, or show the most bravery? "Why," you

admit, "it would be where one will receive no praise, or where other people will not know of it." Yes, you are right. It is that kind of an experience which calls for the most courage.

And is there anything nobler, do you think, even than showing bravery where people may not know anything about it? Suppose you do something for another which comes very hard, and other boys and girls do know of it but laugh at you about it.

"As to that," you tell me, "it may come harder to do something brave, when one is going to be laughed at on account of it." Yes, that certainly is true. It requires a high form of courage under those circumstances.

I wonder if you have ever heard of an old proverb that runs in this way:

"A man of courage never wants weapons."

Do you see any sense in that? Suppose that you have to do something for another which is disagreeable or which might make you laughed at, and you answered: "Oh, yes, I would do it if only I had such and such a thing to help me." How would this proverb apply to that experience? "Why," you explain, "it would mean that one wanted to have weapons."

And would it show courage? "No," you insist, "the proverb says truly that a man of courage never wants weapons. Then what is implied by that proverb? "Why," you answer, "it means that if a man has true courage he will find a way for himself somehow or other. He will make his own weapons."

Yes, I agree with you. We all know that if we could have just the kind of weapons we desire, it would be easy enough to show courage. But then would it be real bravery?

#### Points of the Lesson.

- I. That it is not easy always to be brave or to show courage.
- II. That the amount of courage one shows at any time may depend on how much courage one has shown at other times.

III. That true bravery depends on *strength of will* and does not spring from a mere impulse of the moment. It is an indication of *character*.

IV. That physical courage may consist in enduring pain without making a "face," unless it is something very serious.

V. That bravery of the mind is shown where one does not make a face over disagreeable experiences.

VI. That the higher form of courage may consist in being brave while suffering for others or making sacrifices for others.

VII. That the highest form of all comes in where one does this without expecting to have it talked about or without the expectation of being rewarded for it.

#### Duties.

I. *We ought to be brave in enduring pain or trouble, because it means being strong and having a strong character.*

II. *We ought to show courage and be able to endure, because it is right to do so, and not for the sake of praise or reward.*

#### Poem.

Suppose, my little lady,  
Your doll should break her head,  
Could you make it whole by crying  
Till your eyes and nose are red?  
And wouldn't it be pleasanter  
To treat it as a joke,  
And say you're glad "'twas Dolly's,  
And not your head, that broke"?

Suppose you're dressed for walking,  
And the rain comes pouring down;  
Will it clear off any sooner  
Because you scold and frown?  
And wouldn't it be nicer  
For you to smile than pout,  
And so make sunshine in the house  
When there is none without?

Suppose your task, my little man,  
Is very hard to get;  
Will it make it any easier  
For you to sit and fret?  
And wouldn't it be wiser  
Than waiting, like a dunce,

To go to work in earnest  
And learn the thing at once?

Suppose that some boys have a horse,  
And some a coach and pair;  
Will it tire you less while walking  
To say, "It isn't fair"?  
And wouldn't it be nobler  
To keep your temper sweet  
And in your heart be thankful  
You can walk upon your feet?

And suppose the world don't please you,  
Nor the way some people do;  
Do you think the whole creation  
Will be altered just for you?  
And isn't it, my boy or girl,  
The wisest, bravest plan,  
Whatever comes or doesn't come,  
To do the best you can?

—PHOEBE CARY.

FURTHER SUGGESTIONS TO THE TEACHER.—There is opportunity, if desired, to distinguish between courage in action and that of endurance and submission under difficulties. This, however, may be rather subtle for young minds and could be reserved for a series of lessons in a later course pertaining to "The Duties to One's Self." It is the minor forms of courage and endurance we need especially to emphasize with the young. They are all anxious enough to be brave in some crisis. But the trouble is that most persons neglect to cultivate the virtue in trifling matters. They forget that "whining" about the weather or what they have to eat or about the circumstances of their daily lives, is a form of cowardice. This point needs to be brought out in all manner of ways. We need to disassociate the habit of courage from thoughts of war and battle and bring it down to the affairs of ordinary life. Emphasis should be laid upon the fact that it is a virtue which girls as well as boys, women as well as men, may display. The notion exists that bravery is peculiarly a masculine virtue. But we should try to overthrow such a theory, which has come from connecting this virtue so exclusively with warfare, and

should associate it rather with the thought of strong character or force of will—hence making it plain that force of will and strong character may exist as much in woman as in man. We should clearly indicate that cowardice is a disgrace to the girl as well as to the boy, to the woman as well as to the man—while we may draw the distinction that courage does not require that one should defend one's self beyond one's strength or be foolishly daring. Woman may not have the physical strength of man, and therefore not be expected to show the same amount of physical courage. But we can point out that she may have the same strength of will or force of character—displaying this up to the limits of her physical capacity. If stories or anecdotes are introduced, it were better to connect them rather with the minor details of life, than to bring forward acts of exceptional courage in the face of great dangers or calamities.

## CHAPTER XVII.

### HABIT OF TEASING.

#### Proverbs or Verses.

- "Courage is fire, bullying is smoke."
- "The bully is always a coward."
- "Good jests bite like lambs, not like dogs."
- "Jest with your equals."
- "Children have wide ears and long tongues."
- "From children, expect childish acts."

#### Dialogue.

I should like, in our discussions, to go back a little to the subject of play. Suppose we speak of a boy or girl, and say that they are given to teasing. What would first come to your mind?

"Well, for instance," you answer, "it might imply begging the father or mother for favors, and going on begging even when the favors are refused, hoping by begging long enough to get the favors after all."

Yes, that is one form of teasing. But it belongs to another subject, and we will not talk about that today.

Can you suggest another kind? "Yes," you continue, "there is teasing in play." What do you mean by that? I ask. "Why," you explain, "it may mean worrying a person a little by saying things to them they do not quite like, or doing things to them which fret them a little." Is it always *just a little*, do you say?

"No," you admit, "sometimes it is a good deal." And what do people do it for? "Well," you add, "they may do it just for fun."

But do you think there is any fun in it for those who are being teased? "Yes," you assert, "sometimes even for them there is a certain amount of pleasure in it."



Which one usually gets the more pleasure out of it, the one who is teased or the one who teases? "As to that," you confess, "probably the one who does the teasing."

And what may the other do sometimes? "Oh, he may turn around and tease back again." Then what is teasing really carried on for? You insist, "It is done merely as play. We do it just as we try to win a game."

And when does it really cease to be play? "Why," you answer, "when the feelings are very much hurt, or tears come to the eyes, or the person shows anger, 'gets mad,' as one says."

But does a boy or girl ever keep up the teasing even to that point, and not stop after it has reached that stage? "Sometimes."

And is it still play to them? Do they get just as much fun out of it? "No," you reply, "it may be something different then." What motive could there be for it, at such a time? "Why," you assert, "sometimes people actually take pleasure in worrying others, or making them unhappy." Is that the real motive, do you think?

"No," you answer, "we doubt whether that is the real purpose behind it. One does not tease so as to hurt the person very much, when it is done just for mere fun." But some do it, do they not? "Well," you suggest, "perhaps it is done so as to show their power over the other person." Then trying to show power over another person is something else than mere play, is it?

And what do we sometimes call this habit of constantly worrying other persons when they cannot escape from it, or when it hurts them very much?

"Why," you say, "that is tyrannizing." Suppose a person should tyrannize over you, what would you understand by that?

"As to that," you tell me, "it would be when some person much stronger than we are, is trying to make us do all sorts of things which we dislike and which

we might be obliged to do because we are not strong enough to refuse."

Note to the Teacher.—If you think advisable, you can introduce the word "bullying" at this point, showing how teasing, beginning as mere play, may develop into bullying as a form of tyrannizing on the part of the strong over the weak.

When do you think teasing ceases to be mere play and becomes such tyrannizing; is it, for example, when one person teases another of about the same age or the same strength, or is it when the one is stronger or older than the other?

"Why," you explain, "as a rule there will not be much tyrannizing in that extreme form unless one is stronger than the other." Does it strike you that teasing a person who cannot help himself because he is weaker, is like hitting a man when he is down? Did you ever hear the saying:

"If you are going to fight, fight a man of your size and not some one weaker than yourself?"

Should you feel contempt for a big boy who struck a little boy? "Yes, surely," you exclaim. But when a big boy teases a little boy or a big girl teases a little girl, is it not like striking them, knowing that they cannot strike back?

By the way, do boys tease girls, or is it girls who tease boys? "As to that," you say, "it depends on the boy or girl, and how old they are."

Yes, but how is it as a rule? "Oh," you reply, "more often the boy teases the girl." Why? I ask. "Perhaps," you add, "because it is easier to tease her, she minds it more, and so one gets more fun out of it."

Is that all? Suppose it is a small boy and a very big girl. Then does the boy keep up the teasing? "Not so often," you answer.

Why not? "Because," you tell me, "in that case she can make him stop it." I ask again, therefore, why is it that boys more often tease girls? Is it not really because boys are liable to be stronger than the girls, and the girls are not able to resist?

Does it strike you that teasing girls and making them very unhappy by this means, is like hitting a person

when he is down, or striking a person smaller than one's self?

"Yes," you continue, "but after all, one teases mainly for the sake of the fun and not in order to show tyranny." Perhaps you are right, when the teasing is mere play. It depends a good deal on whether you are doing it for play, or whether you are doing it to show how smart you are or how much stronger you are.

Do you see any other motive for teasing? What if one boy happens to know much more than another, although they are of the same age, and the boy who knows more keeps teasing the other boy about his ignorance. Is it done for mere play?

"No," you confess, "it may be done in that case in order to show off or appear 'smart.'" But do you think that people who are listening, admire the boy who is showing off? "You doubt it?" And yet he may be doing it just for the sake of having other persons see how much superior he is or how much more he knows. Is that a form of teasing to be admired, do you suppose? "No, it is rather a mean kind," you reply.

Do boys or girls ever tease creatures that are not human? "Yes," you admit, "they tease dogs and cats or other animals.

What do they do it for? Why do they sometimes annoy dogs or cats, or like to worry them? "Well," you continue, "it is just mere play. Dogs may tease each other just the same." Yes, that is quite possible.

But do you think there may be a point where teasing a dog or cat or other animal, can be almost as mean as teasing a human being? "Perhaps," you admit. When, for instance?

"Why," you point out, "when it becomes very painful or is like torture to the animal." Yes, I agree with you. When you see a boy or girl torture an animal *just for fun*, you feel somehow as if they could do the same thing to boys or girls smaller than themselves. It is like hitting a man when he is down, or striking a person smaller than one's self.

Do grown people ever tease, do you suppose? "Yes,

sometimes," you say, "we have seen them do it." Do they do it as much as the children? "No, usually not," you answer.

Why not? How is it that grown people do not tease as much as children? "Oh," you add, "they haven't time for it." What if they did have the time?

"Perhaps not even then," you say. Well, why not? I ask. "Because it would look unbecoming," you explain. "They would be acting as if they were children."

Then teasing a good deal is what we call childish, is it? But what does that mean? "Why," you assure me, "it implies that it is what children naturally like to do as children." You think it comes natural to like to tease, do you? If that is true, one needs to be on the lookout lest it be carried too far.

Which do you think we are more inclined to carry too far; the conduct most natural to us, or the habits we acquire with difficulty? "Oh," you confess, "it would be those habits that come easy to us." Yes, that is true.

We call teasing childish, because it comes natural to children to tease, and they are much given to carrying it too far and perhaps even being mean or unkind about it. It implies an important distinction, therefore, whether one does it merely as play, and only so long as it is play, and stops at just that very point.

#### Points of the Lesson.

- I. That teasing is meant as play, "just for fun."
- II. That teasing ceases to be play when it seriously hurts the feelings.
- III. That teasing, when ceasing to be play, becomes tyrannizing or "bullying."
- IV. That teasing is tyrannizing when one is older or stronger than the person one teases.
- V. That boys in teasing girls are often "tyrannizing" over them.
- VI. That teasing animals when it *hurts* them is like fighting a person much smaller than one's self.
- VII. That for grown people to tease very much is to be "childish."

VIII. "That teasing belongs to the habits which seem to come *natural* to us, and *therefore* may easily be carried too far."

FURTHER SUGGESTIONS TO THE TEACHER.—This subject of teasing is an embarrassing one and we may need to handle it with a great deal of caution. The moment we make these distinctions the boys and girls can use them as a plea or excuse. When they are teasing too hard they can always fall back on the assertion that they are doing it only as play. Yet the subject should be taken up, not only for the sake of the children as children, but in order to warn them of danger in the future, as the habit of teasing applies to grown people as well as children. People *ought* to make these distinctions. Boys and girls know pretty well when they are hiding behind sham excuses and when teasing becomes something else beside play. Under such circumstances the wisest way would be not to reason with them, but stop them at once. We might in strict ethics feel as if we ought to discourage teasing altogether as a form of conduct that naturally causes pain. Yet it would be useless to carry the lesson up to this point. Children *will* tease, and grown people likewise. It is the same as with games. People will try hard to beat each other, although it may seem rather selfish. We must give in up to a certain point to the instincts of human nature, inasmuch as we know that nearly everybody will pursue this habit more or less. It is better that we should try to enforce *some* of these distinctions, so that at any rate when people tease, they shall draw a line somewhere as to the extent to which it is fair to keep it up.

## CHAPTER XVIII.

### HUMILITY.

#### Proverbs or Verses.

“There are some who use humility to serve their pride.”—*Dunham.*

“It is not a sign of humility to declaim against pride.”

“Humility, that low, sweet root  
From which all heavenly virtues shoot.”

“Too much humility is pride.”

“Loquacity storms the ear, but modesty takes the heart.”

“Modesty has more charms than beauty.”

“Of their own merits, modest men are dumb.”

“When modesty has once perished, it will never revive.”—*Seneca.*

“The wisest man could ask no more of Fate,  
Than to be modest, manly and true,  
Safe from the many, honored by the few.”—*Lowell.*

“A man may have a just esteem of himself without being proud.”

“He who is puffed up with the first gale of prosperity will bend beneath the first blast of adversity.”

“A man never speaks of himself without loss.”—*Montague.*

#### Dialogue.

Suppose today we talk about a good habit, one which has always been much esteemed when rightly understood. The word describing it will be a long one. But we will reduce it to something simpler by and by. I will write it down. There it is, “Humility.”

Have you ever heard the word before? “Oh, yes,” you say. Then what does it imply? “Why,” you tell me, “it means being humble.” Perhaps, then, one of you could write down those shorter words underneath the long one. There it stands—“being humble.”

But we are not much nearer to the point we are discussing. I want to find out what you understand



by this. What if some one were to speak of a boy or girl, and say that they liked to show off, would that mean being humble? "Not by any means," you answer.

But why not? I ask. When a person is acting in this way, for instance, what is it that he is trying to do? "Why," you explain, "he is trying to make people look at him, and watch him." But if he wanted people to look at other boys and girls and watch them instead of watching him, would that be trying to show off? "No, indeed," you say.

But why not? "Because," you answer, "when one tries to show off, he is anxious that people should look at him, and not at others."

What, then, does he care to have people look at him for, more than at other boys or girls? What is the reason for such conduct? "Oh," you tell me, "he desires to have people say how much superior he is to other boys and girls."

You assume, then, do you, that this is not being humble, or having the habit of humility?

But when a boy or girl is anxious that other people should look at them, point them out, and say how smart they are, how much more they know than other boys or girls; what persons are they really thinking of most of all? You or me, for example? "No," you say, "they are thinking about themselves."

Yes, but in what way? Is such a person thinking about improving himself, forming better habits for himself, or blaming himself for some mistake? "No," you answer, "that is not it at all. It is self-admiration."

I wonder if you have ever heard of a term or phrase describing this habit of thinking about one's self. Suppose I give it to you and you write it down. It is "being self-conscious"—there are the words before you.

Trying to "show off" means "being self-conscious"—that is, thinking all the time about one's self, and wondering whether other people are looking at one's self, or talking about one's self. It implies the habit of comparing one's self with others and all the time think-

ing about the superiority of one's self to other people.

Do you begin to see what humility means? What does it suggest to you now? "Why," you answer, "it is the opposite of *that*."

The opposite of what? I ask. You reply, "The opposite of being self-conscious, or of showing off."

Yes, we are getting down to the point now. Only we must go on a little further. You have not told me all about it yet.

Have you ever heard of persons who talked a great deal about themselves as being humble? I wonder if you have learned of the famous character in a great novel, "Umble Uriah Heep." Some time in the future you will read the story where this character appears.

Now this man was always talking about himself as being 'umble. He would say to others, "I am very 'umble, you know." How would that strike you? Do you fancy he was a good example of humility?

"No," you exclaim, "that could not have been humility." But why not? Surely he ought to have known, himself, whether he was that kind of a man. If a person went around saying he was very humble, why should we not believe him?

"Because," you add, "there would not be any real humility in that sort of a man." But, why not? "As to that," you reply, "the very fact that he went on talking about himself, and telling how humble he was, would show that he was self-conscious, that he wanted to attract people's attention to himself."

What is the term we apply to this sort of a person? Suppose one of us went around saying, "I am very humble," and in that way trying to make people think well of us, or look upon us as being superior, what would people call us after a while? "A humbug?" Yes, that is one very plain term. Mention another of the same kind by which they might nickname us? "Make-believes?" Yes, surely.

But there is a longer word, and a bad one, that we should all hate to have thrown at us. Did you ever hear of the "hypocrite?" And what do you think it

means? "Oh," you tell me, "it implies putting on the outside what is not true on the inside." Yes, that just about describes it.

And so the hypocrite is never a real instance of humility. But is this a habit that we all should admire in other people where it really exists? "Yes," you say, "if it is true or genuine." You tell me, then, that we all admire true humility, but that we despise the hypocrite.

What if, for instance, there were a person who never talked about himself or tried to show off, but always staid in the background. Do you think that this would always imply humility? "Yes?"

Wait a moment now. Do not be too sure. Suppose, for example, that he saw another person being seriously injured, some great harm being done to him, and he did not come forward and try to defend the one in danger, would that be humility? "No," you admit, "quite the contrary."

You confess that just always keeping one's self in the background, and never asserting one's self, does not necessarily mean humility.

We talk sometimes, you know, about certain people having a weak character, not being necessarily bad, but just "putty-like"; people who never seem to have any "snap" or force to them. They never do anything very good or very bad. Then there are others of whom we speak as having strong characters. They have self-reliance, they can take care of themselves.

Which of these two types, do you think, might have the most real humility? "Why," you say, "probably we should see it more often in the man who has a strong character." True, I answer. But the person of weak character might not be self-conscious, or might not try to show off in the presence of others. Why would not that imply being humble?

"As to that," you exclaim, "he might not try to show off, not because he has humility, but because he is weak, or because there is not much character to him."

You assume, then, that it is only the person of strong character who can have the real humility. I will give you a saying which you can remember, although it includes two quite large words. It is this:

"Humility goes with self-reliance."

Just keep that point in mind. I ask you to remember that humility and strength belong together.

Are you sure you understand now what self-consciousness means? "Yes," you say, "it is the opposite of humility." True, but more than that.

Tell me, for instance. Some one is walking along the street in the winter when the ground is slippery. His foot gives way, he falls down and his hat rolls off on the ice-covered ground. What is the first thing he always does after rising?

"Why," you assure me, "he looks around to see if anybody has noticed him." Yes. That is just what most people would do. And what does that imply? "Being self-conscious?"

But why should a person at once look around? Why should he care? "Oh," you say, "he cannot very well help it. He does not like to be laughed at."

You can see from this illustration, plainly enough, what it means to be self-conscious; although when anything of this kind happens to a man, it is very hard for him to help looking around just at that moment. It is pretty difficult then to show humility, so as to be able just to pick himself up and walk ahead without thinking any more of it.

I wonder if you have ever seen any picture of humility. Suppose we had a painting here by some great artist. How do you think the artist would frame the head of the person in the picture. Would the head be held erect with the eyes looking straight forward? "No," you tell me, "probably it would be bowed a little." Yes, I fancy you are right in your guess.

NOTE TO THE TEACHER: There is a picture of the head of the "Mater Dolorosa" which the teacher might show the children at this point. Although it is of "The Sorrowing Mother," yet it suggests this attitude of the head bowed in humility.

Do you mean to say that any person of true humility always goes around with his head down? Is that the kind of person you admire? Such individuals could make themselves very conspicuous, and attract a great deal of attention to themselves.

"No," you tell me, "we should not admire people who went around all the time in such an attitude." How then, can such a painting give a true suggestion of humility?

"Why," you point out, "it does not mean that we are to go around with the head down. It shows rather a certain feeling in the heart." You imply, do you, that inasmuch as the painter cannot describe the mind itself, he figures the head in this position in order to suggest the feeling inside. That is, at any rate, what I understand by such a picture.

No, people of real humility do not go about walking with their heads down. That would be very much like Uriah Heep always saying, "I'm very 'umble."

Then do you see any sense in that feeling inside of one's self, suggested by the bowed head? "You do not know?" Suppose I tell you in one sentence. It shows that the person feels that there is something superior to himself.

Now, have we found what attitude of mind is the opposite of humility? "Being self-satisfied?" you suggest. True. A person of real humility does not go around with his head hanging down. But he always feels that he is not doing as much as he ought to do, or improving himself as much as he might have done. He always feels that he is behind what he aspires to become. He is never quite satisfied with himself.

We will stop here today; because the talk about humility may come up again in the discussion we may have about another habit which you will perhaps tell me is also the opposite of humility.

#### Points of the Lesson.

I. That humility is the opposite of being self-conscious, of "showing off," or of talking about one's self.



II. That it is in contrast with "make-believe" or being a "hypocrite."

III. That it is a feeling about one's self and not a way of appearing to others.

IV. That it means that we are never altogether satisfied with ourselves, or with our conduct.

V. That the truly humble person does not keep comparing his conduct as a whole with that of others, but rather with the best standard of true conduct he knows about.

VI. That hence the humble person is always dissatisfied with himself and always trying to get beyond himself to something higher.

### Duties.

*I. We ought always to feel that there are others better than we are and superior to ourselves.*

*II. We ought always to feel that we could make ourselves better than we are now, and that we have to rise above ourselves.*

*III. We ought always to have standards of conduct which are above us, according to which we are to measure ourselves and to which we are to aspire.*

### FURTHER SUGGESTIONS TO THE TEACHER.—

It will be seen plainly enough that this discussion connects directly with the lesson on "Pride." The one cannot go well without the other. If there are too many points in this sketch, carry over some of them into the next chapter. The thought especially to be impressed on the minds of the young is that *humility goes with strength*. This virtue has too often been connected with weakness, or the hanging head, as a virtue which nobody really respects. We shall find it very important to fight this notion in the minds of the young. We want them to admire true humility, and not to think of it as a mere sentiment which people do not honestly esteem or try to practice. It will be necessary, although hard, to make the children feel that it is an *inside* virtue, that the bowed-head attitude does not mean cringing or walking around in a weak, limp sort of a way, but implies rather the very opposite of thinking all the time about one's self. Do not introduce the word selfishness in connection with



the absence of humility, as we shall associate this with something more definite. But self-consciousness is a vice easily acquired and one which every one needs to fight against and to be ashamed of. The great trouble with most people is that they are disposed to compare themselves with others right around them, instead of measuring themselves according to some ideal standard. It is this latter attitude we wish to foster in dwelling on the virtue of Humility.

## CHAPTER XIX.

### PRIDE.

#### Proverbs or Verses.

"A man may have a just esteem of himself without being proud."

"A clown enriched knows neither relation or friend."—*French.*

"A man well mounted is always proud."—*French.*

"But yesterday out of the shell, today he despises the shell."—*Turkish.*

"He that is proud eats up himself."—*Shakespeare.*

"He that is on horseback no longer knows his own father."—*Russian.*

"Peacock, look at your legs."—*German.*

"Pride goeth before and shame follows after."

"Pride goeth before destruction and an haughty spirit before a fall."

"Pride had rather go out of the way, than go behind."

"Pride increaseth our enemies and putteth our friends to flight."

"Pride leaves home on horseback but returns on foot."—*German.*

"Pride loves no man and is loved by no man."

"Pride scorns the vulgar, yet lies at its mercy."

"Pride triumphant rears her head;

A little while and all her power is fled."—*Goldsmith.*

"The best manners are stained by the addition of pride."

"'Tis pride and not nature that craves much."

"When a proud man hears another praised, he thinks himself injured."

"You a gentleman and I a gentleman, who will milk the cow?"—*Turkish.*

#### Dialogue.

We said the last time that there was another habit, and a bad one, the opposite of Humility.

Will one of you write the word down: Pride. You see it is short, only of five letters. But it implies a

great deal. It is used more often than "procrastination," and much more often than "humility." But people may not agree quite so much as to what the word really means.

Do not be too sure about what you think of pride,—for you may be mistaken in your opinions. Take care that you are not too proud about how much you know of pride.

Suppose, however, you try and tell me a little about what your idea would be of a proud person.

"Why," you say, "it means that he keeps thinking how superior he is, how much he knows, or how much he can do." Yes, but how can you be sure of this? You cannot enter into his mind. How can you be positive that he keeps thinking of those things?

"We can judge by the way he acts," you continue. Then how does he act? How does he look? What makes you convinced that a certain person is of that type?

"Why," you explain, "he talks about himself. That is enough of itself. He is all the time saying how much he is capable of and repeating what he has done."

Yes. That is one way by which pride shows itself. But is that all? Stop a moment now. You may be repeating yourself. Some time ago you used this same language as describing another bad habit. It was something about self—what? "Self-conceit," you answer. Yes.

And do you assume that self-conceit and pride are the same thing? "Perhaps they are," you say. No, not quite the same, I must tell you. Think a while longer about it. A person is conceited about *himself*. It is the *self*, you understand—that is, the self inside of himself. He is conceited about what he *can do*, or how much *he knows*.

But could a man be self-conceited about the clothes he wears? "No," you answer, "not exactly that."

What would be the feeling, then, on his part, if a man talked in a loud sort of a way, or tried to attract people's attention, so that they should observe the qual-

ity of his clothes? "Oh, it would be pride," you exclaim.

Suppose, for instance, a boy had a pony or a very much better bicycle than other boys, and he rode his bicycle or pony up and down the street in order to attract attention. That would not be self-conceit exactly. But what would it be?

"Pride," you suggest. Yes, but in what? Would it be pride in himself? "No, not quite," you would say, "it would be pride in his pony or bicycle."

What, for instance, would you think of a man who had no knowledge, was not educated, did not read or travel, in fact did not have much of anything in himself at all, but on the other hand had lots of money, or a fine house, and talked a good deal about it? "It would be the same pride," you answer.

Suppose a man was very stupid, very ignorant, and had very bad manners, but had some well-known family ancestors, and acted therefore as if on that account he thought a great deal of himself? Once more you suggest "Pride."

You say that being self-conceited implies a feeling about one's self on the inside. But what do people take pride in, especially. Is it in what is on the inside or the outside, do you think? "Oh, the outside," you exclaim. "It is in the clothes, the dress, the money, one's ancestors, the display one can make."

Yes, we are coming to the point now. But is the *feeling* of pride on the outside, just like the clothes, or the house, or the money? "No," you assure me, "that is on the inside."

Tell me now. How is it with proud people? You said that we rather admire real humility. But do we like or esteem a proud man? "No," you reply, "not usually." But are they not pleasant company? Would you not like to associate with a boy or girl who was very proud? "Not generally," you admit.

But why not? They may be able to dress remarkably well, or make lots of display. Why should you not admire them? "Because," you answer, "there may be

nothing in them especially to admire." Yes, but you admire their clothes, do you not? "That may be very well," you tell me, "but the clothes are not the person."

You mean, do you, that you could admire a person's clothes, and not the person himself? "Yes, decidedly," you insist.

And is there any other reason why you would not quite like a proud man or a proud woman. Are they usually, for instance, pleasant persons to associate with? "No," you assert, "they are liable to be disagreeable."

But in what way? "Why," you answer, "they are disagreeable because they do not care about other people. What they want is that we should admire them for their clothes or their display."

Have you ever thought anything about the way pride influences a man when he gets into the *habit* of that kind of feeling? Is such a man ever ashamed of anything? "Not of anything he does himself," you say. I suppose that is true.

But is he ever ashamed of anything at all? "Yes, of some things." Perhaps he may be ashamed of other people, of his old friends, for instance.

Suppose a man inherits a large sum of money and then buys a fine house and begins to wear nice clothes and put on much display, what could make him ashamed of his old friends?

"Why," you explain, "he may feel the difference now between them and himself." Difference in what? I ask. "Oh," you add, "in the clothes and the house and the display."

Why should he care? Why should he not like to have his old friends with him all the same, so that they could admire his new wealth and his new home? "Ah," you say, "the presence of his old friends reminds other people of the fact that he too was at one time poor."

I am afraid you are right. It is a very sad circumstance, but true enough! People who by accident have good fortune come to them and put on a lot of display, are often ashamed of their old friends. They don't like

to be reminded of the fact that they were once in very plain circumstances.

But don't you think that is rather a mean feeling? Would it not be a shame that one really ought *to be ashamed of*?

What would you say of a boy or girl who had a father and mother with little or no education, but who had been helped and educated through great sacrifice on their part, and then as he grows older and succeeds in the world, begins to be ashamed of his poor father and mother. What kind of a feeling would that be? "Pride," you say. Yes, that is just what it would be, *pride*.

But does it not strike you as something positively awful for a boy or girl in that way to be ashamed of their father and mother, who made such sacrifices for their children?

Why do you suppose that people ever do have that feeling? How is it that a man or woman could sometimes display such a wicked shame for their father and mother? What reason would they have for not liking to have their parents live at home with them, for example?

You answer, "It would remind other people of their lowly start in life, of the fact that they were poor when they were young and did not have a fine house or plenty of money."

You assume, then, that pride can have a certain very bad influence on a man's feelings, or a man's character. I certainly think so.

I wonder if you have ever heard an old proverb which says:

"Pride cometh before a fall?"

Can you see the meaning there? What does it suggest to you? Suppose a man had been very proud and something should happen to him, so that people began to quote that old proverb concerning him, what would it bring to your mind?

"It would suggest," you tell me, "that probably he



had lost his money or his beautiful house; that something had occurred which had taken away what he took pride in, and that this had given him a fall."

But how is it that such a proverb ever came into existence, do you suppose? Can you see any reason for it? "Yes," you assure me, "perhaps there have been proud people who have had a fall, and in that way persons began to associate pride and a fall together."

But is there any circumstance which might sometimes bring proud people to a fall, more than other kind of people? Take, for instance, two persons, a man of genuine humility and a proud man, both of whom had been very successful, and had plenty of opportunity for display and a great deal of money. Which one, do you think, would be the more likely to have a fall some time? "The proud man," you suggest.

Yes, but why? What is it that a proud man takes pride in? Outside things especially, or inside things? "Oh, outside things, of course," you exclaim. Yes, that is what we have already said.

Then do you think that such a man would come to *rely* on those outside things and fancy that he could always depend upon them to save him in any difficulty?

You told me in a previous lesson that the humble person carried his head low. You did not mean that, literally; only you implied that was the way such a person felt. It showed his spirit. How would it be on the other hand with a proud man? How would he carry his head? "Oh," you tell me, "he would hold his head high." Yes, that is true. But what would that mean?

"Why," you explain, "it would imply that he thinks he is all right as he is; that his property or his display will be sufficient, and that he can rely on that all the while."

You see that pride might nourish a false reliance, because it would be a reliance on outside things. Hence he would not go on improving himself or taking care about the future. The result is that if a fall should

come he might lose everything. Yes, that proverb is true. The proud man is much more liable to a fall than the man of real humility.

Perhaps you would like to learn another proverb with regard to pride. It is a saying which means a great deal and you will find it worth your while to know it by heart. It reads like this:

"Pride goeth before destruction and an haughty spirit before a fall."

Now just one other point. Let us compare pride and humility once more.

When a proud man does a good deed, for instance, or when he performs his duty, for instance, what will he be thinking of? "Oh," you say, "he will be thinking about himself or how people will admire him." Yes, that it true.

But how will it be with the man of real humility? Would he be all the time thinking of what people might say? "No," you add, "he would simply be thinking of the duty he had to perform."

Yes, you are right. Suppose now we go back and form our definition of humility. What if we should put it in this way:

"Humility means doing one's duty because it is one's duty, without being self-conscious or thinking what other people will say."

Then for pride suppose we add:

"Pride implies doing everything with a thought of the display or show it will make."

#### Points of the Lesson.

- I. That the proud man is inclined to talk about himself.
- II. That pride has to do with what is on the outside, the show one can make in the presence of others.
- III. That proud people are usually disagreeable, because they think only of themselves.
- IV. That pride may make a person ashamed of his friends or even of his father or mother.
- V. That pride weakens one's self-reliance, because it leads a person to depend on outside show or display.
- VI. That the proud man carries his head high, and he is liable to have a fall.

## Poem.

Down in a green and shady bed  
A modest violet grew;  
Its stalk was bent, it hung its head,  
As if to hide from view.

And yet it was a lovely flower,  
Its color bright and fair;  
It might have graced a rosy bower,  
Instead of hiding there.

Yet there it was content to bloom,  
In modest tints arrayed,  
And there it spreads its sweet perfume  
Within the silent shade.

Then let me to the valley go  
This pretty flower to see,  
That I may also learn to grow  
In sweet humility.

—JANE TAYLOR.

FURTHER SUGGESTIONS TO THE TEACHER.—This lesson should certainly give opportunity for stories of one kind or another. It is not necessary that they should come from biography or history. Anecdotes concerning sham display could be introduced. A picture of the peacock could be presented to the class. Throw a contempt into the words used in describing how people show pride, by such terms as "strutting," "crowing." We have not undertaken to deal with the more subtle form of pride, which is perhaps also involved in the disposition of self-conceit, where a person may hold himself indifferent to the opinion of others. Younger children would not catch on to this point. Such a character as that of Grandcourt in George Eliot's "Daniel Deronda" is an illustration of the very quintessence of pride. But it is of the kind which is less often seen and against which it is less necessary to fight. What we need to do is to attack "showiness," as one of the most conspicuous vices of the present time; the disposition to try and hold a position before the world by means of what one can exhibit on the outside rather than by means of what one has within one's self.

## CHAPTER XX.

### FRUGALITY.

#### Proverbs or Verses.

"Frugality is an estate alone."

"Frugality when all is spent comes too late."—*Seneca*.

"After one that earns comes one that wastes."

"To save at the tap and waste at the bung-hole."

"To burn out a candle in search of a pin."

"He builds cages fit for oxen to keep his birds in."

"He that runs out by extravagance must retrieve by parsimony."

"The world has not yet learned the riches of frugality."—*Cicero*.

"Always to be sparing is always to be in want."

"Better spare at the brim than at the bottom."

"Better spare than ill spent."

"He that spares when he is young may spend when he is old."

"He who spends more than he should, shall not have to spare when he would."

"A work ill done must be twice done."

"There is nothing more precious than time and nothing more prodigally wasted."

"They that make the best use of their time have none to spare."

#### Dialogue.

Do you remember a talk we had about a habit connected more especially with money? "Oh, about being saving," you say. Yes, that was it.

But we did not discuss another side of that subject not connected with money at all. Do you see how, for instance, one could be saving of anything else besides money? "Yes," you tell me, "that might be possible. Of course, one could save almost anything."

How about time, for example? Do you see how one could be saving in the matter of time? "Yes." Do you mean that one could get more than twenty-four

hours in a day, or make the sun stand still and wait awhile for you? Can you put time in a bank?

"No," you smile, "but we can easily waste time, just as we waste money." But how? I ask. "Why," you explain, "we might do a little of this and a little of that or a little of the other thing in the course of the morning, and not finish up anything."

Yes, but that is work, just the same. You would be filling up the time. Where does the waste come in? "Oh," you point out, "if we went to work and *finished up a thing*, instead of doing a little of it every now and then, we could do it better and more quickly."

Do you believe, by doing one thing at a time, and doing it up completely, that in this way at the end of the week you could accomplish a great deal more than if you do a little at many things each day?

"Certainly," you insist, "in that way one could finish up a great deal more." You mean, then, that by saving time, you can do more in a given time, or accomplish more in a week, by one way of working than by another? And so it is possible, is it, to be "thrifty" in regard to time as well as in regard to money?

Do I understand you, for instance, to say that one could be very saving of money, keep half of every dollar one earned, and yet not have as much at the end as another person who might be less saving of his money, but who used his time to better advantage? "True," you assert, "that might be possible." If so, there is more than one form of thrift.

Can you see further how a man might be very saving in these two ways and yet not prosper as well as another person less saving in this manner and more saving in other directions?

"Yes," you insist, "there are any number of other ways." Well, in regard to what, besides time and money? "Oh," you say, "in regard to our habits at home, not being wasteful about what we eat and drink, or in regard to our clothes or our furniture."

You think, then, it might be possible in the case of two families equally saving in time and money, and

living on the same amount of money in the year, that one family could have a much prettier home and better things to eat, and better clothes, than another?

"Yes," you assure me, "that does happen." Then how will you explain it? Illustrate by the table and what we eat. "Why," you continue, "one might be careful about not being wasteful in food, ordering just enough and not too much, or saving what is left over and using it for other purposes."

True, there is no doubt about that. The difference between the tables of two families may all turn on that one point about not being wasteful in the kitchen. In such a simple matter, for instance, as paring potatoes, some persons will waste half the potato. They may not think about it. But the consequences are plain enough.

In the same way, for example, how could one be thrifty in regard to one's clothes? You see, one might be very saving in money and time, and yet scarcely ever have any nice clothes at all, while another person on the same income will have plenty of such nice things. What makes the difference?

"Well," you explain, "to begin with, one can take care about keeping one's clothes clean, brush them often, so that they shall not get injured or begin to look shabby."

You think, then, that with clothing after it begins to look a little bit shabby, we may find it much harder to keep it looking nice than if we had begun at the start?

Have you ever noticed how some men are careful in rainy weather to turn up their trousers, and how other men neglect it? Which one will have the shabby trousers sooner than the other?

"Oh, the one that is careless," you say, "and fails to turn up his trousers."

And how about mending, or keeping one's clothes mended? Is there any way of being saving there? "Yes," you point out, "one can begin by having the mending done at once, as soon as need for it is observed, before the need becomes great."



Further, have you ever noticed how two families will have a great difference in their gas bills, or in the amount of coal oil they use, and yet both perhaps have an equal amount of light?

"Why, yes," you say, "in one case the people of the family are careful to turn out the lights when they are not needed." And so there is a possibility of being saving with regard to light, as well as with regard to food and clothing?

Do you ever observe in the same way how certain people are careful with their furniture, so as not to injure it? Just think what a difference it makes in a household when a person is thoughtful about wiping his shoes at the door; what difference it may make in the long run in the amount of money saved in the house.

It may strike you as odd that thrift should apply to keeping one's shoes clean. Yet it seems to have some meaning there, nevertheless.

Have you ever seen a huge cake of ice lying at the kitchen doors of certain people's houses? "Yes," you reply, "the ice man has brought it and left it there for them."

But why is it there? Why is it not in the ice-chest? "Oh, they may be careless about taking it in at once," you explain. But nevertheless the ice is melting away, and you may hear such families talking about being poor and always wishing they had more money.

How about boys and girls in school? Did you ever notice any contrast there in the habits of saving? How about the school-books? Do all such books look alike after being used the same length of time? Will they last just as long? "Not by any means," you reply.

Why not? The books were just alike at the beginning, were they not? "Oh, it is the way some boys and girls slam their books about or injure them, or the way others are careful of them."

And do you notice how some boys and girls will use a great many more pencils and more writing paper than others? "Yes," you add, "but that may not mat-

ter. Paper and pencils do not cost very much. They are cheap now."

That is all very true. But if one is wasteful with paper and pencils, how about the *habit* of being saving? "Well," you admit, "perhaps it would encourage us to fall into a bad habit."

Let me ask you another question. Do you suppose that every boy and girl in our city who has received the same pocket money at the beginning of the week could tell at the end of the week exactly what he or she had spent it for, or at the end of the month? "Not all of them," you confess.

But how about grown men and women? Do you think they always know just what they have spent their money for? "At any rate," you add, "they know how much they have spent, because they know what wages or salary they receive."

But that is not my point. Do they know what they have spent it for? "Some of them do," you insist. But how do they know it? "Why," you say, "they put it down. They keep accounts."

Do you suppose that if a man had not been accustomed to keep accounts for a number of years, and then began to do it for a time, it would make any difference in the way he spent his money? "Yes," you say, "he would know, then, the whole amount of what he had spent for some one thing, and begin to see that he was laying out too much money for one object and too little for another." Certainly you are right. Beyond any doubt, keeping accounts is a good method of encouraging thrift.

I wonder if you have ever heard a proverb of four words connected with this subject. I will give it and you may write it down. Here it stands:

"Waste not, want not."

Do you see any sense in that?

"Yes," you say, "it means that if we are careful about not being wasteful, we shall possess more, and therefore not be so much in want, not be so needy."

And so it turns out, does it, that being saving applies just as much to looking out about not being wasteful, on the one side, as it does about putting by and saving one's money, on the other.

#### Points of the Lesson.

I. That one can be saving of time as well as of material things, by getting more into the time or not wasting one's time over trifles.

II. That one can be saving by not being wasteful about small things—keeping what is left over, for a future time; and hence cultivating frugality.

III. That one can be saving or frugal in the care one takes of one's clothes or of one's books or of one's tools.

IV. That one can be saving in the home by being frugal in the use of light and coal and not wasting them unnecessarily; or in the care one takes not to injure one's home.

V. That it helps to make one frugal by keeping accounts as to the way one spends one's money, in watching how one may waste it on trifles.

VI. That frugality begins in avoiding wastefulness with regard to what one has already, and not merely in saving up what one may get after a while.

#### Poem.

The sunshine is a glorious thing,  
That comes alike to all,  
Lighting the poor man's lowly cot,  
The rich man's painted hall.

The moonlight is a gentle thing;  
It through the window gleams  
Upon the snowy pillow where  
The happy infant dreams.

It shines upon the fisher's boat  
Out on the lonely sea,  
Or where the little lambkins lie  
Beneath the old oak tree.

The dewdrops on the summer morn  
Sparkle upon the grass;  
And happy children brush them off,  
Who through the meadows pass.

There are no gems in monarch's crowns  
More beautiful than they;  
And yet we scarcely notice them,  
But tread them off in play.

—ANONYMOUS.

FURTHER SUGGESTIONS TO THE TEACHER: This may be a dry subject to young people, and we may have to exercise much ingenuity in order to bring out the points and make the theme attractive. The lesson in a certain way is a continuation of the one on "Being Saving." But, whereas the latter topic naturally dealt more with preserving or accumulating what one gets, this further discussion dwells more on the habit of wastefulness, in not being careful about what one already possesses. The little poem above may not seem to have much connection with the lesson. But it could be introduced as a diversion and also for the purpose of showing how one may be frugal in getting pleasure out of small things and not wasting minor opportunities for happiness. This would be an aspect of frugality not often dwelt upon. But it could come in here with some point. Many of these topics must more or less overlap. But it is often better to introduce the old subject under a new name, where there are many thoughts to be brought out concerning it. The methods for illustrating these lessons depend somewhat on the character of the children, their age, whether they are boys or girls, and their condition in life. It might be well to add to the lesson some talk about being "close." There is also a danger from this side, and they should be warned against it, although it is a danger which occurs less often than the other from being wasteful. They can be told of persons who were so exceedingly careful about being wasteful that when they could afford to have more, they were afraid to risk it. In this way, for instance, some people will go on doing hand work instead of using machinery, because it seems to them extravagant to spend money on machinery. In the long run this exaggerated form of saving could be the worst kind of wastefulness. In the same way people will injure their eyes by not having enough light. Or they will not allow themselves enough light for their pleasure, although it is a very simple and honest form of pleasure. But they shrink from this, because they have

long had the habit of being very saving in regard to it. The exaggerated forms of saving on the part of people who do not need to cultivate such habits later in life, are very pathetic; and it is just as well that illustrations of this should also be told to the children, although with less emphasis than on the other kind. On the matter of clothing a great deal might be said with regard to wastefulness. This is a point that could be especially brought to the attention of the girls. Something could be said about the unhappiness in homes, owing to the wastefulness in regard to dress on the part of mothers and daughters.

## CHAPTER XXI.

### HABITS OF STUDY.

#### Proverbs or Verses.

"John has been in school to learn to be a fool."—*French.*

"A little knowledge is a dangerous thing."

"He that imagines he hath knowledge enough hath none."

"He that knows least commonly presumes most."

"He who knows little is confident in everything."

"He who knows nothing never doubts."

"He who thinks he knows the most knows the least."

"Do the head-work before the hand-work."

"Work first and then rest."—*Ruskin.*

"Read and you will know."

"Reading maketh a full man, conversation a ready man, and writing an exact man."—*Lord Bacon.*

#### Dialogue.

Do you like to study? Tell me now frankly just how you feel about it. "Well, some," you answer. Yes, but what I wish to know is whether you really enjoy it.

"Why," you say, "we like to study *some things.*"

And what do you mean by that? I ask. "Oh," you assert, "certain studies are interesting and others are very tiresome."

And what studies do you like most? Suppose you tell me.

NOTE TO THE TEACHER: At this point spend five or ten minutes with the children getting them to name over their studies and state the ones they like most and the ones they like least, or the ones they most dislike. If possible, induce them to give their reasons for their likes and dislikes. With a pencil in hand write down on a piece of paper the answers from each of the members of the class on this subject, no matter how long a time it takes.

But now that you have told me your feelings con-



cerning your studies, do you think we all agree as to the ones which give us the most pleasure?

"No," you reply, "evidently not, judging from the answers which have been given." Then you assume, do you, that some persons like one class of studies and others another class?

But do you really ever enjoy study as much as you enjoy play? You hesitate, I see. Answer me now honestly. "No," you say, "really never."

That is just what I suspected. Can you explain why? "Oh," you continue, "study is *work*." True; but do you not work in your play? Do you not have to work hard there?

"Yes," you answer, "but it is not quite the same; we like it so much. We do not know that we are working at the time we are playing."

Then what is the reason why you prefer play to study or work? "As to that," you assure me, "when we are at play we can do as we please. We do not have to obey rules or stick to one thing any longer than we care to do so."

And you are convinced that in study one cannot be doing just what one pleases? And so you feel that study means work, and play means doing as you please.

But is there any difference in boys and girls in this matter? Do they all equally dislike studies? How is it with the boys and girls you know? Are they all just the same in this matter?

"No," you confess, "there is a difference." Well, what kind? "Why," you point out, "some boys or girls seem to take more to study than others. They seem to enjoy it more, or to dislike it less."

Why is it that some boys and girls like to study more than others? "Well," you explain, "it is their nature. They are made that way." But do you think that is the only reason? Do you suppose that boys and girls ever begin by disliking a study and then come by and by to like it quite a good deal? "Yes," you admit, "that could happen."

And what is the cause for that? "Oh," you add,

"they may become more interested in the subject." But is that the only explanation?

"Perhaps," you say, "they kept on studying it so hard, worked at it so long, that by and by they came to like it." You mean, do you, that one really *makes* one's self like it, in that way?

Do you think for boys and girls as a rule, that study comes naturally; or that usually if one comes to like it, it must be a sort of habit? "Why," you tell me, "after all, it must become a habit."

And what shall we call this habit, then? Can you think of a name for it? Being what, for instance? "Why," you suggest, "being studious."

Now you have told me that this was not an easy habit to acquire; that it is one which comes very hard—"goes against the grain," as we say.

With what kind of studies can we most easily acquire this habit of being studious; with those we like the most or with those we like the least? "Oh," you exclaim, "it is with the studies that we like the most."

It comes harder, does it, to get the habit of being studious with subjects we do not care about?

Do you think that a person might thoroughly dislike a subject at first, and by and by force himself to like it? "You think not." Well, now I can tell you from the experience of older persons. Sometimes boys and girls begin with disliking mathematics, arithmetic or algebra or geometry, and by and by they come to enjoy the subject immensely.

Do you believe that our likes or dislikes should guide us or regulate us in the studious habits we ought to form? "Why, yes," you say, "we should accomplish more, if we cultivate those subjects that we are fond of."

Have you ever observed that where a thing comes easy to a person, somehow he never gets it as thoroughly or learns it as well as when it comes hard? "True," you admit, "that sometimes happens."

Is it always, then, of advantage that the subject we study should be easy for us, or that we should like it?

Might we not be careless and never master that subject thoroughly? Fancy what it would mean if we neglected those subjects we dislike, before we know much about their value to us in the future!

You are right. Habits of study come hard. But which come harder to acquire, do you think; habits in regard to the body, as, for instance, training your muscles to do a certain thing; or habits of the mind, like study? "Oh," you assert, "surely habits of the mind."

But why? Suppose you train your muscles in order to play a game well. Why should that be easier than training your mind for hard work in the future?

"Ah, but," you explain, "in training the muscles for a game there is a certain amount of play in it." Yes, I suspect you are right. And so it is harder to train the mind into studious habits, because there is less play about it.

Have you ever thought what is the main point about being studious; what one special form of effort we have to make? What is it? Now think hard. "Oh," you say, "we must sit still and work." Yes, but that is not the point. We are talking about the *mind* now. Does the mind run around just like the body? You smile at that.

Yes, but I ask you seriously. What do I mean by that, do you suppose? "Why," you suggest, "perhaps it means where the mind runs off thinking about many things, jumping around from one subject to another."

Now, do you begin to see what is the chief effort we must make in cultivating habits of study; sitting still with what? "Oh, with the mind," you say.

Yes, that is the term I want, *sitting still with the mind*. Can you find another way of describing this; sticking to what, for example? "Sticking to one subject or one point." Yes. You see the mind likes to run and jump and leap, just like the body, and it is hard to make it keep still.

What is the word your teachers use sometimes? Can you think of it,—when they want to make you study closely? "Attention?" Yes.

Hence, as you have said, the chief thing about being studious is to acquire the power of attending to one subject. Does this mean attending to one subject for two or three minutes? "No," you answer. Well, how long? "Oh, for quite a while," you say.

Being studious evidently implies being able to hold the mind on to one subject for a long time. By the way, have you ever seen boys or girls who are always changing around in their lesson books on their desks, reading or studying three or four minutes in one and then three or four minutes in another?

Now suppose a boy or girl were to do that right along, and to keep it up through the whole school time, they would still have the habit of being studious, would they not?

"No," you hesitate, "you doubt it." But why? They have been studying all the while. "Yes," you add, "but they have not been sticking to one subject."

One last point with regard to the habit of being studious. Why should we care to acquire this habit? "Oh," you answer, "in order to be able to learn our lessons in school." But is that all?

Let me ask you further. Suppose you had this habit in school and were to lose it entirely when you are grown up. Would it make any difference? Do grown people ever have to study?

"Why," you assert, "it depends on the kind of work they do." What sort, for instance, would not require study? "Oh," you tell me, "simple work, the common kind." But now what kind of work would you rather do? Would you rather be a day-laborer, shovel earth, because it is simple and easy, or would you rather have a work to do that would go on improving you all your life?

"Well," you answer, "perhaps we should rather do the work that would improve us." Yes, but in that kind of work you might have to study just as you study in school, only in another way?

I wonder if you have ever seen persons, grown-up men and women, who never can do any sort of study

work, who never can sit down to read anything serious for a half-hour at a time. What is the trouble with such persons?

"Why," you explain, "one must be 'studious' to do that sort of thing, and they have not acquired that habit." Why do they not undertake to cultivate it? "Because," you answer, "it is too late, one must acquire that habit of being studious in boyhood or girlhood."

Then what form of work do you think those boys and girls who never study hard, fall back on when they get older; the higher kind, or the poorer, cheaper kind? "Why," you suggest, "probably they must fall back on the poorer, cheaper kind." Yes, you are right.

You see, the habit of being studious perhaps decides what kind of work we shall do all our lives, what sort of a position we shall occupy, as well as what we shall learn now. Hence the habit of being studious, after all, may be of great importance.

#### Points of the Lesson.

I. That study means work, and does not usually come natural to us.

II. That one can make one's self like a study sometimes by keeping at it long enough.

III. That the secret of acquiring studious habits is in "making the mind sit still," or in cultivating attention.

IV. That we must not judge of our studies by the way we like or dislike them at the start.

V. That grown people may have to study as much, if not more, than children.

VI. That what we call the higher occupations for grown people, usually require a great deal of study, while those of the more common kind in the use of spade or shovel require the least use of the mind.

VII. That the habits of study we acquire, may determine whether we take to one of the higher occupations or whether we are left to one of the lower kind.

VIII. That if we neglect mind-work when we are young, we must resort to the other kind of work when we are grown up.

IX. That success in the occupations where the mind is concerned, will depend a great deal on how one acquires the habit of study in youth, and how far one is able to make one's self like study.



## Duties.

*I. We ought to try and make ourselves like to study, because in studying we are using the higher part of ourselves.*

*II. We ought to make ourselves like those studies which will do us the most good in the end.*

*III. We ought to compel the mind to work, until we come to like it.*

## Poem.

You'll not learn your lesson by crying, my man,  
 You'll never come at it by crying, my man;  
     Not a word can you spy  
     For the tear in your eye;  
 Then set your heart to it, for surely you can.

If you like your lesson, it's sure to like you,  
 The words then so glibly would jump into view;  
     Each one to its place  
     All the others would chase,  
 Till the laddie would wonder how clever he grew

You'll cry till you make yourself stupid and blind,  
 And then not a word can you keep in your mind;  
     But cheer up your heart,  
     And you'll soon have your part,  
 For all things grow easy when bairns are inclined.

—ALEXANDER SMART.

FURTHER SUGGESTIONS TO THE TEACHER: Here surely is the opportunity for a biography. One might introduce something of the story of a life like that of Louis Agassiz. It is an inspiring narrative and one which can be made most interesting to young people. Emphasis could be laid on his early career and how he threw his whole soul and being into study; how his whole life from start to finish was of this kind. One can point out the way in which he compelled himself to work and the devotion with which he could keep on at one subject until he had mastered it. There is much which is unusually picturesque and striking in the life of Agassiz, to young and old alike. One could read extracts from his letters, or give account of his classroom methods, in the way he made his students work.



Something could be brought in concerning his persistence in getting knowledge under difficulties; as, for instance, in the story of the way he acquired his knowledge of ice and glaciers in Switzerland. The whole lesson might be given over with advantage to such a biography, and it could be held up as an inspiration to the young. One must, of course, be careful in not fostering the idea that the professions are the only high occupations, as if all young people should aspire to become lawyers or teachers or physicians or writers of books. It can be shown how the necessity for study applies to a much wider range of occupations. Emphasis could be laid on the fact that use of the mind becomes very important in all labor which is above that of the spade or shovel in digging ditches or cleaning the streets. The teacher can dwell on the fact that the one chance by which a man may rise into more advanced occupations will depend on the facility with which he uses his mind, or the capacity he has acquired for concentrated effort. We do not wish to have study appear as merely committing to memory facts out of books or having lessons in school. This would give a false impression. We should rather identify the fact of study with the active, concentrated use of the mind in all the many ways where a final purpose is before us. It could be pointed out, therefore, how the lawyer studies, the business man likewise, the book-keeper, the office clerk. Wherever there is a head bent down over the desk, it means "study." Elevate this word therefore in the minds of the young people, from the usual conception of it as being something which only children have to do in school, and connect it in their minds with the kind of brain-work which the more educated people have to do all their lives.

## CHAPTER XXII.

### EXAGGERATION.

#### Proverbs or Verses.

"Exaggeration is to paint a snake and to add legs."—*Chinese Proverb.*

"Exaggeration is a blood relation to Falsehood."

"We weaken what we exaggerate."—*La Harpe.*

"Behold what a great matter a little fire kindleth."—*St. Paul.*

"A man may say too much even on the best of subjects."

"A man of all tongue is dangerous in his city."

"He who says what he likes hears what he does not like."

"It is good speaking that improves good silence."

"It is one thing to speak much and another to speak pertinently."

"Speaking without thinking is shooting without aiming."

"Speech is a gift of all, but thought of few."—*Cato.*

"Thistles and thorns prick sore,

But evil tongues prick more."

"The tongue of a fool carves a piece of his heart to all who sit near him."

#### Dialogue.

Did you ever know of a case where a number of persons came home after witnessing some occurrence, and in describing what they saw, failed to tell it exactly alike? Do you think that ever happens?

"Yes," you assure me, "that is quite sure to happen every time if a number of people try to give an account of the same event." And what is the reason for it? Do they make up the whole story?

"No," you assert. What, then, is the cause of the confusion? "Well, to begin with," you say, "they may not all have observed carefully or seen everything which occurred." Yes, that is one explanation; just carelessness in noticing what took place.

But what made them give the whole account quite as if they had seen it precisely as it happened? Why should they not confess that they had not watched it carefully?

"Oh," you answer, "if they had been so frank, then people would not have listened to them or paid much attention to their story. Hence they tell it just as if they had seen it all.

But is there any other reason why they should not agree in their account? "Yes," you continue, "it might be that they had not been in the same positions, and each one had seen only a part of what took place, or seen it from a different side."

Then was their account inaccurate or untrue? "No, not exactly," you admit; "they each described what they *saw*." Why do you put in the word "exactly?" "Well," you reply, "they might have explained that, and told how they had seen it only from one side."

Would the omission be intentional, do you think? "Not necessarily," you tell me, "they could forget to mention it."

But suppose they do not *forget* in the matter. What other motive might they have? "Oh," you add, "it would spoil their story."

When several persons describe an event and their accounts do not agree, which account is liable to be the most interesting? "Why," you explain, "the one that has most excitement to it, the most variety, the one that is best told."

In the several accounts, on the other hand, which one would be the most liable to be accurately true, the one which was the most interesting and told with exciting features, or the one which would be tame and not attract so much attention?

"Well," you assume, "we must admit that in all probability the tame one would probably be the more correct."

But why? "To begin with," you say, "everything that happens might not be exciting or have anything exciting about it." But is that the only reason? I ask.

"No," you add further, "the fact of it is, a good many persons have a way of dressing up their story so as to make it interesting to people, and not telling it exactly as it happened."

And what do we call such a habit? "Oh, it is exaggeration," you say. Yes, you are right.

Would you really assume that people do this deliberately? Do they consciously tell a lie? Are they clearly aware that they have left a part of their story out, or added something to it? "No, perhaps it is not quite so bad as that," you hesitate.

How do you explain it, then? What is it done for? "Why," you point out, "they may want to make their story interesting, to have people listen to them. They are anxious to attract attention to themselves."

You mean that in doing this they dress up the story or the event, using words which make it striking but are not exactly true in the account? "Yes, that is about it," you reply.

But if it is not done consciously or deliberately, with the idea of telling a lie, how is it possible that they can do this and not be aware of what they are doing.

"Why, for instance," you suggest, "it becomes a sort of habit, so that by and by they forget exactly what did take place, or they purposely may not look very carefully. And so when they are telling their story, they do not exactly know whether they are right or not in what they are describing."

Take a number of persons in this way, say half a dozen boys and girls accustomed to repeating what they have heard. If they do not all give the same account, will it so happen that sometimes it will be one of these people who tells the thing accurately, and another time another, and a third time a third, just as a matter of accident?

"Oh, no," you assert, "not by any manner of means." How is it then? "Why," you add, "usually it is the same person who tells it correctly, and the same person who exaggerates it."

Then why is it that such persons who habitually exaggerate, are not found out in what they say, or in the way they describe things? "But they are found out," you tell me, "people always distinguish between those who exaggerate and those who are careful in their reports of what they see."

In that case, how do we usually treat the reports of such persons who are inclined to give a careless account in order to make it interesting? Do we put confidence in it, and do we feel perfectly safe in repeating it to others in the same way? "No," you add, "on the contrary we are always a little doubtful about it."

Doubtful about the whole story, do you mean? "No, not that." You do not mean that the person actually lies? "No," you answer.

Doubtful about what, then? "Oh, about the exciting part of the story, or the details of it. We may not know exactly what took place, but we take it for granted that something of the kind happened."

Then do you remember a proverb or phrase that is used with regard to such persons whose word we can never quite trust, although we know that they do not mean to tell lies? It is something about "salt." Can you recall it? "Take it with a grain of salt." Yes, that is the phrase.

There are a great many persons whose stories or accounts we always have to take "with a grain of salt." And what does that mean?

Salt is something we use in flavoring. What point is there in such a proverb? "Why," you explain, "we are obliged to flavor their account, or modify it by our own judgment in deciding how far we can trust their word. Or we must flavor it with somebody else's report."

It implies, then, does it, that we must always qualify such persons' accounts, and never take them quite as they are? I suspect that is true.

Do you suppose, however, that people usually know that they have this habit of exaggeration? "Not always," you say.

You assume, do you, that they may continue dressing up their stories, while other people take everything they say with a grain of salt, and yet they may not know about this. Yes, that is quite possible. But why is it that others do not tell them?

"Oh," you answer, "it may hurt their feelings. And then besides," you add, "probably it would not do any good. They would go on telling their stories in that way just the same."

But would they care? Would it worry them, if people did not put confidence in what they told? "Yes," you say, "they would not like that at all. But they would have the habit and it would probably go on as before."

What subjects, by the way, more often tempt us to exaggerate? For instance: Suppose it is something which has happened to a person, or on the other hand, an accident which has happened merely to an object at our door. Which circumstance are we more inclined to exaggerate?

"Well," you admit, "perhaps we are more tempted in what we tell about persons." Yes, I suspect you are right.

But what do we call this talking about persons, reporting what we see or hear in regard to them? You know the word; a short one of two syllables, beginning with "g." "Gossip." Yes, that is it.

And do you see that it is especially in gossip, this talking about people, where men and women, boys and girls, all alike, are most inclined to forget to tell the exact truth?

But further, in which case are we liable to be more careless or to exaggerate—in reporting what a person did, or in reporting what a person said? "Well," you answer, "perhaps in reporting what a person said."

But why? "Oh," you add, "it is not so easy to remember. We cannot preserve the exact words." Have you ever noticed how the same person will repeat what he heard another man say, or another woman say,



three different times, and in no instance tell it the same way or in the same words?

Is not this a little strange? Don't you think it a pity that we are not more careful about trying to be exact in reporting the language of other persons?

What if we are telling something about somebody whom we do not like; or, on the other hand, about some person that we are fond of; in which instance are we more inclined to exaggerate, to make the bad side still worse?

"Oh," you say, "it is where we tell about persons we do not like." Have you ever observed how, in reporting what we have seen a man or a woman do, we may also add the reason for it, exactly as if they had told it to us? And yet they may not have mentioned it to us at all. We just merely guess it according to the way we like or dislike them.

Perhaps by this time you begin to think that the habit of exaggeration is a very easy habit to fall into, and if you think so, I am quite sure you are right.

It is very hard indeed, even for good, honest people not to have something of this habit. The very best persons may show it now and then. They will insert more than they see, or more than they hear.

And there is one other bad form of exaggeration. In telling what another person said, is it merely the words we repeat? Would it be possible to report the exact words, even to a punctuation mark, and yet give an entirely wrong impression about the whole statement? "Yes, that might be possible," you confess. "One can put a look on one's face, or assume a certain expression of the voice, and change the whole meaning." And what would you call that? "More of the same thing," you say, "more exaggeration."

#### Points of the Lesson.

I. That many people have a way of not reporting an event exactly as they saw it or heard it, because of the habit of exaggeration.

II. That people exaggerate in order to make a story inter-

esting and so fall into the habit of not seeing or hearing anything carefully.

III. That people who exaggerate, are usually known and distrusted in what they have to say.

IV. That we are more liable to exaggerate in what we report about persons than about things; and in what we tell about people we dislike than about those we like.

V. That we are most liable to be careless in reporting what other people say, because of the difficulty of remembering precise language.

VI. That exaggeration at first may be unintentional; but by and by it may lead to conscious deception and afterwards to the downright lie.

### Duties.

*I. In reporting what we see or hear, we ought to try and describe it exactly as we saw it or heard it.*

### Poem.

Two ears and only one mouth have you;  
The reason, I think, is clear:  
It teaches, my child, that it will not do  
To talk about all you hear.

Two eyes and only one mouth have you;  
The reason of this must be,  
That you should learn that it will not do  
To talk about all that you see.

Two hands and only one mouth have you;  
And it is worth while repeating:  
The two are for work you will have to do—  
The one is enough for eating.

—ANONYMOUS.

FURTHER SUGGESTIONS TO THE TEACHER: Uninteresting as this lesson may be to young people, it is, of course, most important. On the other hand, the teacher will have to be careful, owing to the fact that the parents of the children may have this habit, and the discussion may set the children to watching their parents and criticising them. But the evil is so great and the tendency so striking, that we must fight it. Owing to the dangerous influence the habit exerts on the whole character, it would be well for the teacher to collect a number of instances and repeat them to the members

of the class. It could also be pointed out how very hard it is even for the careful observer to see what actually comes before his eyes. On this account we may warn the young people against being too ready to dispute others, or in being so sure of what they have seen themselves. If the teacher cares to look for illustrations in this matter, he will find them to a remarkable degree in some of the volume of the "Proceedings of the English Society for Psychical Research." It may be rather hard for the members of the class to understand that they must not be too sure of trusting their own eyes. Yet on the whole it would be well to show them the many ways by which one can be careless, first in what one observes and afterwards still more in reporting upon it. The disposition to "dress up" a story, in order to make it entertaining, is certainly growing on human nature. It might be well, therefore, to find an instance where there are four or five reports of the same event, and have those reports read to the class, showing how they disagree.

## CHAPTER XXIII.

### PROFANITY.

#### Proverbs or Verses.

"The language denotes the man."

"Maintain your rank, vulgarity despise;

To swear is neither brave, polite nor wise."

"We will take thy word for faith, not ask thine oath;  
Who shuns not to break one will sure crack both."

—*Shakespeare.*

"As the man, so is his speech."

"It is more necessary to guard the mouth than the chest."

"Speech is the picture of the mind."

"Put a key on thy tongue."

"No one ever repented for having held his tongue."

"Much tongue and much judgment seldom go together."—*L'Estrange.*

"Keep your tongue within your teeth."

"His tongue goes always on errands, but never speeds."

"He cannot speak well who cannot hold his tongue."

"Confine your tongue lest it confine you."

"An unbridled tongue is the worst of diseases."—*Euripides.*

#### Dialogue.

Did you ever hear a man swear? "Yes," you say, "we certainly have."

How about boys? "It is the same," you admit. "We have even heard boys swear."

Which do you think is worse, for boys or for men to use such language? "Not much difference either way," you answer. Perhaps you are right.

Is it, after all, a nice or a manly thing to swear, or to use profane language? Is it a good sort of habit to have? "No," you confess, "surely not."

But suppose a boy does swear sometimes, or quite a good deal, is often given to using profane language, is it certain that he will stop it when he grows up and

becomes a man? "No," you assert, "that is not at all sure."

But why not? All he will have to do will be to cease using the same kind of language he was using as a boy. "Oh yes," you add, "but he has formed the habit of swearing and it will be found no easy matter to break it off."

Do you mean to tell me, for instance, that one cannot very easily change one's way of using words? What if one has used bad grammar until he is grown up, or pronounced words in a wrong way. Can one then not find out what good grammar is, and afterwards make use of the words in the right way? "It will not be so easy," you insist.

But why not? What will prevent him from at once making the change? "Oh," you reply, "he has formed a habit of talking in that way." Yes, you are quite right on that point. People who would really like to use correct language and speak grammatically when they are grown up, sometimes never can learn quite how to do it. "True," you point out, "it is because of the way they talk when they are boys and girls."

Again, therefore, I ask, which may be worse, for a boy or for a man to swear? "As to that," you acknowledge, "perhaps after all it is even worse for a boy, because it will be more difficult for him to get rid of the habit when he is grown up."

But what do people swear for? When you hear a boy using profane language, why is he talking in that way?

"Oh," you explain, "he may be angry and he is letting out his bad feelings." If that is true, using profane language does not show a very nice sort of a spirit, does it?

But have you ever heard persons using such language when they are not angry at all, just merely in conversation with other persons? "Yes," you answer, "it does happen."

What do they do it for? What reason is there in it,

or what sense? "Oh," you assure me, "perhaps they think it *sounds* fine."

But what do you mean by that? Would you imply that everybody who listens to it, admires them for it? "No, not quite that," you answer; "but perhaps it makes them feel important to use such language." You think, then, do you, that swearing is a way of "showing off," appearing "smart."

For my part I really believe that is the case. In my opinion people swear mainly as a way of showing off. They are calling attention to themselves.

What, by the way, was the bird or animal we mentioned as seeming to show pride? "The peacock?" Yes. And what does the peacock seem to do? "Strut," you tell me. True, that is just it.

Then you assume that swearing is a way of strutting like the peacock. After all, would there not be something contemptible in using profane language under those circumstances, even if there were no other objection to it?

Did you ever see a person who had clothes on that were too big for him? "Oh yes," you smile. When a boy, for instance, puts on a man's hat, how does he look? "Why," you say, "it is ridiculous. We laugh at him."

And suppose a man, for instance, should put on a hat twice too big for himself and walk along the street with it on, what would people do? "They would smile?"

Have you ever noticed that when persons are not very brave, they sometimes talk in a very bold sort of a way and use bad language? Does it strike you that profanity may be very much like assuming something on the outside which does not correspond with what you have inside, as if you were wearing a hat that is too big for you, showing off, or calling attention to yourself?

After all, you see, swearing is something really contemptible. It is using words which seem too big for us, and people appear to "swell out," as it were, when they swear, just as a peacock swells out.



By the way, do girls ever use profane language? You smile at that, I see. "Sometimes," you say. But do they swear as much as boys or as much as men? "No," you answer, "not in the same way."

What do you mean by that? "Oh," you tell me, "girls may use other words. They may employ phrases which sound just as bad for them as profane language would for boys or men."

Then do you think it is swearing? "It is pretty much the same thing," you insist. Yes, I suspect you are right. You see, swearing does not depend altogether on the special words one uses. Girls can make themselves as contemptible with their kind of showy language, as boys or men can with their profanity.

But is there any other very serious reason which makes swearing not only contemptible, but *bad*? What kind of words do we usually associate with profanity? "Sacred words," you say. You imply, then, do you, by sacred words those names or words which are solemn to many people?

Do you mean to say that the use of those solemn or sacred words at any time may be swearing or profanity? "Oh no," you explain, "it is when one employs them lightly, or in order to make one's language seem strong, or in order to show off, or when one is angry, then it is swearing." Yes, you are right.

But what if some one to whom these words are very sacred, happens to hear another man swearing, how does it affect him? "Why," you admit, "it must, of course, be painful."

Why should he care? He does not use those words in that way himself. Let me give you an illustration. What if you heard another boy talking slightly about your father or mother, how would you feel? "Hurt," you answer. Yes, most decidedly hurt.

But why should you care? Why should you not just turn away and not listen? "Oh," you assert, "one could not do that with regard to one's father or mother."

Then do you think it might be shameful or bad for another person to speak contemptuously in your pres-

ence about your father or mother? "Yes, we do," you exclaim.

And now what if these words used in profane language are just as sacred to other people as your father and mother are sacred to you? If you employ those words slightly in their presence, is it not low or mean on your part? Is it not really just the same as if you were talking contemptuously about their father or mother? It is almost like striking them a blow.

So you see it is not only contemptible or undignified to use profanity, but it is also low and unmanly to use lightly those names which are solemn or sacred to other people.

And yet all we have said about swearing may seem of trifling importance, in comparison to the further reason against it, which we have not even mentioned. What commandment against it have we heard about, which was put forward hundreds and thousands of years ago? Do you remember?

"Yes, indeed," you assure me. And what was it, I ask. "Why," you exclaim, "'Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God in vain.'"

What, then, do we call swearing? It is the word we have already used, beginning with "p." "Profanity," you suggest. Yes, exactly. If, for instance, a man were to speak slightly of his mother, would it shock us? "Surely," you tell me. Why? "There is no 'why' about it," you answer. It would be just awful." Yes, that is true.

Does it not seem a little strange, then, that people who would never dream of speaking slightly of their mothers, or who would never tolerate that anyone else should do this, on the other hand are careless in talking in this way about the great Maker and Father of all? If the names of one's human father and mother are sacred to us, should not the name of the great Father who made all things, be even more sacred?

I wonder what it suggests to you when you hear people using such language, taking sacred names 'in vain'? I should call it "brutishness." If swine could

think and talk, I should fancy them filling in the time when not eating, by using vulgar swear words and speaking slightly of their Maker.

But you ask: "If this is true, why do men swear? Why should they be like swine? Why should they put themselves on the level with brutes?"

It would be hard for me to give you an answer. Sometimes it would seem as if it really required an effort for people to act like men, and not like beasts.

This much we can say, that *man as man* never swears. It is man as brute or beast, who takes the name of his Maker in vain or uses carelessly and slightly the name of the Father-over-All. The commandment has come down to us over these thousands of years, as one of the great charges to all the world: "Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God in vain."

#### Points of the Lesson.

I. That it may be even worse for a boy or girl to swear than for a grown person, because it would be even harder to give up the habit afterwards.

II. That swearing is contemptible, because it is showing off with big words and is a form of vanity or conceit.

III. That swearing is vulgar and ungentlemanly, because it is offensive to others.

IV. That swearing is wrong, because it hurts the feelings of others concerning what they may hold as sacred.

#### Duties.

*I. We ought not to swear, because swearing is dealing lightly with sacred things.*

*II. We ought not to swear, because in doing so, we are guilty of profanity toward the Deity.*

FURTHER SUGGESTIONS TO THE TEACHER: As to whether it is deemed advisable to introduce the last feature concerning profanity, will depend on whether it has been decided to introduce the religious phase into these lessons. If the school where they are used is pledged to neutrality on such matters, then this further aspect can be passed over. We have inserted it on the supposi-

tion that the teacher is to exercise his own judgment in the matter. There is also the fact to be considered in connection with this whole subject, that with a miscellaneous class of children, if one speaks too emphatically one may be reflecting on their parents. And here we should be at the danger point. If the young people mingle with persons who are given more or less to a careless use of the name of the Deity, then the "wickedness" of such language may not come out clearly, and we may find it difficult to impress this point on the minds of the young. It depends a good deal on the child himself or on his surroundings, as to what motives we may reach in their minds. But a great deal can be done in making them feel how contemptible profanity *sounds*. What we are aiming at is to discourage them in the use of such language; and if we can throw an element of the ridiculous around it or make it seem contemptible, if nothing more, we may be able to get at their feelings in that way. While drawing the comparison between swearing among boys on the one hand and grown people on the other, and showing that it may often be worse in the young, we are not to let them assume that it is dignified language for *any* class of persons. In fact the point could be brought out that a man makes himself often even *more* ridiculous in using such language, because he is acting like a boy, in trying to show off with high-sounding words. The term "unmanly," if not introduced too often, is very effective, in throwing a sense of opprobrium upon certain language or conduct. But we must take care that this word is not introduced too frequently so as to become commonplace. Do not let the girls who may be members of the class, be indifferent to this subject of profanity. Make them feel that their very "slang" can be almost as bad or contemptible as swearing among boys. If possible, of course, we wish to bring home the fact that profanity at root is a state of the mind or heart, rather than a mere act of the tongue. But it will depend on the age of the pupils as to whether this more advanced thought can be made effective. We are aware that a

strict and scholarly interpretation of the commandment in the Decalogue might not admit of the latitude we have given to the meaning of profanity. But we apply the words in the sense in which they are conventionally understood.

## CHAPTER XXIV.

### HABIT OF BORROWING.

#### Proverbs or Verses.

- "A borrowed cloak does not keep one warm."  
"Beware of borrowing; it bringeth care by night and disgrace by day."—*Hindoo*.  
"Borrowed garments never fit well."  
"He who is quick at borrowing, is slow at paying."  
"Borrowing makes sorrowing."  
"Much borrowing destroys credit."  
"When one borrows, one cannot choose."  
"A hundred years of vexation will not pay a farthing of debt."  
"Borrowing does well only once."  
"Borrowing is the mother of trouble."  
"He that goes a-borrowing goes a-sorrowing."  
"Neither a borrower nor a lender be,  
For loan oft loses both itself and friend."—*Shakespeare*.

#### Dialogue.

Suppose a boy or girl comes to you and says: "Let me have your lead pencil." What do you call that? "Begging," you say. Yes, but what else might it be, instead? "Oh," you answer, "it may be that they want to borrow it."

Do you think it is right to borrow? "Why, yes, surely," you tell me. Then you mean that if I come to ask for your pencil and your penknife and your money and your clothes, and keep on borrowing indefinitely, it's all right, is it? "No," you add, "that would be too much." But why? I ask.

"It depends," you reply, "on how much one borrows or how often one does it." You assume, then, that it may possibly be that too much borrowing would not be exactly right.

But what do people borrow for? Why should they



do it? "As to that," you explain, "there is something they need and which they do not happen to have. It is a convenience for them to borrow this for a short time."

But is there any other motive for borrowing besides just mere convenience? What would you say, for instance, of a man who asked you to lend him something which you really needed for your own use, when he might get that thing for himself if only he would take a little trouble in order to secure it?

"Why," you assert, "that is borrowing perhaps because one is lazy." But is there any other motive besides mere convenience, or sheer laziness, that leads people to borrow?

What if a person happens to know that you have spent money in purchasing a thing, and he comes and asks to borrow it, so as not to have to spend the money himself?

"Oh," you assert, "that is scheming. It is selfishness. There may be no reason why he should not go and buy it just as we did." We have found, have we, that borrowing can proceed from motives of laziness or *selfishness*, just as much as for the sake of convenience?

So far as you have observed boys and girls or men and women, do you notice that all people borrow to the same extent? "No," you say, "one person may be more selfish or lazy than another." But is that all? Might they not do it, even if they were not people of that kind?

"Yes," you answer, "perhaps they might do this just by getting into the habit of it." Quite so. People may just fall into the habit of borrowing, who had not at first done it very often. It may have *begun* from laziness or selfishness or merely because it was occasionally convenient, and then they do it constantly.

But do you see any reason why people should be a little cautious about getting into the habit of borrowing? What difference should it make, after all, provided we are careful to return what we borrow?

"Yes," you insist, "it does make a difference; other people may not like us so much, if we are all the time

given to borrowing." Then you think, do you, that this habit could make us unpopular with others?

But could it really injure one's character? "Yes," you answer, "it can make one more lazy. It may also cultivate selfishness. We may fall into the habit of using our friends, rather than of taking trouble, ourselves."

What about the matter of honesty in regard to borrowing? Did you ever hear of a person who borrowed something and forgot to return it? I see you smile at the question. But why?

"Oh," you say, "because there are lots of such people." Do you really imply that they borrow, as a rule, and do not intend to return it? "No," you assure me, "more often they really do intend to return it when they borrow it."

Then why is it that they fail to do so? "Carelessness," you reply. "They keep putting off returning it, until by and by they forget all about it."

Is that honesty? Is that justice? Is that fair? "No," you admit, "it is dishonesty. It is mean." Then you think, do you, that the habit of borrowing may lead us into habits of dishonesty?

But suppose you borrow something and do return it, then is it all right, everything satisfactory? "It depends," you tell me, "on the condition of the thing when it is returned." "For example," you add, "we may borrow a book of another person and soil it, so that when it is returned it is not in as nice condition as before."

But is that as bad as not returning it at all? "No, not quite as bad," you say, "but it is a form of dishonesty."

How do you think we should deal with things that we have borrowed from others? Should we treat them just as we treat things which belonged to ourselves? "No," you insist, "one ought to be even more careful and take *greater* pains with something one has borrowed."

Yes, I suspect you are right. If we borrow a book,

we ought to put a cover on it, perhaps. If we receive anything in that way we should be unusually careful in regard to it. You are right, if we return it in a poorer condition than we received it, then it is a form of stealing.

But could a man do anything about it? If I lend a book and you returned it in not quite as nice condition as before, could I make you pay for it? "Probably not," you say. In that case is it not even worse to do a thing of that kind? Is it not positively mean to injure a thing belonging to another, when there is no possible redress?

How, then, does it injure one's self to fall into the habit of borrowing? Does it make us weaker, or stronger in character? Are we more, or less dependent on ourselves? "Why," you answer, "it makes us less self-dependent, of course."

You assume, do you, that people who fall into the habit of borrowing, really have less self-respect than before?

Now I come to another point. If you have borrowed something and return it, is that all you have to do, just to give it back again, provided it is in as good condition as before? "No," you say, "one should also express one's thanks."

Do you feel, then, that everything would be settled? Is there anything more you could do? Suppose one family borrows half a cup of sugar—to use a very simple illustration—when the family undertakes to return it, would it be the right way to measure it exactly, an even half cup?

"No," you add, "it might be better to put in a little more than one received." Why? I ask. "Because," you explain, "it would be a little nicer; it would show that we are more grateful, more appreciative."

Yes, that is true. If we borrow something and can return a little more without hurting another's feelings, we should always be sure to do it—not as payment, but as a courtesy.

Is there anything else you could do? "Yes," you an-

swer, "we might turn about and try to do something for them, render them a favor in return." You are right. That is a point to be considered.

When, by the way, you borrow something of another, what sort of a relation do you establish between yourself and the other person? "Why," you tell me, "we put ourselves under an obligation to another."

What would you mean by that? "Oh," you say, "it would imply that other persons are entitled to ask all sorts of favors of us in return." And you assume, do you, that this would be rather embarrassing? If so, it is another serious objection to this habit.

From what persons are we most justified in borrowing, if we do this at all? "Why," you say, "from one's family or one's friends." But under what special circumstances would you feel most free to do this?

Suppose, for instance, a person was using a thing himself just when you wanted it, would you feel quite at liberty to go and borrow it? "No," you assert, "we should try to do it when it will cause the least inconvenience to the person from whom we ask it."

Speaking of this habit as a whole, what do people borrow most of all; clothes, would you say, or things to eat? "No," you answer, "it is money more than anything else." But could one have more than one purpose in borrowing money?

Which do you think would be the worse habit; to borrow money to spend, or to borrow it as capital with which to improve one's business, for instance? "As to that," you say, "we should feel more ashamed to borrow money merely in order to spend it on our pleasures." But why? I ask. "Because," you continue, "it seems more selfish."

Yes, you are right. But is there any other reason? "Well," you add, "perhaps one might be less able to return it."

#### Points of the Lesson.

I. That borrowing is right. But *too much* borrowing is *not* always right.

II. That some people borrow—for convenience sake.

III. That some borrow from laziness or sheer selfishness.

IV. That others borrow just because they have fallen into the habit of it.

V. That the habit of borrowing may lead to dishonesty, by making us careless about returning a thing.

VI. That we should be more careful of a borrowed thing than of our own property.

VII. That we should try to return a little more than we borrow.

VIII. That borrowing puts us under obligations to others.

IX. That if we borrow money we should do it only *when absolutely necessary*.

X. That borrowing, if a habit, may be an injury to ourselves, besides making us a "Nuisance" to others.

#### Duties.

*I. We ought to be ready to lend to others in case of need, but be slow to borrow from others.*

*II. We ought to be even more careful with something we have borrowed than with anything which is our own property.*

FURTHER SUGGESTIONS TO THE TEACHER: It is important that we should avoid arousing too strong a prejudice against borrowing and lending as methods in business life—else it might cause confusion in the minds of the young people, when they know that their fathers are doing this in one way or another. The distinction could be pointed out that borrowing in the commercial world is more of a business transaction, in that people rent money just as they rent houses, and receive a rent for it in the form of interest. The kind of borrowing we have been dealing with in this lesson, is the form of mutual good will, with no business considerations in it, and where there is to be no pay or rent for the object lent or the service rendered. It would be better not to go into the subject of usury, but limit the discussion to the one phase of borrowing just mentioned. On the other hand, it may be well to raise a voice of warning against the danger of involving one's self in debt, even where it is a financial transaction. This point, however, can only be made in a general way with a warning to the young concerning

the evil of going too far in taking risks of this kind and thus bringing ruin to one's self or one's family. Caution, again, must be used here, however, in fear lest there be some reflection cast on the parents of the members of the class.



## CHAPTER XXV.

### HABITS OF SERVICE.

#### Proverbs or Verses.

"A service done by the unwilling is no service."

"He who serves many masters must neglect some."

"He who will not serve one must needs serve many."

"Small service is true service while it lasts."—*Wordsworth*.

"Unwilling service earns no thanks."—*Danish*.

"Whoever serves well and says nothing makes claim enough."

"A servant is known by his master's absence."

"A good servant makes a good master."

"All men cannot be masters."

"Be the first in the field and the last to the couch."

"Honest labor bears a lovely face."

"Deem no man in any age,

Gentle for his lineage.

Tho' he be not highly born

He is gentle if he doth

What belongeth to a gentleman."—*Chaucer*.

"Thou camest not to command, but to serve."—*Thomas à Kempis*.

#### Dialogue.

Why is it, do you suppose, that a person rather hates to be called a servant? This is not always true. And it ought never to be true. Still it does happen. Can you suggest any reason for it?

What if some one, for instance, a boy or girl of about your age, should call you their servant, would you like it? "Probably not," you admit. Why not? I ask. What harm would it do?

"Why," you suggest, "it would sound as if they owned us, in a way, or as if we had to do just what they told us. And we should feel as if we did not exactly belong to ourselves."

Yes, I add, but you may have to do this with regard

to your fathers or mothers. They control you and you must do what they say. "Oh well," you tell me, "in that case it is one's father and one's mother."

You mean, do you, that your father and mother do not exactly own you? "No," you assert, "they have a right to control us, because they are our parents and are older than we are and have more experience."

What is the actual reason, then, that we do not like to be servants, under any circumstances? "As to that," you suggest, "perhaps it is because as long as we are servants, we cannot do as we please. We must do as other people please. And so it rather makes us rebel."

I want to be sure now, that I know what you mean. Do you suppose that there is a living person in the world who can do altogether as he pleases? "Why, surely," you say. Well, who, for example?

"Why," you continue, "a king or a czar, the man who rules over a country." Yes, that is often asserted. People often talk about what a fine thing it would be to become a czar. You assume, do you, that such a person can do as he pleases?

But do you suppose a czar is ever afraid? "Yes," you answer, "that might happen. Perhaps there might be plots against his life." Would he like this? "Not a bit of it," you confess.

Then how might he act in order to escape from the necessity of being afraid? "Oh, that would be easy enough," you point out. "He could have police and they could look after him."

Yes, but do you know that sometimes in such countries where they have a very strong police, the czar is still very much afraid? We are told that there are times over in Russia when the czar has to stay shut in his palace for weeks, in fear lest something may happen to him. And yet he has a great many police to look after him.

What else could he do besides this in order to avoid the necessity of being afraid? "Well," you reply, "he might try to please the people and make them like him,

so that they would not want to injure him." In doing that, do you think he would be doing all the time exactly as he pleased?

"Probably not," you tell me. "It may be he would do this just in order to escape danger to himself." Then, I ask you, is he altogether a free man, even if he is a czar? Is he not to some extent a servant? Is he not compelled to do what he may not like to do? "Perhaps so," you admit.

Then I must ask you further. A servant of whom? Who are the masters to whom he must sometimes be of service? "Why," you tell me, "the people he is placed to rule over." It turns out, then, does it, that a czar or a king must also sometimes be a servant and do things for the people, even if he does not care to do this; or when he would much rather be amusing himself?

If that is true, even a czar or any sort of a king must give up his own pleasures at times and do work for the people he rules over. Then does he not have to do service? Is he not in a sense, partially a servant? "To some extent," you confess.

Why is it, can you tell me, that this notion of being somebody else's servant has been connected with the idea of being owned by somebody, as if the servant was another person's property?

"Oh, that may have come," you suggest, "from former times when there were slaves, and men and women were owned by the persons whom they served." Owned in what way, do you mean? Do you think that it ever happened that they were owned in a sense that they could be bought and sold? "Certainly," you insist.

Do you fancy it ever happened that their masters could punish them by putting them to death? "Perhaps so," you admit.

Yes. Over in Africa, now, in some places a master may put his servant to death because he is angry with him. But you must remember that this implies slavery.

In what way would you assume that being a slave

differed from being a servant, as we understand the word "servant" nowadays?

"Well, for instance," you explain, "the servant is paid wages, whereas the slave had no wages, but only received whatever the master chose to give him. And what is more than that, the servant can spend his money or his wages as he pleases."

Is that all? "No, more than that," you continue, "the servant can change his place if he wants to, he can decide with whom he will work or for whom he will do service." Yes, that is perfectly true.

"Then, too," you add, "the servant cannot be punished in the same way as the slave. He cannot be struck or whipped or starved."

You say, however, that being a servant implies not being able to have one's own way or do as one pleases. This, of course, was true of slavery. But can one as a servant never do as one likes—never, at all?

"Oh, yes," you suggest, "he may have to do what another person asks of him for a certain length of time, so many hours in a day. After that he may be free to go his own way."

It looks then, as if there was a sharp distinction between being a slave and being a servant.

What class of persons, however, especially go under the name of "servants" nowadays. "Why," you say, "those who do service in our homes."

But is there any real difference that you can see between one who does service of that kind, and the clerk in the store or the man who is a bookkeeper, or one who has to work in an office for an employer?

"Yes," you point out, "the servant lives in the house where he or she works." But, after all, isn't it a distinction about a name more than anything else?

You see, every person who works for wages or for pay of any kind, during the time when he is working, is a servant to another or to others. He must do what others tell him, at least up to a certain point.

Do you assume therefore that people really at such times belong to their employer, that they are his prop-

erty? "No, not at all," you insist. What is it then, that belongs to him, if they are working for pay?

"Why," you continue, "their time is his, or the work that they do for a certain time in the day belongs to him. He has a right to direct them or their efforts during that time."

Yes, that is true. Their time belongs to the employer. But does it belong to him altogether. Has the employer a right to make them do anything he pleases? Is he the owner altogether of their time and their work?

"No," you answer, "only for the kind of work one has agreed to do. Up to that point a man's work and time belongs to the person who employs him, and up to that point he is a servant."

Do you suppose it happens that the employer also may be a servant? Take, for instance, a factory. There may be a foreman who employs the men doing the work in the factory, and those men have to obey him in their work. But is he not also employed by others? "Yes," you admit.

"But then," you continue, "the man at the head of the firm, the president or manager, he is not a servant." How do you know that? I ask. What if he is the officer of a company, who elect him as the president? Then if he does not manage the business in a certain way, or make it profitable, he may lose his position and somebody else may be elected as president. Is he not, then, a servant? "Yes, in a sense," you answer, "he is the servant of the company."

It seems, does it, that even while we may be servants of one set of persons, *they* may be servants of other sets of persons. And so it goes on. The President of the United States, is really a servant and nothing else. He has to do what the people command him to do.

What is it, however, that people usually do service for? "Oh," you tell me, "in order to earn one's living, for wages or salary, in order to make money."

Yes, that is quite true. But is this the whole reason? Does a man always go into the business or take up the

kind of work where he can make the most money?  
"Not always," you admit.

Why not? "Oh," you add, "it may be that he would dislike the kind of work where he could make the most money; perhaps he would much prefer to do the sort of work where he might make less money but where he would enjoy the work more."

Do you suppose that in certain kinds of business or occupation, a man may do a part of the work not for the sake of the money at all, but because he desires to be of some good or to do some good, without pay? "It may be possible," you answer.

What motive would a person have who worked in that way? "Oh," you suggest, "almost everybody is glad to do *some* things for other people without being paid.

Suppose a person never did any more than exactly what he was paid for, just so much and no more, always taking great care to stop at that point. Would you like to have a person of that kind working for you?

"Not exactly," you admit. Why not? I ask. "Oh," you explain, "we should somehow feel as if he looked upon us only as a means for making money out of us." Yes, but what of it as long as he really does the service?

"True," you continue, "but we are human beings and not merely paymaster and laborer. If we are really human beings, we want to be of some service to one another."

It looks, then, does it, as if a person who never would do anything whatever, unless for pay, would be rather a mean sort of a person? Is that the way it strikes you?

Have you ever heard of any class of people who work for wages but who always seem to wait around and want a little extra pay? "Yes, plenty of them," you say. And what is that extra pay called, sometimes? "Oh, a fee!"

Suppose, for instance, the man who runs an elevator, and who got his regular wages, acted as if he wanted



everybody to give him a little something extra now and then?

"Well," you suggest, "it would seem rather small." Why? I ask. "As to that," you reply, "such a man looks upon everybody as if he wanted to make money out of them, when he is being paid already."

You think, then, do you, that those who wait around for small fees besides the wages they get, are not a very high class of people? I must confess that I agree with you.

It really hurts the character very much for a person to be always trying to get money out of everybody, beside the wages they receive. People do not like that sort of character.

When a man has done something for you, a service of some kind without pay, how do you feel toward him? "Oh," you answer, "we naturally feel grateful or kindly toward him." And do you respect him more? "Yes, even more."

If, however, he waits around and wants a fee, and you pay him, what sort of a feeling do you have? "Why," you say, "we are quits then. We want him to go away, and we have a sort of feeling of contempt for him."

And don't you think the man also loses somewhat in his own self-respect? All over the world you will find that people despise those persons who loiter around waiting for fees. They feel a contempt for such individuals. They never think of them as being equals with themselves.

When a man takes fees besides the wages he receives, at once he makes himself an inferior to the one who gives the fee. He puts himself in a position where he knows he can be despised. If we wish to have the respect of other people, sometimes we shall have to be of service to them without asking for pay.

For instance, when two people are on an "equal plane" as we say—you know what I mean by that, I think—two men employed in an office as bookkeepers or something like that, and one of them does a little

favor for the other, he would not expect pay, would he? "Probably not," you answer.

But suppose he did. What if he acted as if he wanted to be paid? "Why," you add, "then he would simply take the attitude of an inferior." They would not then be friends or act as if they were equals, would they?

But now on the other hand, where a man has a regular occupation which he has studied to fit himself for, and then receives wages or salary from an employer, does he then make himself inferior to the employer? "No, not at all," you assert.

Why not? "Oh," you answer, "the employer may also receive a salary from somebody else. Each one of them is doing what he has fitted himself for, and it is right that he should receive wages or salary for that kind of work."

And why should he not ask all sorts of small sums from other persons? "Because," you explain, "he receives his wages or salary, and he ought to be willing to do a little extra service now and then for others, just for the sake of human fellowship."

I wonder if you know, by the way, that those occupations where people are paid by fees, as we say, rather than by regular wages, are usually despised occupations. Persons in such employment are always looked down upon, and they know it too.

The man who earns regular wages or salary can hold his head high and feel himself just as good as anybody else. But the one who is paid in small ways by everybody for everything he does, gets into a habit as we have said, of looking upon everybody only as *things* to make money out of.

You see that when a person looks on us in that light, we do not feel toward him exactly like a fellow-creature. If you want to preserve your self-respect and be respected by others, and do not wish to have others look upon you as inferiors, avoid that kind of work where you would be tempted to look all the while for fees. You may lose more than you make by it.

You may know, for example, how grown people feel when they go to a hotel, and boys or people in service there all stand around waiting on them and acting every moment as if they wanted to be paid for something; how disagreeable the feeling is; how, even when we pay the persons, we half-despise them. It is the same in restaurants where we fee the waiters.

Do you see another reason, I wonder, why this manner of earning one's living or making money is contemptible. How was it in the days of slavery when there was no such thing as wages? How was it that the slaves got any money or any favors? "Oh," you say, "by begging or seeking for such favors; by making one's self more completely a slave."

You see how it is that those persons who wait around in order to be paid each time for everything they do, are really putting themselves back into a sort of slavery? They are the least free of any class of servants. And that is why, in spite of ourselves, we half-despise them, just as we should be inclined to look down upon a slave.

I wonder if you can understand how it is that a person actually can earn money and then find out that he fails to get just what he thought he would gain by means of money. In order to get it he makes himself half-despised. And yet he earns the money partly in order to have the respect and goodwill of other people.

All people who do service for wages and salary for the kind of work which they can do well, are in a sense on a plane of equality. It is when we try to make people pay us in extra ways for work that we cannot do well or for the little services we owe to each other as human beings, that we make ourselves inferior, and in a sense acknowledge that we are not as good as the persons we are serving.

#### Points of the Lesson.

I. That all persons are servants in one form or another. No one can do exactly as one pleases.

II. That a servant is not a slave. He belongs to an employer only for the length of time and form of service he has

contracted for. The employer in another way is also a servant.

III. That expecting to make something out of others for each and every service of every kind one renders, is unworthy of us.

IV. That regarding every person as a means for making money out of him, is a way of treating persons as mere things and not as human beings.

V. That looking for fees or extra payment besides our usual wages or salary, puts us on a plane of inferiority to those we serve and makes us despised by them.

VI. That we should not expect to be paid twice for a service, once in the way of salary or wages, and again in the way of a fee.

VII. That living on fees is putting one's self back in the days of slavery, before wages and contracts were introduced. Wages means independence; fees imply a badge of slavery.

VIII. That wages and salary can be paid between men as equals. But in the acceptance of a fee one places one's self on a plane of inferiority.

#### Duties.

*I. We ought to respect service as the true lot of every human being.*

*II. We ought to be willing to do some service without pay, in the spirit of human fellowship.*

*III. We ought never to receive any kind of pay which would put us on a plane of positive inferiority towards those whom we serve.*

FURTHER SUGGESTIONS TO TEACHERS.—If it is permissible to introduce the religious phase at all in these lessons, the above poem is a rare gem, and as one of the most beautiful of its kind should be committed to memory by all the members of the class. The tone of it gives dignity to labor and to every form of true service. The effect of it is to make the person feel that in any kind of honest work he is doing more than earning his living, in that he is rendering a service to the whole human race, in contributing a share to the cause of Humanity. There is a sublime suggestion here of a Common Human Brotherhood in its suggestion of the Brotherhood of Man and the Fatherhood of God. As regards the various points in this lesson on "Habits of

Service," there is material enough here for a number of lessons. The whole problem of fees, wages, salaries or payment of any kind for service rendered, is a delicate one. One of the greatest weaknesses of human nature is this desire to receive a little extra payment in the form of a gift or *bonus*. We do not wish to condemn it altogether, inasmuch as there are times when the regular payment may be inadequate. Then, too, there are classes of servants whose only wages would come in the form of fees, and we do not wish to imply that such persons must necessarily be despised, if that is the only way they have of making a living. Yet we do wish most emphatically to throw a contempt around fee-taking or the insistence on fees on the part of persons doing a service for which they are paid reasonable wages by a company or employer. It is legitimate to point out therefore, the kind of feeling we naturally have, when in order to get the service we are entitled to at a hotel or restaurant or any public place, we are compelled to pay something in addition, to those serving us. The tables may then be turned and it could be pointed out how persons in the other walks of life may be guilty of the same offense in another form, and that in doing so they put themselves on a plane of inferiority. On the other hand, we do not wish in such a lesson to teach that a workman is not entitled to wages or salary for service rendered. There is a nice distinction which can be made with regard to the kind of work for which one fits one's self and through which one expects to earn one's living. In the profession of medicine, for instance, a doctor is entitled to expect a fee for the service he performs. But if any man who had not been educated as a doctor should temporarily render a little service of the kind that would usually come from a physician, and then expect pay for it, he would be looked down upon or despised. The young people should be encouraged to feel that they ought to be willing to render gratuitous services in those directions where their regular occupation or profession is not involved. Furthermore it is



very important to foster a spirit of willingness to do some extra service for the world, even in one's occupation, without always being remunerated for it. The teacher may dwell on the fact that many noble physicians do a great deal of gratuitous service of this kind, asking no pay whatever. The point could also be discussed as to how far we may take pay for services rendered to personal friends, although this is rather a delicate problem. The points of ethical distinction in most of the questions having to do with this whole subject will readily be brought out by the class members themselves. If anything can be achieved in the way of removing the opprobrium attached to the word "service," the result would be worth the effort. We should strive to elevate this word and to make all people feel that they are mutual fellow servants, one of the other. There is a good point for illustration in the opening chapter of the novel "Adam Bede" by George Eliot, which the teacher could review and bring out before the class members; where the hero of the tale rebukes his brother for stopping work and throwing down the tools exactly at the stroke of the hour, instead of "finishing off" the work by continuing a few moments longer. In the way of a biography it might be well to introduce the story of the life of Mary Lyon, as bringing out the way a person may consecrate one's whole career to service. A sketch could be given of the trials and difficulties this woman underwent in order to educate herself, and how she devoted herself to the cause of the higher education of women in the forepart of the nineteenth century, when colleges for women had scarcely come into existence. Tell the story of the sacrifices she made, how indifferent she was to her own welfare in order to accomplish this high purpose, and what grand results she finally achieved. We do not wish to make every young girl feel that she is to have a similar aim on a large scale. But it is well now and then to hold up the picture of a



life in this way before young people, as an inspiration in showing what *can* be accomplished when the effort is truly made. The point can be brought out that the secret of the success of this woman was in her "Habits of Service." See the "Biography of Mary Lyon."

## CHAPTER XXVI.

### GENEROSITY AND STINGINESS.

#### Proverbs or Verses.

"Be just before you are generous."

"The generous man enriches himself by giving, the miser hoards himself poor."

"The stingy man is always poor."

"The miser's friendship continues as long as he gains by it."

" 'Tis strange the miser should his cares employ  
To gain those riches he can ne'er enjoy."

"The only good that a miser does is to prove the little happiness there is to be found in wealth."

"A nature accustomed to take is far from giving."

"Give and spend and God will send."

"Give at first asking what you can;  
It is certain gain to help an honest man."

"If a niggard should once taste the sweetness of giving he would give all away."

#### Dialogue.

If a man always refuses to lend anything, under any circumstances, what do we say about him? "He is stingy," you assert.

Suppose now you try to describe to me what you understand by the word "stingy." This is not the real subject we want to talk about today, but we must get an idea what this special word implies before we go on to the main topic for discussion.

"Why," you explain, "it means close people; those persons who always hold on tight to their money, never giving anything to other people, or giving as little as they can possibly do, making no sacrifices for the rest of the world."

What would you mean by a stingy boy or girl? As a rule, young people do not have much money, and so

they cannot usually be stingy at least in that one direction.

"Oh," you add, "it would perhaps be a boy or girl who never shared with others anything nice which they had. If they have some fruit or some candy, they keep it all to themselves. They do not like to divide with others.

And what does stinginess spring from, do you think; what sort of a feeling or habit or character? "Why," you point out, "it must come from selfishness."

But what about lending? For instance, if you want to borrow something which you need very much, how would such a boy act? "Oh," you exclaim, "he would refuse to lend anything he has; always liking to keep what belongs to him wholly for himself."

But does it always imply stinginess if we refuse to lend something when we are asked for it? Would it be right for you every time to call a person by that word, who would not gratify your desire in this respect? "No," you say, "not necessarily."

When do you think we may be justified in refusing to lend something? "Why," you tell me, "we may know the other boy or girl, and know that they never return what they borrow." You assume, then, that you could refuse such persons the favor without being stingy?

Suppose, on the other hand, the person wanting to borrow something from you, always does return what he receives and returns it with great care, would you ever be justified in refusing his request?

"Sometimes," you insist. Under what circumstances? For example, what sort of things would you especially dislike to lend to others? "Oh," you say, "the things that are very dear to us." Do you mean by that, things that have a great money value? "No," you answer, "not exactly that; but those things which have associations connected with them."

What sort of objects, for instance? "Why," you tell me, "it may be some precious gift from father or

mother; something which is sacred because of certain feelings or associations."

You feel, then, do you, that it would be positively wrong sometimes to lend certain things, even if you knew they would be carefully returned? You actually believe that a person could go so far as to do a wrong to the one who gave him something, by lending it to another? "Yes, sometimes," you assert; "it all depends on what the thing may be."

But is there any other instance where it may be right for you to refuse to lend anything? What if the object asked for is something which you need very much yourself, and you are using it then, while the persons desiring it do not need it to the same extent? Would you be justified in refusing it? "Yes," you say, "we do not think it would be fair for the person to call us mean or stingy in that case."

Then, after all, being unwilling to lend something is not always a good habit, nor is it always a bad habit."

What if, however, you did happen to have something which you were not needing at the moment, and you are sure it will be returned. But suppose you are pretty certain that the person who borrows it, will use it to a bad purpose, injuring himself in some way by using it, would it be right for you to lend it in that case? "No," you assert, "decidedly not."

Do people ever really grant a loan when they are quite sure it will work an injury? "Yes, sometimes," you admit. Why do they do it? It may be unpleasant to themselves as well as work an injury to the other.

"Oh," you tell me, "they do not like to be disagreeable, or to be called mean or close."

Then sometimes it takes real courage, does it not, to refuse a loan? One has to be willing to be called mean and to be looked upon as disagreeable, just in order to do the right thing, when on the outside it seems to others as if we were doing the mean thing.

But now to come to the opposite virtue. What is its name? What is the word we give to the habit of

those who are always willing to lend, where it is right to do so, and who always share nice things with others? Can you think of the term?

"Being generous," you answer. Yes, that is what I have in mind, "generosity." Put that word down, because it is a beautiful word.

How are you going to describe it? What sort of a person would you call generous? "Oh," you explain, "just the opposite of a stingy person." Yes, but describe it.

"Well," you suggest, "it is the person who seems to like to give things to others, to share his pleasures with others. If anything nice comes to him, he seems to get more satisfaction in dividing it with others than having it all alone by himself. He is the person," you add, "who is willing to lend things to other people or who is not disagreeable when asked to do a favor."

What kind of persons are liked most by others, stingy people, or generous people? "Oh," you exclaim, "there is no doubt about that. We all like the generous ones most."

But why? "As to that," you assert, "we like them because we share in their generosity. We may get nice things from them. We can ask favors of them."

Is that the only reason why you admire the generous man? Suppose you never shared in his generosity at all. What if he happened never to do anything for you. Do you admire him still? "Yes," you insist, "we like that sort of a man somehow. He is the sort of a man we always admire."

You mean, then, do you, that it is the character of the person and not merely the favor he may do you, which leads you to like him or esteem him?

You say that a generous person is one who is willing to lend, or to give, or to share what belongs to himself. Then, for instance, if you have spent all the money that is given you, right away as soon as you receive it, and have shared it with others, you are a truly generous person, are you, and truly to be admired? "Yes," you assure me, "that is generosity."

Now wait a moment. Is that true generosity? What if it was given to you by your father and mother and they were hoping that you would save a part of it for a future time, perhaps in order to help educate yourself; but you go and spend it in order to seem open-hearted. Is that true generosity? "No, not exactly," you tell me.

Again: What if there is some one in the home whom you do not care so much about, who may, however, be sick or in need of something, and you might share your money or your nice things with that person. But on the other hand, suppose you go out to some other individual whom you are fond of, and divide with that person. Is that true generosity?

"Not altogether," you hesitate. What makes the difference? "Why," you point out, "it may depend on the person to whom we show our generosity." Then, being truly generous sometimes means sharing what you have with a person whom you are not so fond of, rather than with those whom you most like.

Or again. What if you go and share what you have, with somebody else who will praise you for it, and who will tell others about it, so that you will be thought highly of by others; and, on the other hand, do not share it with some one who may say very little about it or not praise you. Is that true generosity? "No, not quite," you confess.

But why not? "Oh," you reply, "because the motive is not exactly right." Yes, I answer, but the *giving* is there just the same, the sharing takes place. "True," you say; "yet being generous means more than that. It implies doing it from the right sort of motive." You really think, then, do you, that showing generosity in order to be praised, is not the true kind?

One other point right in this connection. Sometimes persons ask things outright from us, not merely as a loan, but as a gift. They may tell us they are hungry, and ask for food. What do you usually do under those circumstances?

"Oh," you continue, "if we know they are really



hungry we try to give them something to eat, or else money to buy food with." But what if you know the person is half-intoxicated, and he will go and use the money to make himself more so? Is that showing true generosity? "Not by any manner of means," you exclaim.

If so, what is it? You make a sacrifice when you give him the money.

"Why," you tell me, "it may be just the opposite. It may be sheer selfishness." How is that possible? "Well," you answer, "one may do it because it would be a worse sacrifice to be called disagreeable, or to seem mean."

Then, as a matter of fact, it is true that sometimes giving may come positively from selfishness and not be true generosity at all?

You say that generosity implies sharing your goods with other persons, in order to make them happy. I wonder if you have ever heard of people who were generous to their friends, but who neglected their own children, or their own family, perhaps never seeming to have quite enough money to pay their bills, or to improve their home.

I ask you, are such persons called generous? "Yes," you say, "they are usually considered so." Is their conduct from a selfish motive? "No," you assert, "it may be from real kindness and not for a selfish reason."

Then do you call it true generosity? "No," you assure me, "it is not exactly the true kind." Why not? I ask; if the motive is not a selfish one. Do you actually mean to say that sometimes we have to suppress kindly feelings, or a disposition to give of what we have?

"Yes," you assert, "sometimes we actually ought to refuse to do such a service." But why? "Oh," you add, "for the sake of those who are at home, for the sake of others who are dependent upon us."

Then, after all, there is a form of generosity which,

though not quite selfish, is wrong, because it does not regard those who may be dependent upon us.

Is there, however, a true generosity which is always admirable, and always good? "Yes, we think there must be," you say.

Can you define it, or explain it? "Perhaps," you continue, "it means being ready to share with others the good things we have, in order to give help or pleasure, where we may not be sacrificing the interests of those who are dependent on us, and not neglecting a true regard for our own improvement."

It turns out, then, that even generosity obliges us to consider what is right or good for ourselves, as well as what is right or good for others.

#### Points of the Lesson.

I. That stinginess means not sharing with others and springs from selfishness.

II. That refusing a loan may be stinginess,—but not always.

III. That it may be right sometimes to refuse a loan.

IV. That generous people are those who are willing to do for others and share with others.

V. That we *naturally* admire the generous person.

VI. That sharing with others may not be generosity, (a) if the object may have been given us for another purpose, (b), if we share with outsiders when those dependent on us need it, (c) if sharing with others may do them injury, (d) if it is done for praise or in order not to be disagreeable.

VII. That generosity depends on the motive and thought behind it.

VIII. That refusing a favor may sometimes be the truest generosity.

#### Duties.

I. *In cultivating the spirit of generosity, we ought not to give to others what may be much needed by those who are dependent on us.*

II. *In cultivating the spirit of generosity, we should always consider, in giving to others, whether the gift might do good or harm to them.*

III. *In our acts of generosity we should try to consider where they will render the most service.*

**Poem.**

Some people roam the fields and hills,  
And others work in noisy mills;  
Some dress in silks, and dance and play,  
While others drudge their lives away;  
Some glow with health and bound with song,  
And some must suffer all day long.

Which is your lot, my girl and boy?  
Is it a life of ease and joy?  
Ah, if it is, its glowing sun  
The poorer life should shine upon.  
Make glad one little heart today,  
And help one burdened child to play.

—ANONYMOUS.

FURTHER SUGGESTIONS TO THE TEACHER.—This little gem in verse has fine sentiment in it and should be talked over with the class members. Take care not to confuse acts of generosity or kindness with what is now called charity. We should not wish to discourage acts of charity. But we can point out that this latter kind of giving must usually be more indirect, either through donations of money, or in the way of assisting others to do the work for us, as in Charity Societies. But the points of this lesson are concerned rather with personal or private deeds which may require a sacrifice or call for individual effort, where two persons may be brought into close relationship with each other, and one must render a service to the other.

## CHAPTER XXVII.

### CHEATING.

#### Proverbs or Verses.

"A clean mouth and an honest hand  
Will take a man through any land."

"A nod of an honest man is enough."

"An honest countenance is the best passport."

"An honest man has half as much more brains as he needs!  
a knave hath not half enough."

"An honest man is none the worse because a dog barks at  
him."

"An honest man is the noblest work of God."—*Pope*.

"Honest men are bound, but you cannot bind a knave."

"Honesty is the best policy; but he who acts on that principle is not an honest man."—*Archbishop Whately*.

"No honest man ever repented of his honesty."

"To be honest as this world goes, is to be one man picked  
out of ten thousand."—*Shakespeare*.

#### Dialogue.

Today we must speak of one very bad habit, and  
you will know what it is the moment I mention it.

Suppose two boys are playing at checkers. One of  
them happens to look away for a moment, and the  
other changes the place of the checkers slightly in his  
own favor, while the boy looking away fails to see it.  
What do you call that?

"Cheating," you say. Is that the name you give it?  
What do you think about it? "Oh," you assert, "it is  
mean." How mean; just a little so? "No," you an-  
swer, "awfully mean."

But is it ever done? Would a boy ever cheat in  
that way? "Yes," you admit, "it does happen some-  
times."

But why is it so mean, as you say? "Because it is  
not playing fair," you answer. "It is winning the

game when one does not deserve to win it." Then, what does that boy do to the other? "Steals the game," you assert. Yes. It is certainly like stealing, to cheat at a game.

How is it that boys and girls can cheat at play? Can you describe how it is ever done? For instance, at baseball? Or in other games?

What if two persons were racing? How do you think one could cheat in order to win the race?

Note to the Teacher.—It would be worth while to go on drawing out the discussion for a long while at this point, even perhaps taking a whole lesson for the purpose. Just let the young people name over possible ways that cheating might occur. The mere mention of the forms in which it could happen would be an influence against it; simply putting it in language or having it described. It would be well for the teacher also to write down and preserve what the children say, with the descriptions they give of different methods of cheating. This feature would perhaps answer for one entire session before we go on to a further consideration of the habit of cheating.

Did you ever hear of a boy who cheated at school? What does it mean?

"Why," you explain, "he may look into his book when he is reciting or at examinations, or use other false methods in order to be able to give an answer."

And whom is he cheating then? "Oh," you tell me, "he is cheating the teacher." Yes, but is that all; anybody else? How about the other boys and girls?

"Yes," you admit, "perhaps he may be cheating them too." But in what way? "Why," you continue, "he may get ahead of them, by that means receiving higher marks; or he may show off to the other boys and girls, and seem to them to know a great deal more than he does."

Then, apparently, according to your account, in acting that way we may not only cheat our playmates or those of our own age, but cheat grown people too.

What is the feeling we suddenly have when we discover that a person has been cheating us? "Why," you answer, "we dislike him. We don't want to play with him any more." But is that all?

Suppose we knew that a person would cheat others.

Then, if we had something valuable we intended to put in the hands of another person to be taken care of, would we put it into the hands of one we know to have cheated at any time? "Not by any manner of means," you answer. But why not?

"Oh," you exclaim, "we could not trust him. He might not take good care of it, or he might run away with it."

What is it that one always loses in the minds of others by cheating? "As to that," you say, "one loses the trust or the confidence of others." Yes, you are right. But how will those others act toward the one who cheats? Will they believe his word? "No," you tell me, "they will think perhaps he is lying."

In school, for instance, how will the teacher act toward the boy or girl who cheats, and is known to cheat? "Why," you add, "the teacher will have to watch them all the time and will not trust them."

Do you suppose, however, that before the teacher discovered it, he trusted them? "Yes," you say. And when we are playing a game, if we do not know a person cheats, we trust him, do we not? "Surely," you answer.

Then why is it—to come back to the first point—that we think it so awfully mean to cheat? "Oh," you exclaim, "it is because a person trusts us, and if we cheat, we are going back on that trust."

Suppose we write that down: "Cheating is a breach of trust." What is it that a person is supposed to lose, who has been cheating and has been found out?"

It is described in a word of two syllables, beginning with "h." Can you think of it now? "Honor," you suggest? Yes.

Among grown people we say the man who cheats has lost his *honor*. Which persons do you think sometimes are most despised; the man who cheats, or the man who deliberately steals? "As to that," you tell me, "perhaps the man who cheats may be despised even more." But why? I ask.

"Well," you add, "it may be because he has not



only stolen something which belongs to us, but he has broken trust with us." Yes, I suspect that is true. Cheating seems often worse than downright stealing.

Do you think it matters so very much sometimes in play if we cheat *just a little*; move something very slightly so as to help us the least bit? Do you think that is ever done? "We are afraid it is," you reply.

But if it is just the least bit, why should it matter? "It is cheating just the same," you assert. And would anything worse come by doing it the least bit? Do you think a person who began that way, would always cheat only a very little?

"No," you say, "by and by he would begin to cheat more and more, until he would have the regular habit of cheating."

What do you think, by the way, of the difference between cheating at play and cheating at work? Suppose, on the one hand, a person cheats at a game, and again in making change of money in some business transaction. Which would seem the worse?

"Well," you answer, "they both are very bad." But which usually would come first, if one began to form the habit? Does one usually begin by cheating in serious matters, or in play?

"More likely," you tell me, "in play." But why? "Oh," you point out, "perhaps because it does not seem quite as bad." Why should it not seem quite so bad? "Well, just because it is play." But it is cheating, is it not, all the same? "Yes," you assert, "it is certainly cheating."

Do you suppose that if a person falls a little into the habit of cheating at play, by and by he may cheat in business when he grows up? What do you say as to that? Or do you think he may outgrow the habit and become honest and upright when he is a grown man? "We are afraid not," you reply. But why? "Oh," you tell me, "he has acquired the habit, and it is cheating just the same, even if it is in play."

True, I am inclined to think that many persons in our state prisons, the convicts, have begun their bad

ways by cheating as children, until by and by they got used to it, and then found it easy to cheat in serious matters. And so perhaps you are right that one is just as bad as the other, cheating in games or cheating in the matter of money.

But speaking of cheating in small ways; can you see how one could cheat in borrowing, when returning something one had borrowed? "Yes," you say, "one might not return it at all." Yes, but that would be downright stealing."

"Well," you continue, "one might return it in part." Yes, but that would be stealing just the same. What if you were returning a book. How could you cheat about it? "Why," you explain, "one might have torn a leaf in a book and not say anything about it."

Yes, that would be a bad way of cheating. But that may happen quite often. People dislike, when they have borrowed anything, to own they have injured it.

But again. Suppose one borrows a thing, and uses it, expecting to return something else equally good. How could one cheat? "Why," you say, "one might return something which has been injured slightly, and not quite as nice, although at first this would not be apparent."

How does one feel, when one finds out that sort of a thing, after one has lent something and it is returned? "Oh, one feels disgusted," you answer, "and never wants to lend *anything* again." You mean that one would not like to lend anything to other people either? "Yes," you say, "that is the feeling. It makes one resolve somehow never to lend anything again to anybody."

But why? You have only lost your confidence in that one person. "No," you assert, "it is more than that. We never have quite as much confidence in anybody."

Then, when a person cheats, what else does he do, besides making other people lose trust in him? "Oh," you tell me, "he somehow can make people lose trust in everybody." If that is the case, in cheating we not

only injure one person directly, but we injure everybody in the world, do we not?

And so you see that cheating seems almost worse than stealing. We are not afraid that everybody will steal, even if one person steals. But if a man cheats us, somehow we do not seem to have the same confidence in anybody afterwards.

Suppose, however, one cheats and is not found out, then he has not lost the confidence of other people? "No." But has he lost anything? "No," you reply, "people still trust him, and perhaps he has even gained something by his cheating." But now look at it from another side.

What if a boy or girl has cheated a few times and finally says: "Now I will not cheat any more; I am going to stop this right off." You think it perfectly sure, then, do you not, that he will never cheat again? "On the contrary," you answer, "it is quite probable that he will do so again."

But what about that resolution? He meant it, did he not? He intended to keep it?

"That is true," you tell me, "but he had begun to cheat, got started in it, and it is not so easy to stop." You mean, then, do you, that a man, having once begun to cheat, cannot trust himself, when he makes a resolution of that kind?

What then has he lost? He has not lost other people's trust in him. "No," you reply, "but he has lost his trust in himself."

And so a man can lose confidence in himself by cheating, even when he continues still to retain his honor in the eyes of other people. What do we call that trust in ones self,—self what? "Self-respect," you say? Yes, that is the word.

Cheating is sure to kill one's self-respect. One may make all the good resolutions in the world. Yet one may go right on and do mean things, until by and by it will come natural to *be* mean.

Yet do you suppose that a person who has fallen into the habit of cheating, ever goes through life with-

out being found out? "Perhaps so," you answer. I doubt it. He may not be known to cheat exactly. But people will somehow suspect him.

But why will they suspect him for something? Will he have a frank and open manner, so that people will like him? "No," you admit, "more likely he will be cautious and very careful. He will seem to show that he is afraid lest people may find him out."

Yes, that is true. In cheating, a person is sure to be found out one way or the other. One is found out first by one's self, in losing one's self-respect, and then one is found out by other people directly or indirectly.

Which do you suppose is worse; to lose one's own self-respect, or to lose the respect of other people? "Well," you add, "perhaps one would sooner lose one's own self-respect." Why? "Oh, well," you continue, "one would still be respected by other people, and they would still be one's friends."

Yes, but what could you do, if you lost your self-respect? You could not trust yourself. If you resolved to do a thing, you could not be sure that you would do it. You might go and do the very thing you had not intended.

Does it not seem as if it would be actually worse to lose one's own self-respect than the respect of other people? "It looks that way," you answer.

#### Points of the Lesson.

- I. That cheating is mean—it is like stealing.
- II. That in cheating at school we cheat *both* the teacher and our fellow-pupils.
- III. That we dislike people who cheat.
- IV. That by cheating we lose the confidence or trust of others.
- V. That cheating is a breach of trust, almost worse than stealing.
- VI. That cheating *just a little* means *sometime* later on cheating a good deal.
- VII. That those who cheat or steal in more serious matters when grown up, *began* by cheating at play when children.
- VIII. That one can cheat in borrowing and returning.
- IX. That by cheating one loses one's trust in one's self, even if not found out by others.

X. That by cheating a person we make him lose confidence in *everybody*.

Poem.

"The Pied Piper of Hamelin," by Robert Browning.

FURTHER SUGGESTIONS TO THE TEACHER.—On this subject of cheating something might be said about loaded dice and the baseness of such a thing. There could be mention of dice in connection with "back-gammon." Then the children could be asked if they understood what loaded dice meant. It might be told how loaded dice had been found in buried cities, e.g. Pompeii, showing how wicked some people were even then and how they cheated thousands of years ago. The term loaded dice is fitting to be associated with cheating. There is something about it so utterly despicable. The most important part of the lesson perhaps, is the discussion connected with cheating about very little things; not being very careful about returning what one has borrowed; or in games, not always acting in a perfectly frank, open way, or taking unfair advantage on slight points, standing up for one's self when one is not quite sure that one is right. It may be advisable to discuss other kindred forms of bad conduct along with this general subject of cheating and associate them together in the minds of the young. Many bad forms of conduct can be introduced along with this subject of cheating, because it is a habit which every boy or girl despises, even when they are inclined to it a little themselves. There is no term they can fling at each other, which is felt more keenly than the cry: "You are a cheat," or "you are cheating."

## CHAPTER XXVIII.

### PREJUDICES.

#### Proverbs or Verses.

"Do not judge of the ship from the land."

"Do not judge of a ship when it is on the stocks."

"Never judge by appearances."

"The cold neutrality of an impartial judge."—*Burke*.

"Who judges others, condemns himself."

"You cannot judge of the horse by the harness."

"A man's own opinion is never wrong!"

"A single conversation across the table with a wise man is better than ten years' study of books."—*Chinese*.

"No man is the only wise man."

"No man is born wise."

"No one is wise enough to advise himself."

"Do not judge of the tree by its bark nor of the man by his exterior."

#### Dialogue.

Are all persons reasonable persons, do you think?  
"What do I mean by that?" you ask.

When, for instance, you are talking with others and they give their opinions, does it always seem as if they were wise or perfectly clear in what they say, with good reasons for their opinions? "Oh no indeed," you smile, "just the contrary."

Do you tell me that people can have opinions, without having good reasons for them? "Yes, any number of them," you answer. But how is that possible? They can think, can they not? They have minds. They can reason. How then, can they have such opinions?

"As to the 'why' of it, or the 'how' of it," you add, "we cannot say. Only we know well enough that people oftentimes do talk and give opinions, without being very sensible in the way they talk, or without having good reasons for what they say."



But why should they talk in that way? Why do they not at least keep silent and not talk at all? "Oh, well," you assure me, "they may think they have good reasons. They do not know that they are not sensible in their opinions."

And so it is possible, is it, for a person to have opinions and assume he has good reasons for them, and yet to be quite mistaken and to be quite unreasonable? "Yes," you admit, "it looks that way."

But how do you know this? Perhaps you may be the person lacking in judgment, when you think that other persons do not always have good reasons for their opinions.

"True," you insist, "but how is it possible that two persons can believe they have the best reasons for their opinions, when their opinions do not agree?" I am afraid you have asked me a hard question. It does not really look as if people *could* have views and could talk, without always having the best of reasons for what they say.

But if they have not good reasons for their opinions what makes them talk that way? How do they come to have those views? Where do they get them? What is it that influences them? "Oh," you say, "it is the feelings. A person may not try to think carefully or be very reasonable in what he thinks. He may feel very strongly about a subject and speak just according to his feelings."

Then you imply that a person's feelings can mislead him, make him have wrong opinions, give him mistaken views about people or about things. "Yes, indeed," you answer.

But from what other source can we get these mistaken views or be led to think what is not true? It may be that sometimes we hold thoughts or opinions which have not been influenced by our feelings. Where do these come from?

"Oh," you explain, "they may come from other people; we may hear what other people say and take

their views without thinking, and adopt such views for our own."

You mean, do you, that in this way, we may come to have wrong views just merely by catching them from other people? "It looks that way," you admit. Now what do we call these opinions we have, where we are without good reason for them—opinions which come to us just from other people or which we have been led to form through the influence of our feelings.

It is a long word I have in mind and a very important one. Suppose I write it down.

It begins with the letters p-r-e-j. Do you know what is coming? "Yes," you tell me, "it is prejudice." But can you tell me how that word came to be used, why it should apply to people's thoughts or opinions formed in that way? Look at the word again. Suppose we take it to pieces. There is first the "p-r-e," and then the "j-u-d." What word of five letters begins with j-u-d? "Judge," you suggest.

Now do you see how the word is made up, and how it explains what a person does when he has a prejudice? "Why," you point out, "he pre-judges." True, and what does that mean? "It would imply," you answer, "that he judges beforehand." Yes, but beforehand in what way? "Why," you continue, "he makes up his mind before he has good reasons for doing so."

How many people in the world, do you fancy, have prejudices? "Oh," you smile, "a good many." Yes, but how many? Tell me the number. "Well," you suggest, "perhaps most everybody." Do you mean to say that there is scarcely a person living who may not prejudge sometimes? "Scarcely anybody," you insist.

But now, with regard to these opinions which we hold without good reasons, and which we call prejudices, what subject do they usually pertain to? Are they more often concerning the moon and the stars, the shape of the earth, concerning plants and animals, and that sort of thing? "No, indeed," you assert, "more often they are about people; about some person

we know or have heard of." Yes, I am afraid that is true.

Why is this, do you suppose? "It may be," you explain, "because we are more interested in people than we are in things."

But as to our prejudices concerning people, let me ask you; do we have them more with regard to people we like or with regard to people we dislike? "Oh, surely," you tell me, "we have them more often with regard to people we dislike."

Why? I ask you. "Because," you tell me, "when we dislike people we do not stop to reason much about their conduct. We let ourselves be influenced by our feelings and so form opinions with regard to them, whether we have good reasons or not."

If some one gives you an opinion about a person whom he dislikes and you happen to know of that dislike, do you feel safe in taking such a person's judgment? "No, quite the contrary," you say.

You mean, then, do you, that having a dislike for a person makes it pretty sure that we shall not be fair or just in our judgment about him? "Yes, indeed," you reply.

Then why are we so ready to have opinions about people we dislike? We know we do not trust other people's views under such circumstances. "Oh," you say, "it is a habit. It comes natural to think bad things about persons we dislike or who dislike us."

But do you suppose it happens on the one hand that we can have prejudices against people for whom we have no such feeling? How would that be possible? We should not be influenced in that case by personal feelings, should we?

"It does happen," you say. But how can it happen, I keep on asking? What makes it possible, if we don't have feelings influencing us in the matter? "Yes," you insist, "but there are the feelings of other people." What do you mean by that? "Why," you explain, "they may have their prejudices because of feelings which *they* cherish."

You imply, then, do you, that prejudices are contagious, like diseases? You smile at that, I see. But could it happen? "Yes, indeed," you say, "certainly." True. We may catch opinions about other people in that way, without any reasons, when the opinions are unfair, just as we catch contagious diseases.

What kind of persons, would you say, are most inclined to have prejudices? "Oh, those who are most inclined to be unreasonable," you answer.

Yes. But why are they inclined to be unreasonable? "Because," you suggest, "it may have become a habit with them to form opinions without thinking." And what did we say it meant to form opinions without thinking; being influenced by what? "By the feelings."

Then you assume, that one can fall into the habit of letting one's self form opinions just from one's feelings rather than by thinking at all? "Yes," you answer, "surely."

But how about holding judgment we catch from other people? "Why, that may be habit, too," you continue.

In what way? I ask. "Oh," you explain, "a person can be careless about thinking for himself, when he hears the opinions of others; he may just take them as a matter of course and agree with them or believe them; and so they become prejudices."

You have said that we have prejudices concerning persons. Do you mean, only about persons whom we know? "More often, at any rate," you imply. But are they always of that kind? Is it possible for us to "pre-judge" about a great many people all taken together?

Do you think that we could have prejudices in regard to the people of China? "Yes," you smile, "surely." What kind, for instance?

"Why," you suggest, "we might be unfair in our opinions of them; speak of them, for example, as if they knew less than they really know, or were a worse kind of people than we are, or had worse habits than we have. We could think of them as being inferior

to ourselves in more ways than they really are inferior."

What sort of a prejudice do you call that? Suppose I give you a term for it. That would be a *race prejudice*. It would imply that we were unfair or unjust in our opinions about people, because they belong to a certain race.

And so you see we can "pre-judge" not only in regard to people we know, but with regard to people we don't know.

Do you fancy it might ever happen that a person could come before you, whom you had never seen, whose name you did not know, and yet about whom you might feel a prejudice before he said a word to you?

"Yes, that might happen," you say. How? I ask. "Oh," you answer, "he might belong to a race like the Chinese, whom we are inclined to despise." In that case, then, you mean that it would not be easy for you to be fair in your opinions about him, before you had become acquainted with him? "Yes," you admit, "that would be possible."

Do you think, by the way, that we could ever have prejudices about people whom we are fond of? "Yes, if having a prejudice means pre-judging," you assure me.

How would this be possible? "Why," you point out, "we might excuse everything such a person did, perhaps blaming the same sort of conduct in other people, that we should not blame in such a person."

How could that happen? "Because," you tell me, "we should pre-judge everything the person did, owing to our fondness for him." I suppose you are right.

But let me ask you another question there on that point. Which is the more dangerous, do you think, having prejudices about people we like, or about those we dislike? Which could do the more harm? "Why," you answer, "probably those we have about the people we dislike."

There is, however, one other point we have not



mentioned. You said that more often we had prejudices about people than about things. Is it not true that we can have them also about things? How about the moon, for example? You know that many people fancy that the weather is influenced by changes in the moon. "Oh, yes," you tell me.

But is that true? "You do not know?" Well, I can tell you. The moon does not really influence the weather.

Then how do you explain the fact that some people believe this? Do you think they have good reasons for their opinion? "Probably not," you answer. Where did they get those opinions, then? "Oh, from other people," you suggest. Yes, they caught them by contagion. You see, people can have prejudices about things as well as people.

But which kind do the most harm? Which form do we especially need to be on our guard against, if we want to be honest and true? "Oh, the prejudices about people, surely," you say.

#### Points of the Lesson.

I. That to have a prejudice means to pre-judge—to judge without good reasons.

II. That prejudices start in the feelings, especially with regard to people whom we do not like.

III. That we may acquire prejudices as people acquire diseases, by contagion—taking what other people say, without using any thought concerning it.

IV. That we may have prejudices against individuals or against whole classes of people, such as race-prejudices.

V. That we may have prejudices about things as well as about people—by taking up with what persons tell us, without studying the matter at all.

VI. That prejudices may injure the one who feels them, even more than the ones against whom they are directed. We are degraded by our prejudices.

#### Duties.

*I. We ought to judge with our reason, and not through our feelings.*

*II. We ought to watch our language whenever anything we have to say may work an injury to another.*



**Poem.**

'Tis well to walk with a cheerful heart  
Wherever our fortunes call,  
With a friendly glance and an open hand  
And a gentle word for all.

Since life is a thorny and difficult path,  
Where toil is the portion of man,  
We all should endeavor, while passing along  
To make it as smooth as we can.

—ANONYMOUS.

**FURTHER SUGGESTIONS TO THE TEACHER:** Continue with this subject, illustrating according to the special local conditions of the pupils of the school, dealing with those prejudices to which they are especially subject. On the other hand, we shall have to be exceedingly cautious lest we stir up bad feelings and touch the sores to the quick. There are few subjects in the realm of ethics in a practical direction, which require such important treatment and yet which are so difficult to handle as this one concerning prejudices. We deal with it first as a habit, and we shall take it up again in a future series of lessons in the study of the "Feelings." Under certain circumstances or with pupils of a certain age we could touch on religious prejudices and the danger from them. We might point out the prejudices which come from the use of mere words or names. This is a very important phase to be considered. Our illustrations must in all cases be adapted to the age of the pupils, their home education, the city or country in which they live. We must make them feel that one of the great duties of life is to fight one's prejudices, and that the more one gives in to them, the lower one is; that the more one conquers them, the more truly rational, that is the more truly a man one becomes. We are to assure the pupils that having prejudices is degrading; that it makes us more like brutes; that it leads us to be careless about using our minds. Throw an element of contempt around the very notion of prejudices. On the other hand, take care that the pupils do not get to thinking about pre-

judices which other people have, rather than about those which they themselves cherish. This form of analysis is always at the danger point of fostering a study of other people's bad habits rather than the bad habits in one's self. We must make children see that it is much worse for a person to feel a prejudice in himself against others, than to have others feel a prejudice against *him*. This, however, is a feature which is not at first appreciated and which should be dwelt upon a good deal. We can show how a person is degraded by having a prejudice towards others, and yet can be indifferent to the prejudices felt on the part of others toward himself.

## CHAPTER XXIX.

### RESPECT FOR THE PROPERTY OF OTHERS.

#### Proverbs or Verses.

"Measure not others' corn by your own bushel."

"Just scales and full measure injure no man."

"Better twice measured than once wrong."

"He who will steal a pin will steal a better thing."

"It is wit to pick a lock and steal a horse, but wisdom to let it alone."

"He who steals once is never trusty."

"Who steals an egg will soon steal an ox."

"A thief does not always thieve, but be always on your guard against him."

"A thief thinks every man steals."

"First a turnip, then a sheep, next a cow, and then the gallows."

"He who will have no judge but himself, condemns himself."

"How is he greater than I, if he had not more justice?"

#### Dialogue.

Note to the Teacher.—It would be advisable, at the start, in this lesson to have a picture of a pair of scales in the hand—or, better still, a small pair of actual scales which could be held up before the class.

You will recognize this thing I hold in my hand. What do we call it? "Scales," you suggest.

And what are they for? "Weighing things." Yes, we take that for granted. But what kinds of things do we weigh in such scales? "Why, every kind of thing," you exclaim. "Anything that has weight."

Words, for instance? Things that people say? Could these be put in scales? "No," you smile, "not exactly." Why not? "Because," you insist, "they are not exactly things. They do not have body." That means, does it, that we really only weigh in the scales an object which has body to it?

"True," you assert, "but we do sometimes speak of

weighing people's words or even the actions of people." Yes. That is what we call a figure of speech and it means a great deal.

But why should we have scales to weigh things? "As to that," you tell me, "we may want to see whether one thing is heavier than another."

What kinds of objects, however, are most often weighed, do you suppose? Where are scales more often used? "In stores or shops?" And what is it that will be put in the scales? "The things that one is going to buy," you answer.

And what are those things? I keep asking. To whom do they belong? "Oh, they belong to the man who is selling them," you continue.

Then what do we call them, so far as he is concerned? They are his,—what? "His property?" Precisely. That is the point. Scales are more often used in order to weigh property.

And what do we mean by Property? "Why," you explain, "it is something that a person owns or that he has a right to, something which belongs to him, or something which he can do with as he pleases." Do all persons have such property, would you say?

"Surely," you reply, "every person owns something, whether it be very little or very much."

If now, for instance, a person should come along and pick up something belonging to you and start to walk away with it, what would you exclaim? "That's mine?" But why would you say that?

"Because," you tell me, "we should want to make the other person understand that he should let our things alone and not interfere with what belongs to us." You mean then, do you, that you have rights over certain things all by yourself. "Surely," you insist.

But what possible reason could anybody have for coming along and taking something belonging to you? What motive would there be for it? What sense in it? "As to that," you explain, "perhaps it would be only in play."

But if it were in earnest, what would it imply? "Oh, it would be mean, or because the one who did it was a mean person." True, and why should he be mean in that way? Why should he take what is yours?

"Because he wants it for himself," you say. What is he then interfering with, so far as you are concerned? "Why, one's rights," you exclaim. Rights over what? "Rights over one's property," you answer.

Do you think it ever actually happens that a person positively takes something belonging to another and keeps it for himself? "Yes," you admit, "it does happen."

Does he always take it in order to keep it? Suppose he should just pick it up, and you knew well that he would give it back by and by. Would you then be liable to cry out, "That's mine?" "Perhaps," you admit. And why? I ask.

"Because," you insist, "he is interfering with one's rights over one's property even if he takes it only for a while. He may not do that without asking permission."

What do we call it when a man deliberately takes something belonging to another and carries it away with the intention of keeping it? "Stealing," you suggest. Oh, but that is something bad, exceedingly bad. We should call it a crime. "True," you exclaim, "but that is just what it would mean; it would be stealing."

And how should we speak of the person who committed the act? What should we call him? "Thief?"

But are all persons who take things belonging to another, called by such a bad name? Actual thieves, as you know, are locked up, put in prison. - "Oh, well," you suggest, "perhaps for those who take only little things, the name might seem too severe."

What do you mean by little things? I ask. Suppose that another boy or girl carried off your pencil. Would he be considered an outright thief? "Perhaps not quite as bad as that," you tell me. What if one were merely to pick up a sheet of paper belonging to another and use

it without asking permission? He would not be taken by the police and put in prison, would he?

"No," you smile, "probably not. But still it would be a kind of stealing," you assert. Why? "Because it is the same principle, nevertheless," you answer. "He is taking what belongs to another."

What is it, do you suppose, that is most often stolen by actual thieves, who are locked up in prison? "Money. But only very bad people, actual criminals, ever steal money," you tell me.

That may be true, I admit. You think it would be positively dreadful, do you, if any one actually took money from another? You would call that a crime?

But what would be the difference, I ask, between an act of that kind and the conduct of a boy or girl who merely picked up a sheet of paper belonging to another person and used it? Would such an act be actually stealing? "Yes," you hesitate, "although perhaps not quite in the same sense." In what way? I ask.

"Oh," you continue, "he might take a trifle like that, and yet not for a moment be ready to steal money."

But how would he excuse himself? "He might say," you tell me, "that the person who owned it would not care much; that it was a very trifling thing; he could give another sheet of paper back the next day, if the person wanted it."

Yet if it happened to be your sheet of paper that you had been wishing to use, would you mind it? "Yes, indeed," you exclaim. How would you feel? "Oh, we might be indignant or even angry. It would not be right or honest for him to act in that way," you insist.

How is it possible, then, that a boy or girl could do such a thing? "Why, perhaps he would not regard it exactly as stealing," you explain. "He felt that he needed the thing more than we did, possibly, and it being such a small affair, what should it matter?"

But if it happens to be his thing which is taken by another, does he view it in that light? Does he pass it over as of no account? "No," you continue, "just the contrary. Then he may be indignant or angry."



What, then, is the real difference between stealing money and just merely taking a sheet of paper belonging to another? "There is no actual difference in principle," you admit. But why is it, then, that a person would take the one thing and not the other? I keep asking.

"As to that," you explain, "it may be because the other thing seems very important, or because a good many people have a way of taking trifling things, whereas they would not actually take money."

But do you suppose that grown men who steal money out of people's pockets, have been accustomed to do that all their lives, ever since they were children? "Probably not," you admit. And why not? "Well, in the first place," you reply, "they would have to learn how to do it without at once being found out."

You think, then, that it must have begun in another way? And in what way, would you suppose? "As to that," you reply, "it would probably be by taking other things at first, about which people might not make so much of a fuss."

You assume, do you, that actual stealing, as we call it, might come from simple carelessness on the part of a boy or girl in taking trifling things belonging to others? "Yes," you admit.

Would such persons, when boys or girls, have taken actual money if they had been able to do it without being found out? "You doubt it?"

And why not? "Oh, it would have seemed too awfully mean," you reply. "They would have felt ashamed of themselves, actually to have done anything like taking money."

But how is it that they get over feeling ashamed about such conduct when they grow older? How is it that a man finally becomes an actual thief, as we say? "As to that," you tell me, "it may be that the feeling of shame wore off and that he got into the habit of taking more important things after a while."

What is the word you used just then? Got into what—did you say? "Into the habit," you answer.

Do you actually mean to assert that a man could have a habit of stealing? "Yes indeed, why not?" you exclaim. It is hard to suppose, I insist, that a man could be so bad as all that. He might take money for instance, just once, under severe temptation, when he wanted it very much. But you do not mean to say that he would do it continually?

"Yes," you continue, "it must be so; otherwise, there would not be so many criminals."

You think that a criminal must be a man who has fallen into a habit of doing wrong? "Surely," you say. "A man is not liable to steal money or some large property unless he has been a thief in smaller ways before."

You fancy, do you, then, that the actual criminals, the men who do such an awful thing as to steal money, take people's purses or watches, enter houses, and carry off the silver as burglars; that such men may not have been criminals from the very start, as children? "Not necessarily," you reply.

Does every boy or girl who is careless about the property of others, in taking merely a sheet of paper for his own use, belonging to somebody else, always become a criminal? "Probably not," you confess. "But at any rate," you add, "that is the way criminals would usually begin, by being careless about the rights of property."

But suppose people who are careless in this way when they are boys or girls, in picking up what belongs to another, and using it for themselves, do not actually become criminals, in the sense of being ready actually to steal money. Could it affect them in any other way, in their dealings with others?

"Yes," you suggest, "it may lead them to be unfair in what they have to do with others; in not being exactly honest or square in their business dealings for instance." How, or in what way?

"As to that," you suggest, "it might lead a man, who is a store keeper or shop keeper, not to be quite strict in the way he measured out things to people."

You mean to say that it would be possible for a man to have scales which were not exactly right, or a measure which was not exactly true?

Could it actually happen that a person might not fill the measure quite full, or give a full amount, when he was weighing out a pound? That would be a kind of stealing.

"True," you add, "but it does happen a great deal, according to the way people talk." Would such a man actually take money or purses or watches out of people's pockets? "Not necessarily," you reply. What would be the difference? I ask.

"There is no great difference," you tell me. Why not? "Oh," you say, "it is taking the property of another just the same. If a man pays for a pound and does not get the full measure, a part of his money is actually taken by the man who does the measuring."

Do you think it might happen, for instance, that one might buy a certain thing in a shop or store, get full measure of the article, yet not get the real thing that one asks for? "Yes, indeed," you exclaim, "that might happen again and again."

But would it be possible, after you have asked for a thing and paid your money for it? "Oh, well," you reply, "one may not be able to know exactly what one is buying; the thing may be 'adulterated,' as people say."

And what does that mean? I ask. "Why, it implies mixing something else in with what one is selling, so that it shall not cost as much to the one who sells it."

How can any man do such a thing? I ask. Why is such a man not locked up in prison? Would that not be stealing? "Yes," you hesitate, "but many people do it, however, so that one gets used to it."

You evidently assume that there are a great many ways by which people may be careless about the rights of others, in regard to property, and yet not be considered actual thieves? Do you suppose, for instance, one could steal anything which could not be

weighed on the scales? "How is that possible," you ask me?

What if a man should publish a book and put his name as the author of it, and it should be found out afterwards that some of the pages in that book had been copied from another man's work. The actual book, the thing which could be weighed in the scales, would be the man's own property. But would there be any stealing there, any burglary?

"Yes," you admit, "it would be actual theft just the same." But what had been stolen? Not money or anything which could be weighed. "Why," you explain, "he had stolen the work of another, the thoughts of another, the writings of another, and had called them his own."

It is possible, then, that there are certain things which might be stolen and yet which could not be measured on the scales? "Surely," you exclaim. I suspect you are right there, and it is a very important point to be considered.

One further question I want to ask you here. When stopping a person from interfering with your property, you would call out "that's mine." What would you say in speaking of something belonging to another person? "That's yours?" Yes. And the distinction we draw is between "yours and mine" is it?

Which phrase do we use the more often, would you fancy, in the course of our lives? "That's yours," or the other? "Probably on that point," you assure me, "one says more often 'that's mine.'"

And why? I ask. "Because it is natural," you say. "One thinks more about the interference with one's own rights, than about the interference with the rights of another, the writings of another, and had called curious fact of human nature, which we ought to reflect about.

In saying "that's mine," for instance, does it come only little by little as a habit that we gradually acquire? "Not by any manner of means." "It is just the contrary," you assert. In what way do you mean?

"It is like instinct," you answer; "every one will exclaim at once about something belonging to himself, asserting 'that's mine.'"

Is it also like an instinct, to be very careful not to interfere with the rights of others, and to always be ready to say, "that's yours"? "Not to the same extent," you admit.

It means, then, does it, that one is to be on guard a little in this matter; that it may come easy to be a little careless in regard to what belongs to another, while one is very positive about what belongs to one's self?

Which habit, then, is the more important to cultivate, that of asserting the rights over one's own property, or of respecting the property of others? "Why, the latter habit," you admit.

And yet we have not quite done with the subject. When a person actually commits a theft, from whom does he take the thing? "Why, from a person." Are you sure of that? I ask. Is it always just from one person?

"How could it be anything else?" you insist. But suppose, for instance, a man were to steal a ride on a railway train, by somehow managing to escape paying his fare. Whom has he cheated? "The conductor," you suggest.

Does the conductor, the man who takes the tickets, actually lose the money? "No," you hesitate. Who does lose it, then? I insist. "Why, the railroad company."

But what is that company, the "Co." which goes to the name? It is not a person, is it? "No," you smile. But can one steal from a *thing*? "Not exactly," you answer.

Would you call it stealing, then? Would it be actual theft? How is it that we should use such a phrase as "steal a ride." "As to that," you explain, "it would be in a way stealing from those who own the railway."

But how would they be affected by it? I ask. What difference would it make? "Why," you point out,



"there would be just that much less paid over to the persons who own the property; they would get just that much less return for carrying on the railway."

You think, then, do you, that one could steal from a number of persons indirectly, quite as much as from an individual man? "It looks that way," you answer.

But which kind of stealing do you suppose would be more common, that of taking money out of people's pockets, entering houses and taking the silver and clothing; or, on the other hand, avoiding paying full money for what one gets on a railway or street-car, for instance?

"The latter would be the more common way," you fancy. And why? What reason would you suggest for it? "Perhaps," you continue, "it might be because one does not see the persons one is cheating. "The man who takes the ticket or does not get it, may not lose by it."

Yes, perhaps that is it. We might call it an indirect form of stealing. It comes easier on that account. And people may fall into the habit of it much sooner than into the habit of taking actual money out of a man's pocket. But is it not stealing, nevertheless?

What if, for instance, the conductor who receives the money on a car, should keep part of it for himself. How would that strike you. "Oh, that would be stealing, of course," you admit. But what would be the difference between such an act and not paying one's fare for one's ride?

Do people who do such things always feel that they are stealing? "No, indeed," you tell me. Yes, you are right. Many persons will do a thing like that who would not actually steal money out of people's pockets.

But does this make it right? "No, surely not," you admit. How is it that they may not actually think of such acts as stealing? "Perhaps they have fallen into the habit of doing such things," you tell me.

It all comes back to a matter of habit, does it, in not being strictly careful at the very start and all the way through one's life, about respecting the property of



others? What, then, is the one command which has been handed down in former times, forbidding us in any way to interfere with other people's property?

"Thou shalt not steal?" Yes, that is the whole of it. And what have we found this to really mean? Having respect for what? "For the property of others," you answer.

#### Points of the Lesson.

I. That a person has certain rights over his own property.

II. That to interfere with such rights is like taking the property, and would be a form of stealing.

III. That actual stealing among thieves is usually of money, or what can be sold for money; but that it does not usually begin in that way.

IV. That stealing can only have become a habit by the loss of all sense of shame.

V. That the loss of such a sense of shame might only occur by one's being careless in small ways about the rights of property.

VI. That one may not become an actual thief, and yet have no true code of honor in selling or buying—that there can be a kind of half stealing as well as half lying.

VII. That stealing may not always be of things which can actually be weighed.

VIII. That we are naturally more emphatic in asserting "that's mine" than in asserting "that is yours."

IX. That a strict regard for the property of others is a virtue which needs to be cultivated.

X. That one could disregard property rights indirectly through stealing from a company of persons, as well as from an individual.

XI. That in past times human beings have expressed their belief in the rights of property and in the wrong of interfering with those rights through the command: "Thou shalt not steal."

#### Duties.

*I. We ought not to take for ourselves what belongs to another.*

*II. We ought not to interfere with another in his rights over his property.*

*III. We ought to give an exact and honest measure for everything we are paid for.*

*IV. We ought to pay for what we receive, and to pay an honest price.*

*V. We ought to be on our guard, lest we become careless in small matters, in regard to what belongs to others.*

*VI. We ought to be very strict with ourselves in all our dealings with other people's property.*

FURTHER SUGGESTIONS TO THE TEACHER: This lesson will be more abstract than most of the others in the series on the "Habits." If thought advisable, the teacher could omit it altogether. Or, on the other hand, he might select just a few leading points from it and ignore the rest. It would depend in part as to whether the young people may afterwards be in a position, when older, to have instruction on a theme of this kind. If not, then they had better have it at such an early age than not at all. There is always the danger of evil results, from "suggestions" being given to the minds of the young, concerning methods which they had never thought of; and in this way starting habits which would not have otherwise arisen. But on such matters, we rely on the good sense of a parent or a teacher. If we believe in the eternal value of the ethical principles of the Decalogue, then it may be well that these principles be brought home to young people at an early age. Temptation today is probably greater than ever before. Possibly it would be well to introduce some stories in connection with this theme, showing how certain persons had resisted temptation, and how others had yielded to it and experienced dire results in consequence.

## CHAPTER XXX.

### CONSCIENTIOUSNESS.

#### Proverbs or Verses.

"Sell not thy conscience with thy goods."

"You may often feel quite heavily on your back what you take lightly on your conscience."

"There is a policeman in every man's conscience; you may not always find him on the beat."

"A quiet conscience sleeps in thunder."

"Conscience often stops at a mole-hill and leaps over a mountain."

"A little stone may upset a large cart."

"A pebble in the streamlet scant  
Has turned the course of many a river.  
A dew-drop on the baby plant  
Has bent the royal oak forever."

"He that contemns little things shall perish little by little."

"My conscience has a thousand several tongues."—*Shakespeare*.

#### Dialogue.

It is a pretty long word that we have for a subject to talk about today and you may not know just what I mean. Watch me first as I write it down.

It begins, you see—C-o-n-s-c-i-e-n: what is it going to be, do you think? "Conscience," you suggest? Yes, it has something to do with Conscience. But it is a word twice as long.

We will go on with it now: C-o-n-s-c-i-e-n-t-i-o-u-s-n-e-s-s. There it is. You know the word, even if it is a long one. But what does it mean?

"Why," you tell me, "it implies obeying one's conscience; doing what one's conscience tells one to do." Yes, I answer, but rather hesitatingly, as you observe. It may mean more than that or less than that or just that, according to circumstances.

Suppose, for instance, you were to hear of a man who had been tempted to steal \$1,000 because the money

had been put in his way, and it was easy for him to carry it off. Now if he refused to give in to the temptation and did not steal the money, would you say he was a conscientious man?

"Yes and no," you answer. Why do you put it in that way? I ask. "Because," you explain, "he might obey his conscience under a big temptation like that, and yet not be what we should call conscientious."

But why so? He had obeyed his conscience and would not steal all that money. "True enough," you add, "but that was a *big* temptation. He could know plainly that it meant stealing, that it was robbery, and that he would have to go to prison if it was found out."

You think, then, that resisting a temptation in fear lest he might have to go to prison if he was discovered, would not be conscientiousness? "Certainly not," you insist.

Suppose he were perfectly sure that he would not have to go to prison, because he would not be found out, what if under those circumstances he refused to submit to the temptation? In that case he would be obeying his conscience?

"Yes?" You mean, then, that he would be a conscientious man? "No, not necessarily," you continue. Why not? I ask. "Because," you reply, "it is a *very* big thing or a *very* wicked thing which he has been tempted to do, and he may find it easy to resist such a big temptation."

How would it be, for example, if an employer were engaging a young man for work, where the employer would have to put a great deal of trust in the one whom he engaged, because there would be much temptation: if, now, he were told that this person had had an opportunity to steal \$1,000 without being found out, and had not done it, would he feel perfectly safe in employing the young man? "No, not by any means," you answer. But why not? Did he not have the fact before him, that the person could resist temptation?

"True," you exclaim, "but a person may be able to resist a big temptation like that, and not resist a little

one." You do not assume, then, that obeying one's conscience in important matters always shows that one is a conscientious man? "No, indeed," you tell me.

Then how do we usually apply these words, "being conscientious," if it is not with regard to resisting temptations to steal large sums of money? "Why," you point out, "we use the word rather with regard to the person who has the habit of 'being strict' about small things, the very small temptations rather than large ones."

What is the phrase I just heard from you, which you have not used before; something about "being strict." What do you mean by that? Usually we employ these words with other people, insisting that they shall do quite as they have agreed to do or what we demand that they shall do. Can it imply more than that? "Certainly," you assure me, "it can mean 'being strict' with one's self."

In what way, for instance? "Why," you continue, "one might be careless about compelling one's self to do everything one had intended to do, about keeping one's resolutions *exactly*, and so overlook one's resolutions in small things."

You think, then, that one can be strict with one's self, just as one can be strict with other people? Which comes easier, do you suppose? "Oh," you tell me, "of course it would be easier with other people than with one's self."

And what kind of a habit are we considering when we talk about being strict with one's self? "Conscientiousness?"

Do you think that a boy or girl, or even a grown man or woman, could pass for being a good sort of a person, be called a good boy or a good girl, a good man or a good woman, in a general way, and yet not have this habit of being strict with themselves or "being conscientious?" "Perhaps, in one way," you reply.

How is that possible? "Oh," you continue, "there is a way of being fairly honest and strict in the presence of others or when other people are around, and yet

being rather careless or less strict when one is altogether by one's self."

I am afraid that is true. Some persons may pass for being really good, trustworthy people, while, after all, in the long run, they prove otherwise, because they have not that habit of being strict with themselves when they are alone.

As a rule, which do you fancy is the easier, to be conscientious when others are looking at you and know what you are doing, or being conscientious when no one is there to see you or watch you? "Why," you admit, "it comes harder when one is all by one's self." Why? I ask again.

"Oh, for one reason," you answer; "because when we are alone we are not concerned by what other people may think of us in case we are not very strict about what we are doing."

**NOTE TO THE TEACHER:** In a subsequent series of lessons dealing with "The Home" we take up the subject of "Eye-Service," in connection with the lesson on "Obedience." Hence, while we start this theme in the lesson on "Conscientiousness," perhaps it may be well to avoid the term "eye-service" and let it come in with the future lesson in the "Home Series." On the other hand, too much cannot be said in a roundabout way with regard to this point of being strict with one's self when no one is watching.

Can you tell me of any way by which a person could be careless and not show conscientiousness, even while such a person would resist big temptations? Do you suppose it ever happens, I ask you, that a person could steal, without really thinking or knowing that he was stealing. "Yes," you reply, hesitatingly.

In what way, for instance, would you suggest? "Why," you explain, "one might borrow something, as was pointed out in a previous lesson, "and then forget to return it, because it was a very little thing."

You mean that it would be stealing just the same, even if it was a little thing? "Yes, in a sense, it would," you answer. Could a person actually return what he had borrowed, and still be guilty of any stealing?

What if the thing we have borrowed has been



slightly injured, just a very little, and we return it without saying anything about it. What do you call that? "Oh," you say, "it would be a kind of a deception." Yes, but anything more? "It would be mean," you assure me.

True; anything further? "Yes," you admit, "it would be a kind of a stealing." Quite so. Now do you see how one might steal in such a small way?

"And still," you add, "the person would know what he was doing." Are you sure, however, that this always happens? What if a person should borrow something and injure it, and forget all about it when returning it?

"Yes," you admit, "but that would not be exactly right, it would show that such a person was not very strict with himself if he could injure what he had borrowed and then forget all about it." What would be the trouble, then? I ask. "Why," you explain, "it would show that he was not a very conscientious person."

You see, we are coming to the point I have been talking about; how one can be strict about important things and not conscientious about small things, so that one can even steal without thinking about it, or knowing that one is stealing.

Do you think it ever might occur, for instance, that a person would go and take some little thing from a brother's or sister's room and forget to return it, or even lose it? "Yes, that might happen," you say. But would it be right? "Why," you add, "if it were a very small thing, what would it matter?" True, I answer, but it was something that belonged to another, even if it was a little thing. What ought he to have done?

"Oh," you suggest, "he should have gone and asked his brother or sister, to begin with, before taking the thing." Do you think that we may injure the things belonging to our brothers and sisters, without intending to, exactly, just by being careless? "Yes," you admit.

And what would you call that? Is it honest? "Not wholly," you answer. But would it be really wicked?

"Why," you say, "not so *very* wicked, because we all use one another's things more or less in the home." But if it happened to be something belonging to you, would you care?

"Yes," you assert, "in that case one certainly would." How would you feel about it? "Oh, rather indignant," you say. And why? I ask. "Because," you assure me, "we should feel as if it were not quite fair for any one else to use our things in that way and injure them." It would be a kind of stealing, then, would it?

And if brothers and sisters do that sort of a thing, what good habit have they failed to cultivate? "They are not strict with themselves," you assure me.

As to this kind of conscientiousness, is it an easy habit to acquire, would you say? Do you think it would be easy for a person to be conscientious? "You doubt it?"

But why should it not be as easy to be strict as to be careless, to do the right thing as well as to do it about half right? "As to that," you say, "if one is conscientious, one has to be watching one's self all the time and it is tiresome."

You assume, then, that it is a trifle irksome to be very conscientious; that it comes a little hard to be strict with one's self all the time. It may be you are right, and perhaps that is the reason why many persons are not so very conscientious.

When, however, we know a person who is very strict with himself, a person who is very careful about the little things in the way he deals with others as well as with himself, how do we feel in regard to him? Do we trust him more than others, feel safer in leaving him with our things or letting him have our things to use. "Yes, indeed," you assure me.

Then conscientiousness, after all, makes people trust us more, does it? How about ourselves? Do you think it makes any difference about our being able to trust ourselves?

You would say, I suppose, that if a person resisted a big temptation, his conscience stopped him. You mean

by this that he felt in the presence of such a temptation as if he ought not to give in or do what he wanted to do at that moment?

But when one is not very strict with one's self about the little things, and forgets, for instance, the fact that he has injured something which he borrowed from another, why does not his conscience influence him and remind him? Why did he not feel a little uneasy when he returned that thing which he had borrowed?

"It may be," you explain, "he had done it so often that the uneasy feeling wore away." You mean, that one can be careless with one's self until by and by one fails to have uneasy feelings over the neglect of small duties. "Yes, surely," you answer.

I wonder, by the way, if you have ever noticed how certain persons fail to be conscientious with regard to their promises. Do you think it might happen that a man would keep his important promises and yet be very careless about the little ones? "Why," you assure me, "if he was careless about the little ones, by and by he would become careless about the big ones."

This is true enough. But is there not a kind of promise which one sometimes gives without saying it outright in exact words? For instance, you and I talk together about something, and from the way you speak I come to understand that you intend to do something or will do something, and you know that I have this understanding. Yet you have not said it in just so many words.

Now in that case, what would the conscientious man do? "Oh," you explain, "he would try and live up to this understanding, even if the promise had not been given in exact words."

But how would the other person be inclined to act? "Why," you point out, "he might perhaps be strict about keeping his spoken word or downright promise, but yet be very careless about those 'understandings,' as we call them; those agreements which we enter into sometimes, without making actual promises in words."

**Points of the Lesson.**

I. That being conscientious means being strict with one's self—especially in small matters.

II. That the man who does not give in to a big temptation, may yet not be a trustworthy man.

III. That the test of conscientiousness is in the way one deals with minor temptations.

IV. That being conscientious means being strict with one's self when one is alone, or when one's conduct may never be found out.

V. That being conscientious implies taking unusual care in the use of other persons' things.

VI. That conscientiousness means great care in keeping one's exact promises, even in what one implies in one's promises.

VII. That being conscientious in everything, small and great, gives one further self-respect and makes one trustworthy in the eyes of others.

**Poem.**

O Moon—said the children—O Moon, that shineth fair,  
Why do you stay so far away, so high above us there?  
O Moon, you must be very cold from shining on the sea;  
If you would come and play with us, how happy we should be!

O children—said the Moon—I shine above your head,  
That I may light the ships at night when the sun has gone  
to bed;  
That I may show the weary boy his way across the moor,  
And bring the busy farmer home to his own cottage door.

O Moon—said the children—may we shine in your place?  
They say that I have sunny hair, and I a sparkling face.  
To light the ships and weary boys we greatly do desire;  
And you might come and warm yourself before the nurs'ry fire!

O children—said the Moon—we have each allotted parts:  
'Tis yours to shine by love divine on happy human hearts;  
'Tis mine to make the pathway bright of wanderers that roam;  
'Tis yours to scatter endless light on those that stay at home!

—ANONYMOUS.

**Further Suggestions to the Teacher:** We have started a subject in this lesson, which might be carried on indefinitely. One must be cautious about letting the word "conscientious" mean exactly the same as "conscience." We must be on our guard about giving the impression that conscience applies only to small things. But as

the carelessness more often is connected with the disregard for one's conscience in minor matters, the emphasis should go in that direction. There is also the other reason for dwelling very much on conscientiousness, in that the habit of being strict on small matters, seems nowadays to be on the wane, partially through the contempt for the old-fashioned Puritanism. But it is very important that we should try to keep this phase of Puritanism alive. While there are exceptional instances of persons being naturally over-conscientious and having too many scruples so as to become positively morbid, yet these exceptions are rare. The danger lies in the other direction. We can risk the possibility of making the person over-conscientious, far more than we can risk the chances of letting him become careless about the minor duties which make up so much of our daily life. A special emphasis should be laid on the carelessness of many persons in the way they use public property. Point out how people may abuse furniture in a hotel and sometimes cause far more injury than is paid for in the bill. Apply this to other experiences in the lack of conscientiousness in the use of utilities belonging to a whole community—books from a library, for instance. It would be well to collect quite a large number of examples of this kind, because the opportunities for lack of conscientiousness in these matters are growing all the while. A very serious danger menaces the human conscience in this special direction. It applies also to the care or carelessness we exhibit in our use of property of corporations. We shall accomplish a great deal, if we can cultivate a little more of the disposition of being "strict" in regard to the way we deal with the property we may own in common with others in a society or community, or with the property owned by a body of persons, like a corporation. There are persons who show very fine scruples in their conduct in relation to other individuals, but who seem to be utterly wanting in scruple, on the other hand, in this larger sense we speak of.



## CHAPTER XXXI.

### HABIT OF SPEAKING THE TRUTH.

#### Proverbs or Verses.

"He that does not speak the truth to me, does not believe me when I speak the truth."

"He that does not fully speak the truth, is a traitor to it.—*Latin.*

"No crime is more infamous than the violation of truth."—*Dr. Johnson.*

"Oil and truth will get uppermost at last."

"Though malice may darken truth, it cannot put it out."

"Truth crushed to earth will rise again,

The eternal years of God are hers;

But error wounded writhes in pain,

And dies among her worshippers."—*Bryant.*

"Truth gives a short answer; lies go round about."

"Truth hath a quiet breast."—*Shakespeare.*

"Truth is above everything else, though truth is not always agreeable."

"Truth is mighty and will prevail."

"Truth is a daughter of time."

"Truth needs not many words, but a false tale a large preamble."

"Truth seeks no corner."

"A thousand probabilities do not make one truth."—*Italian.*

"Equivocation is first cousin to a lie."

"Who ever knew truth put to the worst in a free and open encounter."—*Milton.*

#### Dialogue.

Does it always come easy to tell the truth? "No," you smile. But why not? "It is quite the contrary," you answer; "oftentimes it comes very hard to tell the truth."

And what do we call the opposite of the truth, when we use plain language? "A lie," you say. Yes. And



do you suppose it ever happens that people tell lies? "Of course, many people do," you assert.

Do you mean straight, clear, unvarnished lies, with no whitewash, no effort to deceive ones self into make-believe as if one were telling the truth? "Yes," you insist, "people will tell plain, downright lies."

How often, do you suppose?—once in a lifetime? "It depends on the person," you reply. Can you really think of anybody telling a lie more than once; I mean a straight, out-and-out lie, where a man knows plainly that he is lying? Would not once be enough for a lifetime?

"Oh," you add, "if he did it once, it would be all the more reason why he would probably tell another lie and still another." After all, is it not easier to tell the truth than to tell a lie? "It depends on the occasion," you suggest.

In what way, do you mean? "Why," you say, "the temptation might be great, or the misfortune might be very severe, that would come upon a person if he told the truth."

But how do you suppose a man would feel after having told the truth when it came hard, or after telling a lie when he really hated to do so? Under which circumstances would he feel easier in mind?

"It would depend," you explain, "on how many times he had told lies."

Yes, I suppose that is true. And what do we call the man who tell lies? "A liar," you answer.

Tell me now, candidly, which would you rather suffer from a man, if you had to have one experience or the other—would you rather have him strike you, or tell you a downright lie? Do you know, there are persons who would choose the first? How do you account for this?

"Oh," you say, "a lie seems so awfully mean." Yes, but if so, how is it that people can tell lies? "Perhaps because they are mean people," you suggest.

Do you think they were mean people when they first began to tell lies? "No, not necessarily," you answer.

Do you assume it comes natural to be a liar? "No," you insist, "it would be far more natural to tell the straight truth just as one knows it."

But you said to me at the outset that telling the truth often came hard. "True," you add, "but that is because doing this may cost us very much in one way or another, or be to our disadvantage. What is more," you assure me, "people do not tell the truth to us always, and that makes it harder for us to be truthful to them."

You mean to imply that one liar tends to make another liar? "It looks that way," you admit.

As a rule, if a man were to be called either a fool or a liar, which would seem to be the greater blow to his honor? "Either one would be bad enough," you answer. Yes, that is true; and yet, do you know, that about the worst blow to a person's honor, according to the feeling in human beings for hundreds of years past, has been when a man says, "You lie?"

Why is this, do you suppose? Why should he care? When he is called a fool, is not that worse? It is saying in so many words that he has a weak mind.

"True," you reply, "a man may have a weak mind and yet have honor, or character." It would look, then, as if somehow the human race, at least since civilization began, had felt that about the lowest charge which could be made against a man was to call him a liar.

Do you know, for instance, what a duel means? As a rule, we do not have them nowadays. "Yes," you explain, "it is when two men challenge each other to fight to the death, each trying to shoot or to kill the other."

And are you aware that a great many of the most awful duels in former times have occurred on account of that one charge? It was felt that if a man accused another of being a liar, it was the duty of the other man to challenge the first to a duel to the death.

Nowadays we feel that the right of life and death is not in our own hands, and that it is not our privilege to punish another in that way, even where the other deserves it. But I tell you this, in order that you may

know how human beings have felt about the indignity or meanness of a lie.

But why should we care, for instance, if a man tells us a lie? It might not affect us one way or the other. Suppose we know that it is a lie. What difference does it make?

"Oh, but," you say, "it does make a difference; 'it is treating us as if we were not fit persons to whom the truth should be told' "

You mean that telling a lie to a man is treating him like a brute? Then, lying, for instance, is something more than just telling what is not true. It is a slur upon the honor of the man to whom the lie is told. It is mean and low.

By the way, have you ever heard the word "honor"? "Oh, yes," you say. What do you suppose it means? For instance, it is sometimes said that a man has lost his honor. What do you understand by this? "Why," you explain, "it would show that he has done something so that people could no longer put confidence in him." And what would that imply? "It would mean that he would lie," you answer.

If, on the other hand, we say of a man that he is a thoroughly honorable man, what does it suggest? "As to that," you tell me, "it means that he can be trusted; that people always feel sure in their dealings with him that he will deal squarely, that he will be true and tell the truth."

What is it, then, that usually goes with truth-speaking as a habit? "Trust," you answer. Yes, quite so, trust in a man's honor. Men who speak the truth always, without any exception, are men who are to be trusted.

But why is it that some men are not considered to be exactly dishonorable, as men who have lost their honor; and yet, on the other hand, when they are mentioned it is felt that they could not be *quite* altogether trusted?

"Oh," you add, "it means that they do not always tell the *exact* truth; that they try to get around it; that

they equivocate." Would it imply that they had the habit of telling lies? "Not quite that," you answer, "it would be not telling the whole plain truth."

How is it that one can equivocate, without necessarily telling a downright lie? "That is easy enough," you answer, "one can leave out part of what is true, or change the impression of what one is saying by a look on the face; or one can use words in one way when one knows that others do not understand them quite in the way one is using them."

And what do you call that? "Equivocation?" Yes, and what kind of a lie do we sometimes term it? "A white lie," you say.

Have you any idea how such a name ever arose? "Well, for instance," you tell me, "it may have come about because people would try to deceive and yet, as it were, whiten over what they were telling, so that it would not be altogether a lie."

As a rule, how do you suppose that people who have fallen into the habit of telling downright lies of the blackest kind, began the habit? "Oh, probably by equivocating or telling what we call white lies."

You mean that this would make it easier by and by for a man to get into the habit of telling any kind of a lie whatever? "Yes, surely," you answer.

But which habit would you say was the easier to acquire; the habit of telling lies, or the habit of telling the truth? "It depends on circumstances," you tell me; "if a man is living with other people who are given to telling lies, it will be easier for him to fall into the same habit." Then lying is contagious, is it, like diseases? "Yes," you smile.

Now turn to the other side, the habit of speaking the truth. What would be the surest way of acquiring that habit, can you suggest? "One way, for instance, would be," you assure me, "by avoiding white lies, by taking care not to equivocate, by keeping to the strict or exact truth all the time."

By the way, what kind of men are usually the most esteemed, would you say, as a rule, the world over?

"Oh, the men who have power, or a good deal of money," you answer. Do you really mean that? I ask. I spoke of *esteem*, you notice.

"Well," you tell me, "it may be that such men are not exactly 'esteemed' most highly, altho they are admired and talked about a great deal." Does it always follow that a man of wealth is a man of honor, for example?

"No," you admit, "it may sometimes be quite the contrary."

Then really what class of men do we most esteem, the men of wealth just for the sake of their wealth, or the men of honor? You assure me, "when it comes to *esteem*, we esteem the men of honor."

Yes, that is true. Many a man has said that he was willing to let his wealth go, become poor, see all his money pass out of his hands, if only he could keep his honor.

And what did that mean? "Why," you tell me, "it would imply that he wanted to feel that people still could trust him just the same, so that people would be sure that he always was a man of his word and spoke the truth."

By the way, when a man tells his first lie, how does he probably look in his face. "He may blush, or show a sense of shame," you suggest. Yes, I believe that is true.

And why? I ask you. "Oh, because he would feel so mean." Again, let me ask you: Which do you suppose is the worse of two forms of crime; to lie, or to steal? Have you ever thought of that? "Why," you answer, "perhaps to steal would be worse, because one may get punished and be put into prison if one steals."

Yes, that is true. And yet how do you account for this saying I have met with from a famous man:

"No crime is more infamous than the violation of truth." Was he mistaken, do you suppose?

"Not necessarily," you confess. Why not? I ask. "Oh," you suggest, "a lie may seem all the worse just because it is not punished *as a crime*."



I am not sure but that a wrong such as lying is worse than stealing. They are both awfully bad. Do you think, for instance, that the men who are in prison for stealing, were guilty of that sort of a crime before they had ever told lies?

"Probably not," you fancy. You mean, do you, that they began first by telling lies, and that lying led to stealing? "Yes," you say. Perhaps that is true. Somehow when a man tells a lie, it is just as if his honor went all to pieces, as if his character were all gone. No one feels sure of him about anything. We feel as if the next step for him *naturally*, would be to steal.

Has it ever happened, do you suppose, that a man has faced death rather than tell a lie? I can assure you there have been men who loved the truth so much, who have been so in the habit of speaking the truth, that rather than lie they have gone to their death.

I might tell you, for instance, of a man who at one time had expressed his views on certain religious subjects, asserting just what he believed; and when he had done so, he was threatened with the pain of death if he did not take it all back. He was afraid for a time and so wrote what he called a recantation, denying what he first said. And then he felt so ashamed, repented so bitterly, that he withdrew his recantation and came out once more asserting just what he believed. And they burned him at the stake. And do you know what he did? He held out his right hand with which he had signed that recantation and allowed that hand to burn off in the flame, in order to show his shame and repentance for the lie he had told. He wanted to feel that now at the end he had stood by the truth and was dying for what he believed to be true.

Have you ever thought how it is that sometimes we apply the truth not only to speaking, or to what one says, but to the kind of life a man leads. "Yes," you answer, "sometimes we talk of a man leading a true life or being a true man."

What do you suppose that means? Is it just the same as speaking the truth or always telling the truth?



"No," you say, "it is more than that; it would somehow imply that if a man had led that sort of a life, his conduct had been true as well as his language." Yes, but what would you understand by "true conduct"?

"Perhaps," you suggest, "it means where a man has kept the rules he has laid down for himself, 'been true to his conscience,' as one says."

You assume, then, do you, that there is a certain way in which one can be true to one's self besides always speaking the truth in what one says to others? You think that a man might be true to his word always, in what he said to others, so that people could believe him in whatever he told them; and yet that same man might fail to keep his own good resolutions. He might lose self-control, for example, and fall into the habit of showing anger when he had intended not to do so.

If a man were to act in that way, break his own good resolutions, lose his self-control, talk angrily, or eat too much, be a glutton, for instance, would such a man be what you would call a true man, even if he never told lies?

"No, not exactly," you admit. Why not? I ask. "Because," you explain, "he would not be true to himself, to his own resolutions, or true to his conscience." Then it looks, does it not, as if being true meant even more than always speaking the truth.

Listen to these words from a great poet:

"Truth is the strong thing. Let man's life be true."

What does this mean; mainly just speaking the truth at all times? "No," you answer, "it would imply also being true to one's conscience, not doing what one would be ashamed of doing."

You are right. Grand as it is for a man to have the habit of speaking the truth, it is even more grand and noble where a man makes his whole life true.

Do you suppose, however, that a man could have his life true, and yet not have the habit of speaking the truth? "No," you smile, "that would be out of the question."

Why? I ask. "Because," you assure me, "if he did not speak the truth, he would also not be true to himself, would not be true to his conscience. He would do what he would be ashamed of doing."

Yes, but anything more than that? If he failed to speak the truth, what else might follow? "Oh," you reply, "he would be pretty sure before long to be untrue to himself in other ways." How, for instance? "Why," you say, "he would be careless about keeping his resolutions in regard to his own conduct in other respects."

Yes, if a man does not have the habit of speaking the truth, the rest of his conduct is liable to be untrue also. He is pretty sure to lack self-control, and to "go to pieces," as we say, in all sorts of ways.

Suppose now we put this last point on the black-board. Write it down so that we shall see the words before our eyes. Put first the words, "Speaking the Truth," then underneath it, "Being True in One's Life." Opposite, as covering them both, write the words, "The Habit of Truth."

Do you see how in a certain way, the habit of truth may perhaps cover all the good habits we have talked about in this series of lessons?

#### Points of the Lesson.

I. That telling the truth at all times and under 'all circumstances comes pretty hard.

II. That we call the person who knowingly speaks what is not true, a liar.

III. That people who have a fine sense of honor would sooner be struck by a blow with the fist than to have this title "liar" attached to them.

IV. That a lie is a slur upon the honor of the man to whom the lie is told, as well as a reflection on the honor of the man who tells it.

V. That there are persons who may not tell downright lies at first, and yet in what they say, may not always tell the whole, plain truth. We call this, equivocation or a white lie.

VI. That people who are liars, usually have begun their fall by allowing themselves to acquire the habit of equivocating. The white lie at first usually leads to the black lie afterwards.

VII. That lying is contagious. Those who tell lies lead other people to reciprocate, and so foster the habit of lying among others.

VIII. That the men who stand in the highest *esteem* are usually the men who are the most true in their speech.

IX. That a lie seems all the worse as an evil act, because it may not be punished as a crime—as stealing is punished.

X. That being true means not merely always telling the truth to others, but also applies to the way one keeps one's resolutions or is true to one's self or to one's conscience.

XI. That the man who does not have the habit of "being true," is liable to "go to pieces" in all his conduct.

XII. That "being true" means being true in one's life. The man who in the highest sense is true to himself will be the man who is true to all the world.

### Memory Gem.

"Truth is the strong thing; let man's life be true."

—BROWNING.

### Lines Or Verses.

"Think truly, and thy thoughts  
Shall the world's hunger feed;  
Speak truly, and each word of thine  
Shall be a fruitful seed:  
Live truly, and thy life shall be  
A great and noble creed."

—BONAR.

FURTHER SUGGESTIONS TO THE TEACHER: In this lesson we should try and emphasize the habit of *speaking the truth* rather than dwell too much upon the habit of *telling lies*. Concerning the latter, the better way is to arouse in the mind a sense of disgust or a sense of horror for a *lie*, and leave that sense of disgust or horror to exert its own influence. It were better to move the young people by giving them pictures of true honor and of true men who have stood by the truth. So, too, in the same way one can *describe* equivocation and white lies. Speak of them with disgust or with horror. Make the young people understand what is meant by the half-lie. We can connect it in their minds with the downright lie. But all the while we should try to reach them on this side in an indirect way. It is a sad fact, but one we must face, that very few people always tell the truth. Do not go into the question as to whether a lie is ever justifiable. Questions of casuistry of that kind serve no purpose for

younger children. We shall accomplish more by arousing a sense of contempt for any kind of untruth. We could give a number of illustrations of brave men who have stood by the truth. It will be seen that we have kept this lesson distinct from the one on "Habits of Deception." Naturally they belong together as one theme. But while it may be exceedingly hard to eradicate any possible disposition to deception, we can implant in their minds a revulsion of feeling against the lie, and a sense of awe on their part for honor and truth. The last few paragraphs about "being true" have been inserted as a kind of climax to the series of studies concerning "Habits." While the chief emphasis in the lesson should be laid on *speaking* the truth, yet we might take the opportunity of using a few moments at the close, to dwell on the motto: Being True.









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
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